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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UN Draft on UNPROFOR Mandate Examined *[TANJUG]* 1

ALBANIA

Prosecution Completes Case Against Nano *[KOHA JONE 27 Mar]* 2
'Fiendish' Serbian Colonization Plan Viewed *[KOHA JONE 26 Mar]* 3
Possible Right-Wing Links to Royal Heir Viewed *[KOHA JONE 27 Mar]* 3
Independent Trade Union Holds Congress *[ALEANCA 24 Mar]* 4

BULGARIA

Berov Defends Cabinet Against Recent Attacks *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Videnov Supports Cabinet in Currency Crisis *[DUMA 23 Mar]* 5
Further Developments in Media Strike Reported *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Security Commission Chairman on FYROM Issues *[STANDART NEWS 22 Mar]* 6
Macedonian Nationalist Activity Analyzed *[24 CHASA 24 Mar]* 7
Radiation Levels Around Kozloduy Plant Normal *[DUMA 24 Mar]* 7

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus: Coalition Failed To Reach 'Compromise' *[Prague Radio]* 9
Officers Protest Communist Dominance in Army *[CESKY DENIK 26 Mar]* 9
Academy Discovers Possible Cure for AIDS *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 24 Mar]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Foreign Minister Kukan Views Priorities *[SMENA 24 Mar]* 12
Daily Publishes Text of Coalition Agreement *[SME 23 Mar]* 14
Meciar on Future of HZDS, Personal Plans *[Bratislava Radio]* 16
Government To Strive for IMF Standby Loan *[Bratislava TV]* 17
Filkus Views Trade With Czech Republic *[DENNI TELEGRAF 24 Mar]* 18
ΩAlleged Flaw in Restitution Law *[MOSTY 22 Feb]* 19

HUNGARY

Goncz Interviewed Before Visit to Poland *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 28 Mar]* 21
MDF Deputy on Party's Foreign Policy Line *[Budapest Radio]* 22
SZDSZ Policy Emphasizes Economic Cooperation *[MAGYAR NEMZET 26 Mar]* 23
Poll on Leaders' Popularity Published *[NEPSZABADSAG 28 Mar]* 24

POLAND

Further Reportage on Dariusz Rosati Candidacy 25
Daily Views Coalition-President Rift *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 26-27 Mar]* 25
Sejm Speaker Oleksy Comments *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 28 Mar]* 26
Kwasniewski Not Withdrawing Candidacy *[Warsaw TV]* 27
Conservative Party on Rejection *[Warsaw Radio]* 28
Rosati Intends To Withdraw Candidacy *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Mar]* 28
New Nominee for Finance Post *[PAP]* 29

Poll: Majority Say Walesa Actions Weaken State *[PAP]* 29
Daily Views Possible Support for Walesa *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Mar]* 29
Pawlak, Olechowski on Talks With Goncz *[Warsaw TV]* 30
Regional Cooperation Discussed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Mar]* 31
Only UN Bans Apply in Trade With Burma *[Warsaw Radio]* 31
SdRP's Kwasniewski on Reforms, PSL Rapport *[Warsaw TV]* 31
Privatization Minister on Foreign Investment *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Mar]* 33

ROMANIA

Military Cooperation Accord Signed With Russia *[Bucharest Radio]* 36
'Crisis' Within Intelligence Service Examined *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 25 Mar]* 36
Survey Places Iliescu Third in Popularity *[Bucharest Radio]* 37
Decrease in Support Explained *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 24 Mar]* 37

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Silajdzic Addresses Assembly on Agreements *[Sarajevo Radio]* 39
Croats Refuse To Enter Sarajevo Assembly Hall *[TANJUG]* 41
Constitution To Be Approved *[Zagreb Radio]* 41
Bihac Deputies Support Federation Constitution *[Sarajevo Radio]* 41
Karadzic: FRY, Greek Troops Should Be Deployed *[POLITIKA 28 Mar]* 41
Serb Congress Rejects Karadzic's 'Fascism' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 42
Leader Comments on Congress *[Sarajevo Radio]* 43
Rift in Liberal Bosniak Organization Explained *[Sarajevo Radio]* 43
Krajisnik Alleges UNPROFOR Bias *[TANJUG]* 44
Muslims, Croats Step Up Attacks on Serbs *[TANJUG]* 44
Serb Artillery Attacks on Gorazde Renewed *[Sarajevo Radio]* 44
Relief Supplies Cut Off *[Sarajevo Radio]* 45
UNHCR Suspends 'Vital' Aid Route *[AFP]* 45

CROATIA

Granic Addresses Chamber on Washington Accords *[Zagreb Radio]* 46
Delegation Leader Comments on Sarajevo Talks *[Zagreb Radio]* 46
Serb-Croat Talks Resume in Zagreb *[Zagreb Radio]* 47
Mediator 'Optimistic' on Truce *[AFP]* 47
Martic Letter Protests Croatian 'State Terror' *[TANJUG]* 47
Tudjman Apologizes to Jewish Community *[Zagreb TV]* 48

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Foreign Minister on Cooperation With Bulgaria *[MILS-NEWS 28 Mar]* 49
Commentary Views Regional Security Issues *[PULS 25 Mar]* 49

SLOVENIA

Defense Minister Jansa Impeached; Kacin Appointed *[Ljubljana Radio]* 51
LDS Leader on Jansa Removal *[Ljubljana Radio]* 51
Social Democrats Leave Coalition *[Ljubljana Radio]* 51
Christian Democrats Respond *[Ljubljana Radio]* 51
10,000 Rally in Support of Jansa *[TANJUG]* 51
Background of 'Crisis' *[TANJUG]* 51
Commentary on Developments *[SLOVENEC 25 Mar]* 52
Claes To Support EU Associate Membership *[Ljubljana Radio]* 52
French Official Visits, Promises Support *[Ljubljana Radio]* 53

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Libyan Special Envoy Makes Official Visit 54
Meets With Jovanovic *[TANJUG]* 54
Meets With Minister Unkovic *[TANJUG]* 54
Jovanovic: Embargo 'Major Obstacle to Peace' *[Paris LE MONDE 29 Mar]* 54
Army Chief Stresses Military Modernization *[TANJUG]* 55

Serbia

Milosevic Meets With Libyan Special Envoy *[Tripoli TV]* 55

Kosovo

Rugova Comments on Prospects for Talks *[RILINDJA 27 Mar]* 56
Serbian Police Confiscate Reporters' Notes *[Tirana TV]* 57

UN Draft on UNPROFOR Mandate Examined

LD2903124194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1216 GMT 29 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, March 29 (TANJUG)—The first draft resolution on renewing the mandate of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which expires on March 31, grants only two of the numerous demands made by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman—it renews UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional six months (instead of the one year recommended by Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali) and extends air support for UNPROFOR to include the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.).

The first draft, a copy of which was submitted to TANJUG on Monday, retains the insistence on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina contained in Resolution 871 which renewed UNPROFOR's mandate six months ago, but leaves out the provision which calls for placing under Croatian authority the disputed 'pink zones' border areas between the R.S.K and Croatia.

The draft also drops the original insistence on the integration of the U.N.-protected R.S.K. into Croatia, and instead calls for a generally acceptable negotiated solution.

The R.S.K. has been proclaimed by the local Serbs in their ancestral lands within Croatia's communist-era arbitrary borders in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former federation and trampling on the local Serbs' rights.

The territory was placed under U.N. protection in the spring of 1992 in order to end fighting between the Croatian Army and Krajina Serbs. The step has, however, failed to deter Croatia from launching four offensives against the R.S.K. since, in an effort to enforce its rule there.

The draft also drops all reference to a demilitarisation of the U.N.-protected areas. Butrus-Ghali, reporting to the Security Council, pointed out difficulties inherent in such a demilitarisation, in view of Croatia's four offensives against the territory, and explained that UNPROFOR was unable to protect the Serb civilians.

The draft resolution retains the controversial provision that a full normalisation of relations between the international community and the parties concerned would depend on their cooperation in the application of a peace plan and the relevant Security Council resolutions. This provision has been interpreted in various ways, with individual Security Council members insisting it means pegging the Krajina problem to sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro).

The U.N. Security Council clamped sanctions on Yugoslavia in late May 1992 for the country's alleged aggression on neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, where in actual fact civil war has been raging for the past two years among the local Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

The draft insists on a need for normalising communications and reopening the Adriatic oil pipeline, but makes no further reference to the Zagreb-Split railway or the reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, which is at present open only to U.N. troops.

The first draft ignores Tudjman's demands for placing Udbina Airport and the Dzeletovci oilfield in eastern slavonija, R.S.K., under UNPROFOR control, for deploying foreign monitors along Croatia's 'internationally recognised' borders, and for posting international border guards along the R.S.K. borders.

Although the haggling that follows is certain to be fierce before a final text is put to the vote on Thursday, it is already clear that Tudjman has been given far less than he had hoped for, at least in the first draw.

The part of the resolution that relates to Bosnia-Herzegovina upholds the Bosnia peace process and the efforts to reopen Tuzla Airport for humanitarian needs.

Bosnian Serbs have agreed to permit the reopening of the airport in that Moslem-held northeastern Bosnian town, on condition that Russian observers and Serb control be deployed there to safeguard against the Moslems using the airport as a conduit for arms and other military materiel.

The latest draft endorses Butrus-Ghali's recent request for an additional 8,250 troops, monitors and civilian assistants to reinforce UNPROFOR, and instructs that the necessary funds should be mustered for the purpose.

Prosecution Completes Case Against Nano

AU2803155894 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 27 Mar 94 p 2

[I. Keko report: "Prosecution Calls for 14 Years Imprisonment for Fatos Nano"]

[Text] Including interruptions, the Nano trial has now lasted for three weeks since its start on 5 March. Tirana District Court, surrounded by police for every session, has called a record number of witnesses and has attracted the interest of the entire press. It must be said that the trial was held for practical reasons in two buildings, in the old courtroom on Kavaje Street and in the former building of the Energy Directorate. Despite the changes in both the location and the accusations, Prosecutors Qeleshi and Gjokutaj did not deviate from the goal for which they had joined forces: the conviction of Socialist leader Fatos Nano. The Nano trial is inevitably the trial of the year. Neither the protests of the European Parliament nor the noise of the Socialist Party and its electorate have influenced the trial. Rumors of a rebellion of the electorate on the eve of the trial were successfully quashed by the people's police, and the Democratic Party's propaganda did the same for the Socialist Party's propaganda. The Democratic side will no doubt consider the end of the trial a new victory over the old communist nomenklatura, because this is the language that has been used against Nano. In itself, the Nano trial is an episode in a prolonged series of trials of the former nomenklatura, to continue with the trials of Ramiz Alia, Hekuran Isai, and others.

Thus, the prosecution at the Nano trial finally summed up its case at yesterday's session of Tirana District Court before the bench presided over by Agim Bendo. Prosecutor Qeleshi read out the 27-page file and in conclusion presented his demands.

The prosecution demanded: "A verdict of guilty against the defendant Fatos Nano for the crime of appropriating state property and abusing his office for the benefit of other persons to the amount of 73,780,000 leks, and his sentencing on the basis of Article 62 of the Penal Code to 13 years imprisonment; also a verdict of guilty against the defendant Fatos Nano for the crime of falsifying official documents and his sentencing on the basis of Article 110 of the Penal Code to three years imprisonment. "A verdict of guilty against the defendant Sokrat Plaka for the crime of abuse of office leading to damages incurred by the state amounting to 73,780,000 leks and his sentencing on the basis of Article 106 of the Penal Code to five years imprisonment.

"A verdict of guilty against the defendent Robert Gjini for the crime of abuse of office leading to damages incurred by the state amounting to 399,390 leks and his sentencing on the basis of Article 106 of the Penal Code to four years imprisonment.

"A verdict of guilty against the defendant Hasan Hallko for the crime of abuse of office leading to damages incurred by the state amounting to 144,821 leks and his sentencing on the basis of Article 106 of the Penal Code to two years imprisonment.

"The prosecution also demands that the defendants be held liable to pay to the Albanian State Bank the sums over which they have been accused, under Article 155 of the Code of Penal Procedure."

After the prosecutors' summing up, the lawyers of Nano, Plaka, Gjini, and Hallko asked for time for their clients' defense.

Lawyer Perparim Sanxhaku asked for 20 days to defend Fatos Nano; Lawyer Ali Meta asked for nine days to defend Sokrat Plaka; lawyer Fatmir Braka left the time necessary to defend Hasan Hallko to the court's discretion, but asked for a sufficient period; and lawyer Roland Permeti requested nine days to defend Robert Gjini.

In conclusion, the court decided to invite the defense counsel to make their presentations in their clients' favor on 30 March 1994. Thus ended the session, which began at 1210 and ended at 1305. After it ended, we turned to Prosecutor Genc Gjokutaj, who said that the prosecution's summing up was a synthesis of the evidence obtained throughout the judicial investigation and during the trial, which proved the charges. The severity of the punishment is in total proportion to the importance of the accused and the seriousness of their activities. The very serious consequences arising from the defendants' criminal activities must be taken into consideration.

Asked whether the prosecution would triumph over the defense, Gjokutaj said:

"We do not envy the defense. We are men of the law and are convinced of the justice of what we have argued. What the court decides is the court's business."

Mr. Nano's lawyer, Perparim Sanxhaku, made no press statement after Prosecutor Qeleshi's summing up. He said that he reserved the right to speak after the defense summing up, which Bendo has decided will take place at 0900 on 30 March. It is not known what Mr. Sanxhaku hopes for from this session or whether the bench will reduce or increase the sentence requested for Nano. The latter is highly probable, if one remembers the precedent of the journalists' trial.

In connection with the defense summing up on 30 March, it has been learned that Fatos Nano has finally stated that he will defend himself, but will he bring evidence to show his innocence? From what has been seen in the trial so far, Nano has not wished to enter into the details of the accusation, and this leads one to think that his speech will deal more with the trial's political ramifications than with its legal details.

'Fiendish' Serbian Colonization Plan Viewed

AU2803165394 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 26 Mar 94 p 3

[B. Prespa article: "Do the Serbs Have the Money To Colonize Kosova?"]

[Text] Recent reports from Kosova mention new Serbian plans to colonize this part of former Yugoslavia. Various figures have been tossed out to the media, testifying to a fiendish policy in Belgrade to depopulate Kosova by expelling the Kosovars over the border. Fear of a Kosovar exodus is present in Albania, especially in areas bordering the former Yugoslavia. Asked about the danger of war, the Albanian authorities mention as one of the consequences a mass exodus of Albanians from Kosova toward their kin-state. Nevertheless, it seems that the Serbs want to accomplish their plans without the help of weapons, as in Bosnia, but with the aid of money. ATA reported a few days ago that Belgrade had placed an additional 400 million German marks [DM] at the disposal of Kosova colonists, with more to come. In the last four years, 120,000 Albanians have been dismissed from their jobs and about 300,000 have been forced to leave Kosova. These are alarming figures when one remembers that the population of Kosova is no more than 2.5 million Albanians or 400,000 families. A simple calculation shows that every family has been affected by exile or job dismissals.

During the existence of the former Yugoslavia, colonists were brought to Kosova mainly from Croatia, Slovenia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, after the destruction of the Yugoslav community, Serbia's scope for activity has significantly narrowed and the colonists that can be cajoled into moving to Kosova are no doubt Serbs and Montenegrins. It is thought that Belgrade intends to bring 600,000 Serbs to Albanian-populated territories to change the population's ethnic structure. About 23 years ago, the Serbs forced the Kosovars to abandon their country and it is well known that hundreds of thousands of Albanians emigrated to Turkey under duress. As in the case of Bosnia, the Serbs consider the Albanians of Kosova as Muslims first and Albanians second. Nevertheless, their common nationality and language shared with the 3 million Albanians of Albania cannot be denied. Under the circumstances of the economic crisis that has engulfed the former Yugoslavia, where you need a suitcase full of dinars to buy a loaf of bread, it is astonishing to see mention of such astronomical sums, which could far better be invested in the development of Kosova. It seems that the Serbs invest for one thing alone: a Kosova without Kosovars. This would be the investment of the century, an investment to be used as an argument against anybody with any claims to Kosova and the 2 million Albanians living there.

If Tirana is also aware of such figures, the Albanian Government must protest to all the international organizations, because the depopulation of Kosova would have immediate consequences for Albania. It is easy to imagine what would happen if hundreds of thousands of Kosovars were to enter Albania, forcibly expelled by Belgrade. The effects of such a policy, if it were to be tolerated, would be felt by every Albanian family from north to south, because every Albanian family would have to shelter an Albanian from Kosova. The time has come for government propaganda to sensitize the international public. Solely through the speculations of a few itinerant journalists, Belgrade has accused Tirana of militarily preparing the Kosovars for war, while remaining silent over the DM400 million and other figures. Tirana cannot accept a Kosova without Kosovars if it thinks even for a moment about Kosova and the Albanians living there and if it thinks for a moment about an Albania different from the one we have today.

Possible Right-Wing Links to Royal Heir Viewed

AU2803165194 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 27 Mar 94 p 3

[Andi Bejtja article: "Right-Wing Albanian Nationalists Under the Royal Wing"]

[Text] The departure last October from the Democratic Party [PD] of Deputies Baleta and Kalakula simultaneously marked the start of efforts to start a home-grown right wing, which the blue color adopted by the PD three years ago would suit more than any other group. It seems that these two deputies are at the same time working to form a typically right-wing party and a coalition of right-wing forces, which may be the largest coalition in the next elections. The party for which Baleta and Kalakula are working has its natural roots in the National Front [Balli Kombetar], in Legality, and in the Property With Justice Association. Because the total restitution of property lies at the foundation of its program, it would be natural for this still unregistered party to form a coalition with the Republican Party, whose chairman did not hestitate to take part in a meeting in Shkoder with the "PD's right-wing outcasts," although he has still not publicly repudiated the old distinctly fading Republican-Social Democrat-PD coalition. An increasing rapprochement is also noticeable with the Cameria Association and the Association of Former Victims of Political Persecution, with whose representatives the two deputies meet, it seems, not merely to drink coffee. This is shown by the recent visit to Johannesburg by the right-wing deputies and Kurt Kola, chairman of the Association of the Former Victims of Persecution.

But what is the right launching on the Albanian political market? Parliamentary deputy and former Agriculture Minister Kalakula said in an interview published in ALEANCA: "We are for the immediate and unconditional restoration of all property to its legitimate owners.

"We are for the privatization of enterprises, especially in agriculture, forestry, construction, the textile industry, the food-processing industry, tourism, etc.

"We wish to establish new criteria for privatization, substantially favoring former owners, victims of political persecution, and employees, who will be given priority in the granting of small and medium enterprises on delayed repayment terms.

"It is not only the proprietors that have been left disappointed," Kalakula continued in his interview. So have the hundreds of thousands of former victims of persecution, who in fact also include the proprietors, who have also received nothing of what belonged to them. These too were promised "vouchers." There are also hundreds and thousands of unemployed workers and intellectuals on welfare. The people's strongest anticommunist hopes lie here." [no opening quotation mark as published] It is precisely among these strata that the Albanian right hopes to gain support. "I want to stress that these people are watching me, not as an individual, but because of the position that I uphold, which it seems to me reflects their aspirations."

Moreover, the right has come out clearly in favor of a nationalist policy, which is the ideological rallying point of the parties with whom they wish to form a coalition. Nevertheless, it must be said that this still undeclared right-wing front needs to create a single center that will have the strength and credibility to attract the fringe, which is often still within the PD's orbit. It seems that the two deputies are not strong enough to do this, and one of them cannot enjoy the total confidence of this home-grown right for the simple reason that he was once Hoxha's representative in the glass palace of the United Nations. In this resepct, the weightiest and most suitable figure, even though he does not speak good Albanian, remains Leka Zogu, whose political baggage contains nothing but the successes and failures of his father Ahmet [King Zog]. The fact that the heir to the royal throne himself is making overtures to the right is shown by the invitation to visit South Africa that Leka extended to its representatives. This also explains the current Albanian authorities' fear of allowing him to enter Albania. Thus, the heir to the throne, if he is allowed into Albania, may also be carrying the little banner of the Albanian right as well as the great flag of the monarch of the ethnic territories. This may be the aim of the home-grown Albanian right: to grow strong under the royal wing.

Independent Trade Union Holds Congress

AU2803171394 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 24 Mar 94 p 5

[Skender Minxhozi report: "Independent Trade Unions Congress: Explosion Averted"]

[Text] While the Albanian state was celebrating the second anniversary of the Democratic Party [PD] coming to power on 22 March, the Union of Independent Trade Union [BSPSh], one of the country's two largest trade unions, was holding its first congress in the Palace of Congresses in Tirana. These 48 hours, expected to be a difficult test for the current BSPSh leadership headed by Valer Xheka, ended without any dispute among the fractions that have recently arisen within the trade union. Chairman Xheka confirmed his dominance by receiving 90 percent of the delegates' votes in the elections at the end of the congress. It might be said that what was expected to be the congress of the great split ended with the triumph of the present leaders, who will continue to hold their positions at the head of the first anticommunist trade union for four more years. In fact, the neutralization of the fractionist group of Valer Lubonja and Imir Kamba, the latter a cousin of PD Secretary Tritan Shehu, was evident on the eve of the congress, when their names were absent from all the lists of the presidiums that were to chair the plenary sessions. Their vilification as "separatists," "Red whippersnappers," and "gangsters" in the general report delivered by BSPSh Secretary Vilson Qendro, which provoked a positive reaction from the audience, then sealed the fate of the "rebels," whom various sources claim to have decided to create another trade union. In this case, we would have a reprise of the secession of such names as Gezim Kalaja and Sami Karriqi, who formed the autonomous miners' union.

The BSPSh's first congress once again underlined the current crisis of relations between this trade union and the state of Berisha, despite their one-time alliance in the struggle against communism. The end of this alliance became explicit at this congress and was justified by the trade union's need to continue its struggle to defend the workers' interests. "Becoming the tool of parties means death for a trade union," Vilson Qendro declared. He later accused the franctionists precisely of being manipulated by "certain political forces," without naming them. Vilson Qendro set out the demands on which the BSPSh will base its strategy in the coming years. These include stemming the hemorrhage of lay-offs, the linking of wages to the index of inflation, pension increases, and a social policy from today's state. Mr. Qendro criticized the government's indifference and arrogance in excluding the trade union from making decisions that involve social consequences for the population, and in not seeing fit to negotiate a number of parliamentary bills with trade union representatives. He went on to say that the Strike Law is in fact an anti-strike law. The tone of the speeches at the congress and the harsh criticisms addressed toward the Meksi government might indicate a reawakening of the BSPSh, which has so far been considered a body approving the Meksi cabinet's economic platform and reforms.

President Berisha, in his speech of greeting at the start of the first day's proceedings, openly stated that he had followed developments within the BSPSh, wishing to convey the idea that he continues to have total control over the trade union that brought him to power. High-flown and euphoric, the Albanian president said that he would act as a mediator between the trade unionists and the government and that he considered the trade union's demands to be fair, while he of course also expressed satisfaction at the phrase in the report expressing support for the reforms of the PD's state. He speech was an official permit for Xheka to continue on his path for four more years after this congress, which is time enough to settle in....

Berov Defends Cabinet Against Recent Attacks

AU2503125794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0600 GMT 25 Mar 94

[Report by Kalina Stancheva on a statement by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov on domestic issues for Bulgarian Radio, Television, and BTA; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Prime Minister Lyuben Berov has made a statement for Bulgarian National Radio, Television, and BTA on topical domestic problems. The "Khorizont" program will transmit the statement later, but here is a summary by our reporter Kalina Stancheva:

[Stancheva] The prime minister has the impression that a new campaign to topple the government has begun. In his statement he disclosed the composite elements of the campaign and offered his explanation as to why the action was starting just at this moment. The first reason, he said, was that the two trade union confederations had reached a common position regarding their property. Prime Minister Berov said that the deadline of 1 September can be kept without any ultimatum. A furor is being raised at this juncture because one of the two trade union leaders is having difficulties with his membership. According to Berov, the problem will be resolved before the end of August. Professor Berov described as a gross falsehood [Podkrepa leader] Trenchev's allegation that secret talks were being held with the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] on replacing individual members of the cabinet and striking political bargains.

The second groundless accusation was that the Council of Ministers is neglecting to provide bread for the people, the prime minister said. He said that the ban on the export of grain will remain in force until the new harvest is brought in. Because of the threatened shortage of vegetable oil, we have increased the export duty on sunflower seed and their products, he said.

Prof. Berov that the government was further accused of supplying water without charge to Turkey, but in fact Turkey is paying three times the price paid by Bulgarian consumers.

The prime minister further said he could not understand why the trade unions had come out against the mass privatization. Furthermore, Dr. Kurtev [chief secretary of National Coordinating Council of Union of Democratic Forces] has accused the government of attempts to introduce a state of emergency. The prime minister said that at 1200 on Friday 1 April he will give a news conference, to which—and here I quote Prof. Berov's words—I invite Dr. Trenchev, bringing with him the damning tape recording that he claims to have in his possession. In addition, I invite Mr. Kurtev, Mrs. Mozer [leader of Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], and Mr. Spasov to attend, bringing with them the list of villages in which they claim recommunization is being carried out in the liquidation councils.

The prime minister offered the following explanation why political groupings of various colors were mounting their attack against his cabinet at this moment: It is because the cabinet is determined to fulfill in a responsible way its program for mass privatization, as well as agrarian reform, and to wage a determined campaign against economic crime.

Videnov Supports Cabinet in Currency Crisis

AU2803175794 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Mar 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, by Dora Chichkova in Sofia on 22 March: "Attack on Lev Has Been Mounted by Foreign Currency Speculators"]

[Text] Zhan Videnov celebrated his 35th birthday on 22 March. He spent his birthday attending a four-hour session of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Executive Bureau and having two-hour meetings with Professor Todor Vulchev, Bulgarian National Bank [BNB] governor, and Deputy Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev, and then found time to give an interview to DUMA before setting off to his next working meeting.

[Chichkova] Is the BSP leadership worried by the state of the foreign exchange market, and how is it planning to react?

[Videnov] We are seriously concerned about the lev's weakness. There are no objective reasons for the market to have passed the barrier of 50 leva to the dollar. The people and business circles have real fears connected with the forthcoming taxation reform, the price rises for energy and postal and communication services, and certain difficulties arising in the foreign debt negotiations. However, all these fears have been deliberately played upon to create a psychosis and to enable dishonest people to reap financial and political dividends. This can only be countered in one way—by coordinated efforts on the part of the BNB and Council of Ministers, assisted by parliament, to create an atmosphere of security, clarity, and greater confidence in the institutions.

[Chichkova] Which circles have exploited the situation?

[Videnov] I am certain that the attack on the lev was specially mounted by foreign currency speculators. They have already gained hundreds of millions in profits. The worst thing is that some circles want this situation to continue, not simply to obtain fresh profits, but also to cause hyperinflation. The people who want this are banks that hold considerable amounts of bad debts, holders of large amounts of foreign currency (mostly in foreign bank accounts), and middlemen who have "blocked" the sale of the large state enterprises so that they can buy them for a song. And last but not least, there are political circles in Bulgaria and abroad that for months have been trying to destabilize the country. Everyone knows who they are.

[Chichkova] Nevertheless, is there a risk of hyperinflation?

[Videnov] Hyperinflation can only be provoked artificially. Neither the budget, the policies of the BNB, and the taxation system, nor the realities of the domestic economy provide preconditions for this. The measures that the Council of Ministers and the BNB should take are well known; I refer to strong foreign exchange controls, collecting the budget revenue to the last stotinka, closely monitoring prices and providing timely compensation for the incomes of the weakest social groups, and adopting a much tougher approach in the foreign debt negotiations. At a series of meetings that I have had these last few days with Ministers Georgi Tanev, Stoyan Aleksandrov, Valentin Karabashev, and Evgeni Matinchev and with BNB Governor Todor Vulchev, I think that we have reached agreement on what measures are needed.

[Chichkova] Is a cabinet crisis possible?

[Videnov] It can only be caused by factors outside the government, especially by irresponsible domestic and foreign politicians. Some of them want to cover over the traces of their deals in 1992, while others want to make up for their lack of action in 1993. The best thing now is to support the Council of Ministers and the BNB and not allow the sabotage plotted against them to succeed.

[Chichkova] What do you think about the insinuations that the country's salvation lies in a new cabinet, and a caretaker cabinet at that?

[Videnov] This is utterly ridiculous. The present parliament cannot produce a new government, and it would be a crime to restore the former cabinet. The only other solution is immediate elections, which would take us years back into the past. A caretaker government could only prepare for such elections. Anyone who thinks that this solution can save Bulgaria is an open enemy of the country.

Further Developments in Media Strike Reported

AU2803175994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Bulgarian dailies did not come out this morning and private radio stations interrupted their programs to protest the plan to impose an 18-percent valued added tax [VAT] on newspapers. [passage omitted]

At this afternoon's meeting the Governing Board of the Bulgarian Private Radio Stations Association decided to prolong the protest actions another 24 hours. Private radio stations will therefore not resume their programs until 0600 on 30 March.

The association applied for a meeting with Snezhana Botusharova, deputy chairman of the parliament, at which they will demand that VAT for commercials be abolished, this being the private radio stations' only source of income. Regardless of whether the meeting takes place or not, private radio stations are resolved to resume their broadcasts the morning of 30 March but to pursue their protest actions in other ways.

Our local correspondents and BTA are reporting that several local newspapers and local radio stations in Plovdiv, Vratsa, Sliven, Silistra, and other towns in the country have interrupted their publications and programs in solidarity with their colleagues.

At today's meeting the Secretariat of the Bulgarian Journalists Union once more confirmed its solidarity with the newspapers and radio stations on the strike against VAT.

In a letter to the parliamentary groups, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] also expressed support for the demands of the journalists on strike, insisting that the problem be resolved by 1 April 1994, when VAT comes into force.

Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov described the implemented threat of the newspapers to go on strike as a simple act of blackmail, as a method of winning compassion and [word indistinct]. Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov officially declared to journalists at the Council of Ministers that he is not against freedom of speech, that he has never prevented anyone one from writing whatever he wishes, but that he is in favor of everyone paying his taxes.

Security Commission Chairman on FYROM Issues

AU2803152894 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 22 Mar 94 p 6

[Article by Nikolay Slatinski, chairman of the National Assembly National Security Commission: "Bulgarian Foreign Policy Is Not Field of Infighting"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Bulgaria is following with great interest the events around Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The delay in recognizing Macedonia turned this country into a dangerous focus of tension. Bulgaria has no territorial claims vis-a-vis Macedonia. The claim regarding the existence of a "big" Macedonian minority in Bulgaria is absurd. For every normal person, the Macedonian Slavs in our country are Bulgarians. They share our past, language, culture, and blood. One century ago, the great powers coldly and without a drop of compassion cut a piece of living flesh from the body of the motherland. Today Bulgaria's first concern must be turning Macedonia into a state based on international law and separating it from the disintegrating Yugoslav space. By simultaneously recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1992, we provided valuable proof of our intention to conduct an independent policy and of our conviction that the countries in the region must have the same status and be

equal and sovereign if they abide by the UN laws and norms. The statehood and free choice of a people—this is the main and leading factor in international relations. When a country like Croatia, for example, is recognized, this is done without any qualifications as to what part of the population is recognized. The statehood of the entire nation is being recognized, regardless of the people's ethnic origin or the manner in which they themselves determine their self-awareness. This is an internal issue of the country and its people and the personal right to choice of every citizen. Refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of any state, Bulgaria decisively opposes every attempt to distort our history and every attempt against our national memory and ancient values on which our value system is based. Unfortunately, the statements of the Macedonian leaders now contain precisely such attempts. To this we could add the existence of certain articles in the Macedonian Constitution to which we object, and the frequent cases of anti-Bulgarian campaign in the Macedonian mass media. Thus, the coincidence of positions with Greece on certain issues is hardly an accident. It is a consequence of common concerns and interests. Nevertheless, Bulgaria does not undertake unilateral actions, such as the sanctions Greece imposed on Macedonia. We are led by the principle of trying to understand a position even when you do not share it. Now we are convinced that the sanctions by no means facilitate abating tension in the region and contradict our principle of good-neighborly relations. Greece's remark that its act does not represent a precedent (tacitly addressed at the United States) is a weak consolation.

Bulgaria strictly observes its commitments and will not retreat from the firm position of noninterference in the Yugocrisis. This is a clearly declared intention which today enjoys the support not only of the political forces but also of all Bulgarian people. However, I ask myself—who could guarantee that, at a negative development of the events in the Balkan, a radically exacerbated situation, and direct threats of Bulgaria's national security and interests, Bulgaria will remain a passive observer?

One cannot make attempts against Macedonia, Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian population and demand that we remain passive and indifferent.

Bulgarian foreign policy is not a field of infighting, improvising, and behind-the-scene deals. Dispute everything, history always sentenced our politicians justly. At this crucial time, the cost of their decisions and choices is exceptionally high. Perhaps higher than ever before.

Macedonian Nationalist Activity Analyzed

AU2803171094 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 24 Mar 94 p 5

[Staff report: "Extremists Join Ilinden United Macedonian Organization"]

[Text] On 23 March it became clear that activists of the Union for the Prosperity of Pirin Macedonia [SPPM] have joined the illegal Ilinden United Macedonian Organization [OMO].

The SPPM secretly decided in Blagoevgrad to dissolve itself and join the OMO, where it "could be more useful" in the struggle for the autonomy of Pirin Macedonia. SPPM leader Alan Andonov had already resigned.

The SPPM has about 1,500 members and its ideas are similar to those of the OMO. However, its independent activity was aggravated by the investigation of the regional security service and attacks in the Bulgarian press.

The organization gained some prominence when the Russian nationalist Zhirinovskiy visited Sandanski. Then it became clear that Ossetian Alan Andonov was the commissary of the illegal "red units" in Bulgaria. They were established in Sandanski in 1992 to protect the interests of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and the struggle against U.S. imperialists and bourgeois ethics. However, later on relations between Andonov and Vladimir Spasov, chief of the BCP Central Committee, cooled, and the Ossetian now embraces the ideas of nationalism. The SPPM supported the recognition of Macedonian, Pomak, and Slav-Muslim minority rights in Bulgaria, in accordance with the program adopted at the end of September.

The scandalous news conference in Sofia of OMO Secretary Jordan Kostadinov galvanized the most right-wing elements in the Pirin region. The one-man organization, Slave Makedonski, considered until now the chairman and member of several organizations hitherto considered moderate, also joined the OMO. On 23 March his newspaper MAKEDONETS carried the illegal SKORNUVANE (AWAKENING) as a supplement. Its previous issue had been confiscated for its anti-Bulgarian propaganda.

The newspaper, written in a mixed Macedonian-Bulgarian dialect, points out that from 22 to 24 May militant nationalists intend to organize an international symposium of the "Macedonians of Pirin Macedonia." The Initiative Committee has reportedly invited emigrees from Australia, Germany, and Canada. They were supposed to come with their pockets full of money to finance the symposium. The delegates will visit Melnik and sample the famous wine made in this town.

Radiation Levels Around Kozloduy Plant Normal

AU2803151194 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Stoyan Sirakov]

[Text] The Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant will close down the oldest four generating units, which date from the time the plant was opened, in 2005. This was established by a commission of experts that completed a

comprehensive analysis of the nuclear power plant with a view to determining "the plant's effects on the surrounding and working environment and on the health of the population." New units will take at least 10-15 years to build, so the experts consider that their construction should start immediately.

The experts found that the incidence of lung, breast, and thyroid cancers is less than the national average. The scientists compared their figures with those for the Belene and Yambol districts as well as with the average indices. In the entire series of measurements carried out, they established no difference in the background gamma radiation levels before and after the nuclear power plant was commissioned. Measurements were taken throughout the period that the plant was in operation at 400 separate points in 46 centers of population. The experts found no significant deviations in natural and man-made radioactivity in the regions surrounding the nuclear power plant compared with other localities in Bulgaria. The waters of the Danube were found to contain no increased concentration of radionucleides resulting from fluid discharges from the nuclear power plant. The team of scientists confirmed that during the entire period that the plant had been in operation it had had no effect on environmental radiation. Specialists point out that the pollution from a 1,100-megawatt thermal power is 10 to 40 times higher than that from a 1,440-megawatt nuclear reactor.

Klaus: Coalition Failed To Reach 'Compromise'

LD2903121194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] The political committee of the Civic Democratic Party met in Prague today. The party chairman, Vaclav Klaus, told Czech radio about the meeting:

[Begin Klaus recording] Today's meeting discussed the outcome of the talks of the Coalition Four held yesterday and confirmed, more or less, our basic positions. As far as election laws are concerned, we have still not managed to reach a compromise, or what could be termed its essence. We repeat that our current positions on this issue are still valid. These positions have been voiced on many occasions, and, as far as this case is concerned, they happen to be identical with those contained in the government's proposal, which is already in parliament.

To pursue any further talks in this respect, our party's political committee has authorized the chairman to negotiate possible compromises with the coalition partners. That is one thing.

As for the other topics, a consultation on the next course of action to be taken with regard to Jewish property is to take place later today. Several of our ministers will attend. I think these are the main matters we are currently interested in. [end recording]

Officers Protest Communist Dominance in Army

AU2903084994 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 26 Mar 94 p 10

[Article by "jab": "Who Is Who and Who Was What?; Political Officers of the Previous Regime Are Being Heaved Into Top Army Positions"]

[Excerpts] General Vacek, former minister of defense, has remained loyal to the army even as a pensioner. To this day, he is moving without any restrictions in the highest military circles, and his former subordinates receive him loyally and cordially, with all honors. Whenever he visits an Army unit, he is met by the commander's adjutant and must sign the visitors' book, as though he were an officer in uniform. (This official duty and regulation does not apply to the civilian Vacek.)

Of course, the minister of defense cannot be everywhere. He should, however, make sure that key posts are held by people who recognize the basic military virtue—discipline—and who understand their service as one to their country and not to the former minister. Will it be the prime minister again who will himself have to set right all the potential Milovice and Ralsko affairs [sites of former Soviet military bases, the privatization of which had been sought by high-ranking officers of the former communist-controlled Czechoslovak Army]?

Although 82 financial desks (offices) have been established in the armed forces at a cost of some 200 million korunas, the financial officers of individual units have self-evidently retained their previous positions. The situation is reminiscent of that of the Culture Ministry's Theater Department, which, although it in practice no longer takes care of any theaters, employs the same (and, according to some reports, an even greater) number of people as it did in November 1989.

"We Do Not Have Other Experts"

Minister Baudys (we would like to take his side, were it not that so many results of the Army's transformation testify against him) keeps saying that "we do not have any other experts." Leaving aside the experts who have built for Baudys a laser firing range directly in his office, the chief occupation of the "Ministry of Defense and General Staff experts" is how to create jobs for their fellow warriors from the era of struggle against the imperialist threat, who would otherwise face redundancy. Whereas in the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, and even Sweden staff numbers in logistics are being cut as a result of computerization, in our country they are growing. Is the minister too busy?

And what about the much-touted operation against the number of drones who worked as political officers and against the maladies of our military past in general?

What Kind of Experts Do We Have?

Colonel Josef Bagin, former chief of Military Counterintelligence, today works at the head office of the Military Police.

Colonel Frantisek Dvorak, former chief of the Military Counterintelligence Inspection Office in Prague, is today chief of the Ministry of Defense Inspection Authority, which is also in charge of Military Defense Intelligence. He has built his military career on his friendship with Gen. Vacek, which constitutes, at the very least, the potential risk of information leaks.

Colonel Josef Dvorak, former chief of Military Counterintelligence in Tabor, can be found serving in Mlada Boleslav today.

General Klima, a participant in the Second Nationwide Congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (so much for nonparty members), is commander of the 2d Combined Aviation Corps in Hradec Kralove.

Colonel Burda (today commander of the Combined Transport Regiment in Pardubice) acquired fame when he declared, as late as 1990, that "the lessons from the crisis-ridden development [a hardline communist document on lessons to be learned from the "Prague Spring" of 1968] are and will always remain valid" for him.

Colonel Pavel Vesely, former chairman of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Committee at the Brno Military Academy, who is a friend of [chief of General Staff] General Nekvasil, is today commander of the Prerov air base. Lieutenant Colonel Reznak, formerly political officer of military unit 1,562, has found a safe haven in military unit 1,999 in Pardubice.

Experts With a Title Before and After the Name

Colonel Docent Engineer Frantisek Korinek, candidate of sciences, involved as a functionary in "Operation Wave" [planned by the communist regime to crack down on its critics], serves with a high rank at the Higher Military School of Ground Forces in Vyskov, where he is educating future experts.

Colonel Docent Engineer Frantisek Blaha, another functionary involved in "Operation Wave," heads the Department for Pedagogical Science at the Brno Military Academy. From other officers involved in "Operation Wave," we will also find there Lieutenant Docent F. Vizdal, Ph.D. and candidate of sciences.

Colonel Docent Zdenek Rozum, Ph.D., candidate of sciences, formerly a staffer at the Evening University of Marxism-Leninism, is now deputy departmental head at the Brno Military Academy. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, officers who refused to sign a resolution in support of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in November 1989, who were never members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who did not abet former political officers, and who have helped shed light on the Army's involvement in Operations "Wave" and "Intervention" [another operation against critics of the regime planned during the latter stages of the communist regime], are being harassed and liquidated "in the spirit" of the minister's Order 023 about interviews and ways of dealing with personnel issues. For example, Captain Kjucukov, from the Third Communications Battalion in Breclav, who helped a Ministry of Defense commission of inquiry decode General Petr's coded message number 4A, became victim to permanent harassment in service and, under psychological pressure from the commander of the engineering battalion, left for civilian life on 31 January 1994.

What Did Gen. Nekvasil Have To Say?

All the names cited above are from a letter that a group of officers from Olomouc addressed to the Defense and Security Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies this January.

How did Gen. Nekvasil, chief of the General Staff of the Czech Army, react?

On 1 March 1994 (speaking apparently on behalf of all officers who, like himself, underwent their military training and education toward subservience in the USSR), he declared: It is necessary to put an end to the inflammatory voices from Olomouc, which disrupt the working climate and lecture the General Staff on what to do in the Army.

What can one add to this? A group of officers from Olomouc had turned to their constitutional officials, which is, and should be, their right, guaranteed by the Constitution.

No One Takes Any Interest in the Contents of the Complaint

The solution resembles those that the Ministry of the Interior used to apply [in the 1950's], when some prisoner managed to smuggle out from a forced labor camp a letter with a complaint. The investigation, and, of course, the subsequent punishment concerned as a matter of principle the "illegal sending," while the contents of the complaint went unheeded.

The senders of the Olomouc letter are in for similar treatment today. The gray pigeons raised their eyebrows and told themselves that the buoyant heads who had written to the Defense and Security Affairs Committee must be cut down to size [sentence as published, apparently a literary allusion].

We do not have anything against members of the Defense and Security Affairs Committee, and we believe that its members are decent, educated people. Nonetheless, similar practices disrupt the trust of the citizens (and not only those who are conscripted) in their freely elected representatives. If a citizen is made to feel again and again that there is no right and no justice, the result is a devastating percentage of people who have no confidence in parliament. Naturally, this also means no confidence in the parliamentary system as such. Free criticism and control represent the foundations of democracy, as those who read [philosopher and first Czechoslovak President] T.G. Masaryk know. In U.S. Army barracks, you will find posters with the text: Blow the Whistle! [last three words published in English] What it means is: Blow the whistle and let it be known when you witness something in your service that you genuinely dislike. The text is usually followed by a list of all the things that give you the right to blow the whistle.

If some blowing of the whistle (for example, a letter to a congressman) were to be followed by harassment, those guilty of it would get into very serious trouble.

It may be possible that even competent and decent people could be found among the experts who graduated from Soviet military schools and who were members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. But how realistic is it to expect competence and decency from them, after the experience of the past 50 years?

Academy Discovers Possible Cure for AIDS

AU2803142994 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 24 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by "(aha)": "The Discovery of Czech Scientists May Help Cure AIDS"]

[Text] Prague—The discovery of a new group of chemical substances by scientists from the Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in the mid-1980's can essentially affect the development of medical drugs against AIDS. The new drugs, based on the substance developed by the

Czech scientists, affects diseases caused by the so-called DNA viruses, or retroviruses [retroviry], that appear in connection with immune deficiency, particularly in AIDS patients and patients who have undergone tissue transplants.

"The new preparation should solve, for example, the problem of shingles (an eye disease causing blindness), hepatitis, and even AIDS. It has an effect on viruses for which medical science has no drugs," Antonin Holy, from the Academy of Sciences said. Patients would take the drug once a week or at longer intervals.

The U.S. firm Gilead Sciences from California has obtained a license for utilizing the discovery of the Czech scientists and is attempting to manufacture the drug. In the United States, where the preparation is being tested on AIDS, experts say that it really affects the condition of people who suffer from full-blown AIDS. Clinical tests of all of the preparations are not yet completed.

Foreign Minister Kukan Views Priorities

*AU2803183694 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak
24 Mar 94 pp 1, 6*

[Interview with Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan by Boris Gandel; place and date not given: "So That They Do Not Beat Us for What Is Not Our Fault"]

[Text] *Following the recent appointment of the new government, the Slovak Republic already has its third foreign minister since its emergence. After Milan Knazko and Jozef Moravcik, the post of the head of Slovak diplomacy has been assumed by Eduard Kukan. He is a man with 30 years of diplomatic experience. He worked at several diplomatic missions abroad, most recently as Slovak ambassador to the United Nations. SMENA asked Kukan for an interview in connection with his appointment.*

[Gandel] Minister, what are the priority issues for Slovak foreign policy?

[Kukan] The highest priority in Slovak foreign policy continues to be integration into Europe, the gradual incorporation and assimilation into European political, economic, and security structures. That is the main task on which we must concentrate. At this time, another priority is the reinforcement of good relations with neighboring countries. It is the duty of every state to maintain good relations with all countries and with its neighbors, in particular. We do not choose them; they are here. If neighbors are interested in living in a good relationship and peace, they should both be interested in maintaining the quality of relations. I see yet another priority in the need to help the economic development of Slovakia. A functioning economy is the main task of our new society, and, in this respect, our foreign service should help solve the economic questions. An orientation is also necessary toward the image of Slovakia that—I do not wish to go into details—is not always the best. The reasons for this situation are rather complex, and our foreign policy wants to be more active in the direction of making this image—I do not want to say favorable, but perhaps objective, so that they do not beat us for what is not our fault. This roughly sums up my priorities.

[Gandel] How do you intend to implement them?

[Kukan] Regarding integration into Europe, we cannot wait. It is a truly urgent issue. We signed the association agreement with the European Union and want it to be ratified by all of the Twelve before the end of the year. I say Twelve because, if we do not manage to get it done before the end of the year, there might be not 12 but 16 of them, and it would take that much longer. Hence, we are interested in seeing this agreement go into effect. In this context, I would like to bring up the issue of the stability pact in Europe. This is a very topical issue, and I am convinced that the development will show the need for Slovakia to pay great attention to this issue.

Regarding relations with neighbors, I would like to emphasize that Slovakia is interested in the development of good relations with Hungary. We want to create an atmosphere that would be propitious for a dialogue—that is, a discourse between the two partners. Both partners must be willing to conduct it. It must be emphasized that it should be relaxed, composed, and free of emotions so that we can discuss how to solve the problems. I am convinced that such an atmosphere will eventually lead to results. The same applies to the relations with the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria, and Ukraine.

As far as the economic profile of our foreign policy goes, the question of the efficiency of cooperation with the Slovak Economics Ministry will have to be solved. At our embassies abroad, we also have employees of the Economics Ministry whose work is not always sufficiently specified. We will endeavor finally to find a conceptual solution to these questions so that their activity is oriented toward specific tasks that would help the Slovak economy.

[Gandel] You spoke about our relations, and, in this context, I would like to ask something. Your Budapest counterpart, Geza Jeszenszky, said on Hungarian Radio on its Sunday [20 September] program that the statements made by new Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik are encouraging, and he expressed the opinion that a historic Slovak-Hungarian settlement could now take place. How do you understand his pronouncement?

[Kukan] That is such a vocal, eloquent expression—a Slovak-Hungarian settlement. In my perception, it is more on the pragmatic level. I have no idea what Mr. Jeszenszky meant by Slovak-Hungarian settlement, but apparently it was the return of Slovak-Hungarian relations to a constructive plane without the extreme politicizing of some issues. I see it rather more realistically. Our new government is interested in dealing with and solving specific problems in relations with our neighbors. I would prefer a path of gradual steps, from simple to more complex ones, because I believe that some problems could be solved quickly without any real difficulties. That could bring us to further, more substantial issues. I repeat, this requires willingness and an accommodating attitude from both partners.

[Gandel] Which country do you believe you should visit first and why?

[Kukan] You know, I inherited the foreign affairs sector, and certain trips and foreign political activities have already been arranged. It is in the interest of my credibility that I comply with these obligations of the Slovak Republic. The first trip should be to Poland on 8 April. It is a previously arranged affair. I should meet my Polish counterpart there. I am not certain, however, whether developments will bring something else before then. So, to your question why, I reply that it was discussed and agreed upon earlier. I believe we have

really good preconditions for maintaining good cooperation with Poland. No doubt, goodwill is not lacking on either side.

[Gandel] During the government of Vladimir Meciar, criticism was heard that Slovakia is too East-oriented. Which direction would you like to emphasize?

[Kukan] I believe that this issue is blown up abroad in the West European and U.S. media. The orientation of Slovakia is quite clear. As I mentioned earlier, we are interested in integration into the European security, political, and economic structures. That speaks for itself. Of course, we are interested in developing our relations with Ukraine and other partners in the East. It is normal and natural. I believe that we can very well "score points" economically there.

When I said that these issues are sometimes blown out of proportion, I could give an example from my experience in New York, where our contacts with Russia and Ukraine were used as follows—ah, just look, Slovakia wants to return to the old times, etc. In this respect, the actual situation must be explained. In my opinion, any thinking person must understand that it is advantageous to have a neighbor in the East who offers good conditions for the export of our goods and represents a large market on which we can establish ourselves. No additional speculation is needed. It is completely unnecessary.... Our orientation is obvious—toward Europe, toward the European Union, and, at the same time, using the opportunities offered by cooperation with other countries as well.

[Gandel] Which of the problems of the Slovak Republic were most obvious to your partners in the United Nations?

[Kukan] They were the things that were also most discussed at home: the problems of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, its status, what the Slovak Government is doing to solve this issue in accordance with international norms. These were the questions that most often popped up in conversation. There was also freedom of the press—that was observed very carefully. I will also give you an example, however, of how the U.S. media treated the case of Trnava University, particularly the beginning of the affair. The U.S. reader has never learned that the problem has been solved. Therefore, we have argued and contended that the U.S. media, which claim to be objective and fair, should always bring their work to the end. Our colleagues have also carefully followed the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros issue, in which they are well versed. These were the three main areas that were most discussed.

[Gandel] Among the most burning problems of Slovak diplomacy are certainly the vacant ambassadorial posts. Your predecessor, current Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik, once said that they would be filled by the end of March of this year. Several weeks ago, State Secretary Jan Lisuch spoke about the end of June. A consensus of three entities is needed for the approval of ambassadorial appointments—the Foreign Ministry, the government, and the president. In this context, when leaving the post of the head of diplomacy, Jozef Moravcik declared that it was a long way from the ministry to the presidency. Now the situation should be better in this respect. When do you believe it realistically possible for the ambassadorial posts to be finally filled?

[Kukan] Personally, I believe that the filling of the ambassadorial posts is a very important issue. The absence of ambassador to Washington for 14 months—that was not good, to say the least, and I am not going to go into details. Every country perceives its partner through the prism of whether there is an accredited ambassador in that country. On the basis of whether there is an ambassador, they judge the amount of interest in mutual cooperation. You mentioned some dates. I would prefer not to speak in a definite time frame. I know that my predecessor and the state secretary share with me the opinion that the ambassadorial posts must be filled. For practical reasons, however, a precise date cannot be set. You actually said that the authorization of appointments takes a while. I assume that it will be faster now and that it will be settled. Nevertheless, you know that we ask the country to which we are sending the ambassador for agreement. This sometimes takes three or four weeks, sometimes even longer. Therefore, I believe that it would not be proper to speak about specific dates. I can confirm, however, that I have spoken about it with Prime Minister Moravcik, who agrees that these questions must be solved immediately, regardless of the six-month term of office of the new government. We do not want to solve it at any cost. We want the ambassadors to be people who will represent Slovakia well.

[Gandel] In this context, I would ask: Would you let us know the name of your successor in New York?

[Kukan] I do not know. For the time being, my deputy, Peter Tomka, who has the rank of ambassador, has taken over the position. It is not a permanent solution because he is the Slovak Government's commissioner for the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case at the International Court in The Hague. I left New York in a hurry, so I have not yet thought about who will get the post of ambassador to the United Nations. It is desirable, however, that he be there in September, when the General Assembly starts.

[Gandel] It is known that Eva Mitrova is to become Slovak ambassador to Budapest. To date, she has worked as ambassador to the Council of Europe. Do you believe it is appropriate for an ambassador to leave the post where he or she worked only briefly, just long enough to establish contacts, and transfer to a new place to start again practically from scratch, and may I also ask who is to replace Mrs. Mitrova in Strasbourg?

[Kukan] Of course, if the situation permits, it is in the best interest of the government for an ambassador who has established himself or herself somewhere, set up

contacts, and begun to be productive for the government to stay there as long as possible. Life is not a straightforward affair, however, and it can happen that an ambassador who has good contacts at one location is needed elsewhere. I believe that this is so in the case of Mrs. Mitrova. Relations with Hungary are so important in our foreign policy that not having an ambassador there would be rather harmful to our objectives, particularly if we speak about the peaceful matter-of-fact dialogue we want to conduct with the Hungarian side. Hence, we really need an ambassador in Budapest. Regarding the successor to Mrs. Mitrova—we are a little further along there than we are in New York—we have some names, but it is not yet at such a stage that I can give them to you.

[Gandel] How would you assess—I would term it—the sincere message of greetings sent by U.S. President Bill Clinton to the new Government of the Slovak Republic?

[Kukan] I believe that the message is quite clear and favorable, and that it expresses full trust in the new government and a willingness to cooperate constructively and in a matter-of-fact way with this government. I have also received a letter of greeting from my U.S. counterpart, Warren Christopher, and I can say that it was not just a diplomatic message but a very personal one. Warren Christopher wrote that he knows what I have been doing and assures me of very effective cooperation. I must tell you that it felt good and that it encouraged me tremendously. I have received similar messages—from Klaus Kinkel, for instance—that were also not of the commonplace type that are sent in traditional diplomacy, those two or three phrases that one can say even if awakened at midnight. They were real messages, which took into account the Slovak situation and the specific person; they were messages actually addressed to me, Eduard Kukan. I must admit that it truly encouraged me very much.

Daily Publishes Text of Coalition Agreement

AU2803195194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Mar 94 p 4

["Agreement on Coalition Cooperation," signed in Bratislava on 21 March]

[Text] The political entities that have formed the new Slovak Government signed a coalition agreement on Monday [21 March]. Jan Carnogursky (Christian Democratic Movement), Peter Weiss (Party of the Democratic Left), Milan Knazko (Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic), Jozef Moravcik (Democratic Union of Slovakia), and Ludovit Cernak (New Alternative) confirmed by their signatures their consent with the wording of the agreement. In view of the significance of this document, we publish it in full.

Entities

Article One

Coalition Partners

1. The Christian Democratic Movement

2. The Party of the Democratic Left

3. The Center Bloc, consisting of the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic, the Democratic Union of Slovakia, and the New Alternative, which are represented in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] by clubs of independent deputies, have reached the following agreement on coalition formation:

Coalition Aims

Article Two

(1) The coalition partners have agreed to form a parliamentary and a government coalition.

(2) The coalition partners undertake to shape their relations in the interest of good functioning of the joint coalition government and of the NRSR and other constitutional bodies of the Slovak Republic until the early elections.

(3) The coalition is based on the principles of understanding professional expertise in formulating the targets of economic, social, foreign, security, and domestic policies. Details are set forth in a supplement to this agreement, which represents the core of the government's policy statement.

Relations Between Coalition Partners

Article Three

The coalition partners mutually respect the political programs of their partners and observe the principle of noninterference in the internal matters of the other partners.

Article Four

The coalition partners will mutually respect the contents and nature of their contacts with political parties that do not participate in this agreement. Should the results of the aforesaid contacts touch upon cooperation among the coalition partners as defined in this agreement, the contracting parties will exchange information on the contents of their agreements with other parties.

Coalition Council

Article Five

(1) The Coalition Council is being set up to address basic issues concerning the functioning of the coalition, particularly to decide on personnel questions, on the principles of the government's policy statement, and on other

matters reserved for the Coalition Council by the coalition partners, and to deal with mutual disputes.

(2) The Coalition Council is made up of the coalition entities' statutory representatives or by persons authorized in writing to stand in for them. Unless agreed otherwise in advance, coalition talks in the Coalition Council are attended by three representatives of each coalition partner, with two representatives being the minimum.

(3) The Coalition Council meets always with representatives of all coalition partners present. Its meetings are held regularly, at least once a week.

(4) An extraordinary meeting of the Coalition Council can be called by any coalition partner. In such a case, the Coalition Council will meet within 24 hours after the last partner has been notified of the appeal to hold the meeting.

(5) The coalition partners will agree on the Coalition Council's rules of procedure in harmony with this agreement.

(6) An extraordinary meeting of the Coalition Council will be held whenever proposed by the ministers of at least one of the entities making up the government coalition.

Manner of Adopting Decisions

Article Six

(1) Important issues are dealt with by the Coalition Council in the form of the conclusion of coalition accords.

(2) A coalition accord is concluded when the representatives of all of the coalition partners express their consent with it and confirm it by the signature of the chairman or its authorized representatives.

(3) A coalition accord is always needed when filling the posts of government members and state secretaries, when dealing with personnel issues in the NRSR, and when filling the posts of chairman and deputy chairman of the Supreme Inspection Office, National Property Fund bodies, and central bodies of state administration. The coalition partners have agreed to respect until the end of the electoral term the principle of proportional representation in these bodies, according to the present strength of the parliamentary clubs.

(4) Each contracting party has the right of veto in the event of unsuccessful talks on personnel issues. A new candidate is put forward by the party that had submitted the original proposal, unless the contracting parties unanimously agree otherwise.

(5) Until a final common decision is reached on any disputed issue, the contracting parties will voluntarily refrain from public comments on the other parties' positions.

Further Consultations

Article Seven

(1) The coalition partners will conduct regular and irregular consultations at the level of chairmen of parliamentary clubs or at other official levels, with the aim of improving coordination among constitutional bodies of the Slovak Republic and making it more professional.

(2) Regular consultations among coalition partners will be held before and during NRSR meetings. Consultations will always be attended by the chairman of the parliamentary club and one member of the club leadership. Following mutual agreement, consultations can also be attended by the contracting parties' experts.

(3) While respecting the principle of professional expertise, consultations among coalition partners will be held about filling leading positions in the general and specialized state administration, appointing ambassadors, and filling posts in the central bodies of state administration, as well as when discussing key changes in the posts of district police chiefs. These consultations will be held through the medium of ministers nominated for the entities making up this coalition. The ministers will communicate the position of the partner they represent no later than one day before the government meeting in question. If any entity represented in the coalition disagrees with the proposed changes, the disputed issue must be decided in the form of a coalition accord.

Solution to Disputes

Article Eight

(1) In the event of a situation arising that, in the opinion of any coalition partner, poses a threat to coalition cooperation, this partner's chairman or his authorized deputy will establish contact with the other coalition partners without delay. The coalition partners will try to coordinate their activity and reach consensus on measures that are suited to improve the situation or come to terms with the disputed issue.

(2) Objections raised by any coalition partner to the professional qualifications or political competence of officeholders appointed on the basis of a coalition accord are dealt with in the Coalition Council.

Provisional and Final Stipulations

Article Nine

(1) In the interest of achieving consensus in addressing the problems of contemporary society and with the aim of improving ethnic relations in the Slovak Republic, the coalition partners have agreed to cooperate with the Coexistence Movement and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, political entities that do not participate in the government. With this in mind, representatives of these political entities will be regularly invited to meetings of the Coalition Council.

(2) This agreement is binding for the coalition partners as long as the joint coalition government exists.

(3) The parliamentary coalition ceases to exist

a) on the day of the start of the campaign for elections to the NRSR

b) through notice given by even one of the contracting parties, within 10 days after written notice is delivered to the other contracting parties.

Meciar on Future of HZDS, Personal Plans

LD2803175594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS, by Anna Samelova following the conclusion of the HZDS National Assembly in Presov on 27 March—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Samelova] Mr. Chairman, you adopted a new political program for the movement. How does it differ from the previous one that was adopted in Trnava last year, entitled "From Sovereignty to Prosperity"?

[Meciar] The difference between the programs is, above all, in the chronology: This year's policy covers the period 1994 to 1998. The program is built so that it allows for creating a basis for a government program, and, moreover, it reassesses the situation in which the Slovak Republic finds itself today. In other words, it is based on many years of experience, seeking pragmatic answers to the problems encountered in all spheres and in all kinds of activities, whether in politics, culture, or elsewhere, which the Slovak Republic must overcome. In other words, our program represents an offer. We are again the first to come up with something like this, and we expect again that the others will create alternatives to our program because we have, indeed, sought what is good and possible.

[Samelova] The assembly also altered the statutes of the movement, among other ways by putting the current consultative body, the HZDS Council, and the national leadership on an equal footing. What reasons have led you toward this step? Is this not some kind of duplicity?

[Meciar] No, in essence it means building a two-chamber system of the movement's leadership, which has been built like this from the very beginning but, owing to the passivity of the chairmen, has never been fulfilled. The movement's council will unite professional clubs, and it will unite the intellectual sphere that will work with us. It will also unite the deputies and the state administration that will work toward the elections and the local elections that are being prepared. This is of great significance. These people must have influence and space to make decisions. [passage omitted] At the same time, the principle that the leadership, after the Assembly, is the highest political body of the movement must be respected.

[Samelova] The Assembly devoted considerable attention to the analysis of why it was that the HZDS was in the opposition again today. Could you tell us something about the results of this discussion?

[Meciar] It was a businesslike discussion. We are not looking for a culprit; we are looking for causes, but, above all, we are seeking guarantees in the movement's mechanisms for the future period. We cannot fail to see that 18 deputies from our movement failed from both the human and the political viewpoints. Of them, 10 signed a statement saying that, if they were to leave the movement, they would give up their mandates. They have left the movement but have kept the mandates. We cannot fail to see that the government was overthrown not only by the opposition, but also by the attitude of these people who were in the movement with us and recognized its program. We are seeking ways to guarantee the stability of the parliament both within the movement and outside it. We are seeking to undertake measures inside the movement in the sphere of pledges, discipline, and responsibility toward citizens, and ways to win over the citizens during the elections so that they may find the same security with us that they did in 1992.

[Samelova] You mentioned the deputies who left the HZDS. In this connection, self-critical addresses were allegedly heard at the assembly. They came from the districts from which these deputies, who are no longer members of the movement, got to parliament. What was this self-criticism about?

[Meciar] The selection of the candidates was based on proposals of district assemblies, the so-called nominating assemblies. Then it was confirmed by the nominating assembly held in Zilina. Afterwards, they went through psychological tests and personal interviews. Despite this, there were human errors. In other words, the criticism was aimed at the districts for not knowing their candidates well. In many cases, those who had left could not cope with their work because they had no dialogue with the movement they had left or with the citizens. [passage omitted]

The government is now in the hands of these 18 people. For me, it is always a warning if people put their subjective desire for posts or power above the principles they are to serve.

[Samelova] Mr. Chairman, on Thursday [24 March], at the HZDS meeting, the moderator said that the radio and television were closed to the HZDS. Ever since your Cabinet was dismissed, the HZDS has not organized any news conferences. You yourself have refused in the parliament requests by radio and television for interviews. How would you explain this contradiction?

[Meciar] To be precise, running along the corridor with somebody sticking a microphone in front of you—that is not an offer. It is normal that giving interviews is also work. It is work for both the editor and the interviewee, and time and conditions must be allocated for it. I see no contradiction here. Indeed, we appear less on both the

screens and everywhere else. We can see the changing character of reporting, we can see the contents of the reports, and we are aware that we are not participating in it. Our assessment of these things is that this is one of the areas where we were unable to ensure full democracy. That is why, logically, when conditions prompt a different interpretation of democracy, the media behave differently, too.

[Samelova] Two weeks ago, at support meetings for your departing government, some of your followers physically attacked four journalists. How do you view this unpleasant incident, the fact that those involved were your potential voters?

[Meciar] Did you see it?

[Samelova] I was there.

[Meciar] I received the resolution from the people who were there and who were protesting. They talked about Mr. Zitny, who sprayed tear gas in people's eyes without their doing anything bad. There were about 100 signatures of eyewitnesses who described the situation in a completely different way. I am not a judge to play the role of a referee. If I am to follow whomever I trust more, I certainly trust the citizens more than Messrs. Zitny and Hrib.

[Samelova] Mr. Chairman, my last question will be worded so as to be both personal and professional. When, in June 1992, you took the post of the prime minister for the second time, you said in your main interviews that you had given a written pledge to your party that, if the Slovak parliament should recall you again from the post of prime minister, you would not return to politics. Everything seems to indicate that you are preparing for the election campaign and that you are preparing for your third return to politics. How did you (?personally) come to terms with this pledge?

[Meciar] First, I have not left politics yet. I have only changed position from the government to the opposition. My daughter came to see me in parliament when they recalled me. When they dismissed me, she came to see me and said something that was absolutely correct from the point of view of her understanding the events that concern me. She told me that politics was one hell of a dirty business and that I should leave.

But there are other points. First, the movement to which I offered my post invited me back to it. Second, there is a certain hope and trust of the citizens that things may look different, that there is an alternative to the current government coalition. If all of this has some meaning, I will come again in September with an offer. I will ask those who will decide in the elections what I should do.

Government To Strive for IMF Standby Loan

LD2803215894 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2000 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The Coalition Council chaired by Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik met in Bratislava this afternoon. The meeting took place at the level of chairmen and deputy chairmen of the coalition parties and movements. Representatives of the Hungarian Coalition took part in it as well. At a short, improvised news conference held this evening, we learned the following about the Coalition Council meeting:

[Moravcik] "We have discussed only one theme so far, and that is the preparation of the government policy statement. It is indeed a very serious matter, with the economic program in its focus.

"As you know, the talks on a standby loan were suspended because the previous government was unable to accept the conditions that were set additionally. So far, economic development has been different from what was envisaged when the budget was drafted. It means that our starting points now are worse than the starting points of the previous government, which has caused a whole range of problems we have to resolve this week. Which means that we have to concentrate on solving them this week.

"Today, we had to make an important political decision as to whether we should apply for a standby loan [from the IMF] and whether we would use the time allowed us to establish certain development trends. Our decision was positive in both cases, which means, yes, we will apply for a standby loan, and we will want to establish certain development trends. Naturally, this will require some unpopular measures. We are considering what specific measures to take since there are a number of possibilities."

[Announcer] Asked whether the government had decided to implement major restrictive measures in the social sector at the cost of their endangering the preelection position of the coalition partners, the prime minister said:

[Moravcik] "We will have to adopt all measures once we have considered the acceptability of their impact on the social sphere. This will require enormous effort on our part in order to find a certain balance. We will have to do this by 12 April, when we are to address the parliament [with the government policy statement], or even earlier because we are to submit the policy statement to the deputies on 6 April."

[Announcer] With regard to the state budget, Jozef Moravcik said:

[Moravcik] "If we want to get a standby loan, we have to respect the 4-percent limit. That is the key issue. We want to gain a better position in international currency relations. The standby loan does not only mean that we will get a credit of tens of millions of dollars. It also means an assessment of our financial credibility, which we need if we are to communicate with the financial world."

[Announcer] The congresses of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and of the National Democratic Party were held on Saturday [26 March]. Asked whether the government's deliberations today take account of the results achieved by the supreme bodies of these two parties, Jozef Moravcik said:

[Moravcik] "We focused on what I have just told you."

Filkus Views Trade With Czech Republic

AU2803162494 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 24 Mar 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus by Stanislav Drahny and Robert Casensky; place and date not given: "The Old Bloc Must Be Abolished No Later Than 1 May"]

[Text] Rudolf Filkus, the former HZDS economics expert, has become Slovak finance minister and deputy prime minister responsible for economic development. He granted our paper an interview on the economic objectives of Moravcik's new Cabinet and the prospects of economic relations between Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] In what way will you improve the difficult economic situation in Slovakia?

[Filkus] Every government has some limits. Our limits are determined by the time remaining until the early elections. We have to adopt this viewpoint when speaking about what the government can do and what it believes to be its main task. In my opinion, the government's main task is the political and economic stabilization of this country. We have to send signals abroad describing the extent to which the situation has stabilized. This is important in terms of the influx of foreign capital into the country. Of course, it is also important in terms of the domestic economy. There are no miraculous cures that would help us to do something great, if for no other reason than that our time span is limited. We have to take this factor into consideration.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Are you considering a devaluation of the Slovak koruna, a devaluation that would strengthen the export-stimulating policy, or are you going to orient yourselves toward protective measures, such as import certificates, for instance?

[Filkus] First, I have to say that the finance minister should not have a say in devaluation. We are giving an opportunity here to those who are in charge of monetary policy—that is, the Central Bank. This bank is responsible for monetary stability and is entitled to decide, while taking economic criteria into account, whether to devalue or not. Of course, the bank governor can come to see the minister and ask him what he should do to improve the situation in the state budget, to decrease the pressure of the inflationary spiral, etc. I want to say that our people strongly believe, unfortunately, that the finance minister should decide whether to devalue. I repeat, this is a matter to be decided exclusively by the National Bank.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Devaluation can be replaced by an import surcharge. However, this is an inefficient measure. Are you going to maintain it?

[Filkus] The protection of the market is a normal economic tool. I consider the surcharge that we have introduced to be a good economic measure because it can, at least theoretically, protect the market. At the same time, however, it is necessary to implement subsequent systemic measures not only to protect the domestic market, but also to help develop a proexport policy. I expected, for example, that import surcharge, particularly on food products from the Czech Republic, would help us to "clean" the market. The empty space thus created would be filled by our producers, which is usual in normally functioning economies. Unfortunately, this is not what is happening. On the contrary, prices went up following the introduction of the import surcharge.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] What will happen to the "quality control" of Czech food then?

[Filkus] On Monday [21 March], we discussed with Minister Kocarnik three open issues. They are food certificates, the customs union, and two clearing blocs [clearingovy blok]. As regards the certificates, you certainly know that an agreement, which is valid until the end of March, provides for mutual recognition of the Czech and Slovak certificates. This should change as of 1 April. I consider it to be a positive step by the Slovak side that we spoke openly about those problems. The validity of the certificates will not be abolished on 31 March but will be extended for at least one month. In this way, we will avoid the situation that recently arose on the Czech-Slovak borders.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] People are saying that similar duty should be imposed on consumer goods. Can you confirm this?

[Filkus] This is a matter to be decided in the future. Why should the quality of some products not be tested? I am of the opinion that this problem is different from the problems in trading relations with other countries. For many products, we have the same technology as the Czech Republic, the same standards, and the same quality. I do not see a large problem here.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] The so-called clearing account plays an important role in Czech-Slovak relations. Slovakia has a large deficit on this account. Are you going to try to eliminate the old clearing bloc?

[Filkus] This is very serious business. The old bloc has become a subject of various speculations, and many entrepreneurs have made money to the detriment of the state. I do not believe that this is an honest business. By antedating their claims, entrepreneurs made a profit based on the fact that they were sending money through

the old bloc and receiving it from the new one. At present, this problem has accumulated, and debt has exceeded the limit of 130 million European Currency Units. The state had to pay it using not the old exchange rate but the current one. The state had to suffer a loss that is proportionate to the profit the speculators made on the clearing account. Because of this, the old bloc should be abolished as soon as possible—no later than 1 May.

Of course, it will depend on both sides whether this bloc will be abolished. According to preliminary consultations, both sides are in favor of abolishing the old clearing bloc as soon as possible.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] You said that several cases of fraud have been mentioned in connection with the old bloc. Do you believe they could be explained retrospectively?

[Filkus] I do not believe that is possible.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Will there be a second wave of coupon privatization in Slovakia?

[Filkus] Certainly. The fact that the privatization process, which is an important economic accomplishment, has become a tool for concentrating power makes us accelerate the privatization process, depoliticize it, and make it more understandable. In the fall, we want to prepare the second wave of coupon privatization.

I believe that all of the privatization methods are equal. Coupon privatization is the fastest. We have promised our people: We are going to give you back a part of the property you lost in wages. Privatization has an ethical aspect, too.

ΩAlleged Flaw in Restitution Law

94P20549A

[Editorial Report]

"Dangerous" Precedent

A commentary in a Bratislava independent weekly has warned that the proposed extension of a new law providing for restitution of property unjustly seized during the communist era to cover the decade preceding the communist takeover (including the 1939-45 period, when Slovakia was a satellite of the Third Reich) may create a "dangerous" precedent, legitimating the claims of former Sudeten Germans to former Czechoslovak property. The author, Jaroslav Stracelsky, writing in the 22 February issue of MOSTY, urged Slovak lawmakers to pay close attention to the drafting of the restitution law and, in particular, to oppose the government in its effort to shift the beginning of the period covered by the law from the originally proposed February 1948 to November 1938.

Role of Hungarian Leader

Stracelsky claims that, while drafting the restitution law, designed to compensate Slovak citizens and organizations, particularly Jewish citizens and the churches, for losses suffered because of political discrimination in the pre-1989 period, the Slovak Government may have been unduly influenced by the demands of Miklos Duray, the chairman of Egyutteles, the largest political party representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Speaking on Slovak television, Duray attacked the so-called Benes Decrees of 1945, which legalized the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as well as some Hungarians from Czechoslovakia immediately after World War II. Duray insisted that these decrees be invalidated.

Implications for Sudeten Claims

Stracelsky suggested that "Slovakia's Hungarian citizens apparently felt that what Duray had in mind was redress of old wrongdoings" and that the Slovak Government must have shared that view. This, he said, may explain why, "under the innocent pretext" of wanting to rectify the injustices inflicted on the churches and their property, the government proposed to push back the date for property restitution to the Jewish communities from 1948 to the day of the Vienna Arbitration of 2 November 1938, when Slovakia ceded portions of its territory to Hungary. But, argues Stracelsky, "this innocuous legal move" has serious hidden implications. The government has either ignored or overlooked the fact that, "while on the day of the Vienna Arbitration the Slovak south was not yet occupied by Hungary, Hitler had already annexed the Sudeten territory." Thus, whether intended or not, the recognition of this fact by the Slovak Government, as reflected in the draft of the law, "will make it possible for the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft [the Bavaria-based organization of Sudeten Germans and their descendants] to obtain additional support for its territorial and property claims" against the Czech Republic.

The Sudeten Germans will be able to insist that, because the Slovak Government seems now to be willing to compensate those who were dispossessed as early as 1938, the Czech Government should follow suit. "The fact that this can be done in Slovakia should make things easier for the [Sudeten] Germans in their negotiations with the Czech Republic as well." It should be clear, Stracelsky adds, that "the Slovak Government would be committing a major mistake," and he admonishes the Slovak parliamentary deputies to be "vigilant" no matter how "innocent the government documents submitted to them may appear."

Link to German Visitor Seen

In conclusion, Stracelsky hints that Duray's criticism of the Benes Decrees may have been related to a visit to Budapest by Klaus Franke, a Christian Democratic deputy in the German Bundestag. Franke's trip, he points out, took place shortly before Duray's television appeal. During that trip, according to Stracelsky, Franke

allegedly tried to induce Gyorgy Csoty, the deputy chairman of the Hungarian parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, "to make sure that the Hungarian minority deputies in Slovakia appeal, in the Slovak National Council and the Slovak media, for the cancellation of the Benes Decrees, which affected the Sudeten Germans." Stracelsky characterizes the Franke-Csoty talks as a "provocative event" that could not but "attract attention in both Hungary and Slovakia" and speculates about the possible existence of "a lobby (endowed with considerable financial means) that may be interested in a deliberate escalation of Slovak-Hungarian and Slovak-Czech tensions and that utilizes, for that specific purpose, its own stable of Trojan horses." The potential impact of such tensions on the course of the early elections that are being planned, he adds, should not be ignored.

Goncz Interviewed Before Visit to Poland

WS2803123094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Mar 94 p 21

[Interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz by Grzegorz Lubczyk in Budapest on 22 March: "A Society Cannot Be Replaced; The Meeting With Prime Minister Pawlak Will Be Important To Me Since I Think We View Some Things Differently"]

[Excerpts] On 22 March the Hungarian president received journalists from RZECZPOSPOLITA, PAP, and GAZETA WYBORCZA. Below we publish Arpad Goncz's replies to questions asked of him by the Budapest correspondent for our newspaper.

[Lubczyk] The political and economic transformations which the countries of East and Central Europe are going through are a remarkable process. According to you, Mr. President, what have we done with the freedom and democracy which have been reinstated?

[Goncz] The most important matter is that we continue to exist. That is a big accomplishment, both for the new Poland and the new Hungary; it is a real achievement by both our societies, especially when we consider the kind of devastation the Cold War inflicted on people. Despite that, we established democratic systems. In Hungary, we are getting ready for the second free parliamentary elections. Regardless of many reservations, deficiencies, and inadequacies in different walks of life, it is my view that it is not just us—Poles and Hungarians—that managed to adapt ourselves to the changes by gradually getting rid of the mentality which was in effect for decades. In my view, that process of adaptation to the new situation, and also of replacing the old way of thinking with a completely new one, is the essence of democracy. Of course, the process has not been completed yet and it continues to be very difficult; it requires constant sacrifices by people even though they are already very tired of the reforms and of modernization.

Despite that, I think that our two societies have a more optimistic vision of the future than Western societies; this is a result of complicated and often tragic history and national experiences. Perhaps this will sound a bit presumptuous, but there is nobody that has been—and still is—affected more by every tick of the clock both in the West and in the East than Poles and Hungarians. That is one of the justifications for why we should stick together.

[Lubczyk] According to what you are saying, Mr. President, our two countries continue to go their ways. The elections in Poland changed the political configuration there, and new forces have taken over power in the Slovak Republic. How do you explain this turn to the left?

[Goncz] I would rather not answer this question before the elections in my country since some political parties could immediately accuse me of making suggestions. As president, I cannot deal with fortune telling. I will gladly address the issue at the end of May.

[Lubczyk] So I will ask you at that point for additional explanations and supplementary information, but right now I suggest we just skip Hungary in our discussion.

[Goncz] The turn to the left can be explained relatively easily. The phenomenon is also visible in the West, although in slightly different proportions. After the euphoria and some achievements, there occurred a crisis linked to the recession, and societies simply hold it against the governing parties that they are not capable of handling these problems. After all, new authorities in postcommunist countries started off under tragic conditions in many cases. What the first democratic governments attempted to do, can even be compared to ... an attempt to commit suicide. Often we are waging battles with the impossible. While being extremely determined, we expect outright miracles to happen! Of course, there is always a chance to do something. I am not saying miracles do not happen, but possibilities and chances must be evaluated realistically.

Under this very complicated social and economic situation of individual countries, those who are in power right now must continue to keep in mind that they are the last persons in the world who could afford to ignore any principle of democracy and that they must always take the people's will into account, and to regard what society wants—and not the authorities—as the most important thing. Every government can be replaced, but societies and people cannot. [passage omitted]

[Lubczyk] After a few years of experience, what is your evaluation of the president's place and role in establishing democracy in Hungary?

[Goncz] Hungary's president has very limited powers. Personally, I often find myself in awkward situations since people tend to generally believe me and rely on me, whereas in actual fact there is not a lot I can really do. So I think very carefully about every word I say. It is a paradox that you are hearing this from a writer, but only now have I come to really appreciate the power of words.

[Lubczyk] Do you think that the powers of the "head of state" should be amended?

[Goncz] I think I have no right to discuss the issue. Let the political parties and society speak about this if they think that is the right thing to do. I think that if a debate like this were to take place, I should not participate in it. [passage omitted]

[Lubczyk] Mr. President, how do you intend to utilize the meetings with representatives of Polish authorities?

[Goncz] If I were going to Portugal or to Latin America, then I could say that I am going there to make a "breakthrough" with regard to this or that. But when it comes to Poland and its people, that is a completely different story. I think that being on the outside, as it were—and also, I think, having quite a good knowledge

of Poland's historical and contemporary winding roads—I view your current problems in a slightly different way than yourselves. And vice versa. I expect to find answers to many questions during my talks with President Walesa and with many other Polish politicians—and also with other kinds of people, by the way. Among others, my meeting with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak will be significant to me since I think that we view some issues differently. I am sure the current visit will also be helpful to President Lech Walesa and myself so as to better prepare ourselves for the April meeting of the "heads" of seven countries.

[Lubczyk] What are politics to you?

[Goncz] Politics is not an isolated term to me. I always view politics from the perspective of society and through people's behaviors and responses, among others to reforms being introduced. Politics is a way to make life better.

MDF Deputy on Party's Foreign Policy Line

LD2503191894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1150 GMT 25 Mar 94

[Interview with Hungarian Democratic Forum Deputy Gyorgy Csoti by correspondent Miklos Keleti; place and date not given; from the "Foreign Political Observer" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Keleti] The MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] has government experience; it has played a determining role in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy in the past four years. If it finds itself in the same situation in the next four years, in what areas can we expect continuity, adjustments, or perhaps changes?

[Csoti] The electors can expect continuity, primarily in foreign policy. We plan to continue the foreign policy that bears the stamp of Jozsef Antall, adapted naturally to the given circumstance—because the world is changing in the meantime—and eliminating the minor mistakes that we made during the four years of government, because we naturally were not perfect.

However, there will be no change in the main line: The basic, determining factors in Hungarian foreign policy are to join the process of European integration and the handling—and solution where possible—of the vital issues of Hungarians beyond the borders, naturally in coordination with the good relations to be shaped with neighboring countries.

[Keleti] Let us look more closely at the individual areas, including integration with Western Europe. We will soon officially submit our accession application to the European Union [EU]. We know that this in effect could be on the agenda in around 1996 or 1997. What aims does the MDF have in this area until then?

[Csoti] Many things must be done concerning the further development of relations with the EU countries. Many things must be done here in Hungary so that we catch up economically, so that we adapt our legal system to the European norms. So there is plenty to do. [passage omitted]

There are members of the [European] family, primarily Mediterranean countries, whose economy is not much stronger than ours. For this reason, we expect—and we have received promises to this effect from our West European partners—that our accession will be a political decision, that having achieved the necessary minimum, accession will enable us to be part of the system of European integration, and that by this they should ensure us the possibility of further economic progress.

[Keleti] The other sphere that is being mentioned a lot recently is our relationship, our military-security relations, with NATO. The situation has become somewhat clearer with the announcement of Partnership for Peace and with the signing of the framework agreements on this. Nonetheless, what does the MDF expect from NATO specifically, within this cooperation, and according to the MDF program, in what specific areas must Hungary take steps so that there is closer cooperation?

[Csoti] What we expect from NATO is that within the Partnership for Peace program we—and other countries in the region that are ripe for this and wish to gain this status—should have the genuine possibility to gain full membership. It is very important to emphasize that the European security system must always cooperate with Russia and Ukraine—because this is inconceivable contrary to them or without them. However, they do not even wish to be full members, and it is inconceivable that a considerable proportion of the countries in the eastern half of the region will become members in the near future.

For this reason, what we expect is that within Partnership for Peace, everyone in the trans-European [as heard] region should be a [NATO] partner, a cooperation partner, and the central European countries who have completed the essential phases of transformation and who want it should be full members.

[Keleti] The next big foreign policy issue is the place and role—in diplomacy—of the Hungarians [magyarsag] beyond the borders. Let us begin with Vojvodina, since the situation there is special because of the southern Slav conflict. It has been raised recently that a conflict, a conflict of interests could develop between our rapprochement to NATO and the protection of the interests of the Hungarians there. What do we expect in the future, and what does the MDF wish to do in order to avoid such situations?

[Csoti] I do not think that this would mean a conflict. Indeed, I say the opposite. For example, the fact that Hungary—together with some other central European countries—might at a given moment be a member of

NATO and a few neighbors of ours might not. would not endanger the given country and would not (?give rise) to tension between the given neighboring country and us, since it is important for the neighboring country, in the present case Serbia, that there should be stability and security in the region. The wider the area embraced by NATO—thereby strengthening NATO and stability in the region—the more it should be in interest of Serbia, if it wants a peaceful and stable Europe, trusting that the war there will come to an end as soon as possible, that the situation there will be normalized, and that the other countries of the region could take a similar path.

Therefore, I do not believe there is such a problem there, nor do I believe there is any vis-a-vis Romania or other countries. The theory—which the Socialists represent and, I do not wish to speak on their behalf but they say this everyday—that Hungary should enter NATO together with all of its neighbors is not realistic. If Hungary, and let us say, Slovakia, Austria, and Slovenia, as four potential, aspiring countries were to be excluded [from NATO membership], this would have a detrimental impact on us, on the region, and it would not help at all. Indeed, to the contrary, by perhaps increasing instability it would impair Romanian and Serbian interests as well.

[Keleti] Concerning the question of autonomy: One often feels that when this question is raised in Hungary and in the neighboring states, let us say Romania or Slovakia, it is approached on the basis of entirely different viewpoints, entirely different ways of thinking. There, it is regarded as provocation against the nation-state; we regard it—autonomy for the minorities—as a natural application of European thinking, European legal-political norms. [passage omitted] Is there any chance of hoping for psychological bridge-building, rapprochement? This is one factor among many.

[Csoti] It is definitely possible and necessary. I believe that it is an indispensable condition for finding a solution. These two neighboring countries [Romania and Slovakia] must come to terms with the fact that the peoples, ethnic groups.... [brief break in reception] Right cannot be applied selectively. An over 2-million-strong ethnic group or a 700,000-strong ethnic group, nation—because the expression co-nation could also be applied to them in the given country—is entitled to the same rights as those of the majority nation.

Regarding the psychological factor: A historical reconciliation would be necessary, where there was a precondition that we should fully grasp one another's problems and ways of thinking, that we should have empathy with one another.

If the Slovaks and the Romanians try to grasp fully the Hungarian situation, what Trianon meant for us, what the traumas, the historical blows to this country during various dictatorships meant, and that it has not been possible to recover from these to this very day, then obviously there will be a rapprochement between us.

However, we must also imagine ourselves, for example, in the situation of the Slovaks, who did not have an independent state for centuries—that this as well is a bad situation, it influences the current political forces and public opinion. This is what we must grasp. If we jointly comprehend fully one another's traumas we will be able to understand one another and it will become clearer to us that we in this region are interdependent. We should not work against one another but hand in hand when building the future, the Europe of regions where the borders will not have any significance, and where we can prosper to one another's benefit and to our benefit.

SZDSZ Policy Emphasizes Economic Cooperation

AU2803162294 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 26 Mar 94 p 3

[Nagy report: "The SZDSZ on Relations With Neighbors—Economic Cooperation to the Forefront"]

[Text] Ivan Szent-Ivanyi, foreign policy spokesman of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], discussed the party's political views in connection with the SZDSZ's relationship system in our region at a news conference on 25 March. This was timely in view of the fact that the SZDSZ's leaders had visited a number of neighboring countries in recent weeks and had conducted talks with leading politicians.

As Szent-Ivanyi said, the relationship system with the neighbors is one of Hungarian foreign policy's most important areas. For this reason, in their view, Hungary's interest is to have peaceful and well-functioning relations with the neighboring countries. However, in the past four years most problems have arisen precisely in this area, which has been partly due to the government's ideological style of foreign policy, Szent-Ivanyi said. Unlike the current coalition, although the SZDSZ considers it very important that the situation of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries is settled, it does not make relations solely dependent on this.

According to Szent-Ivanyi, new principles need to be introduced in regional relations, practical issues have to be placed to the forefront, and the interests of the other side in improving the relationship have to be made clear. During their visits to Romania, Austria, and the Czech Republic, the SZDSZ politicians found that interest was mainly shown in economic cooperation.

The SZDSZ considers regional organizations like the Visegrad cooperation or the Central European Initiative particularly important. Talking about the Visegrad group, Szent-Ivanyi said that in the course of their talks with the Czech foreign minister, it was said that Prague does not want ostentatiously to break off this cooperation but it has different ideas on it. Szent-Ivanyi said that, in their view, Romania and Bulgaria should join the Central European Free Trade Agreement.

Poll on Leaders' Popularity Published

AU2903121994 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Mar 94 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed report: "Goncz, Horn, and Fodor Are Leading—The Latest Survey of the Szonda Ipsos"]

[Text] The Goncz-Horn-Fodor trio continues to head the popularity list of the Szonda Ipsos Opinion Poll Institute. According to a survey carried out in the first two weeks of March, only three politicians out of the constant "players" on the list remained in the same position.

At the beginning of the election campaign, the public showed signs of uncertainty. The number of people who are uncertain about which party to support although they would like to vote increased from February to March, and so did the number of people who do not know which party might win the elections. Two months before the 1990 elections, slighly fewer people (58 percent) declared their readiness to participate in the voting than now (61 percent), but then the proportion of people who had no party preferences was only 31 percent, compared with the current 41 percent. In the first two weeks of March 1994, 22 percent of the people who are sure they will vote do not know which party they will vote for. This figure was 9 percent in 1990.

The number of people who refrained from giving their opinion on politicians also increased since February. With a few exceptions, there has been a decrease in the popularity index, but most of the differences are statistically insignificant compared with the previous month.

In the case of two politicians of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz], namely Viktor Orban and Laszlo Kover, and two politicians of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], namely Ferenc Kulin and Sandor Lezsak, the drop in their popularity index borders the statistically significant line.

Sandor Nagy, chairman of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, is again on our March list. He is in second place on the national list of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. His popularity has not changed since September 1992. Women, older people, and people with a lower level of education find Sandor Nagy more sympathetic than others. Generally, people who sympathize with the left think of Sandor Nagy more favorably than the average, and people who do not sympathize with the left think of him less favorably than the average. Consequently, Sandor Nagy is considerably more popular among MSZP followers (65 points) than among other voters (42-50 points).

Popularity List	Percent	Change
1. Arpad Goncz	75	-3
2. Gyula Horn	65	0
3. Gabor Fodor	62	-3
4. Janos Palotas	61	-1
5. Zoltan Kiraly	58	-1
6. Gabor Kuncze	58	-1
7. Lajos Fur	56	-3
8. Ivan Peto	56	-1
9. Tamas Deutsch	56	-3
10. Tamas Nagy	55	-1
11. Laszlo Bekesi	54	-1
12. Viktor Orban	54	-4
13. Laszlo Surjan	53	0
14. Sandor Nagy	52	0
15. Peter Zwack	51	-1
16. Zoltan Gal	50	-3
17. Peter Boross	50	-3
18. Imre Pozsgay	47	-2
19. Laszlo Kover	46	-4
20. Sandor Lezsak	42	-4
21. Ferenc Kulin	41	-5
22. Geza Jeszenszky	41	-2
23. Imre Konya	35	-3
24. Jozsef Torgyan	30	0
25. Istvan Csurka	30	-1
26. Gyula Thurmer	21	-1

Further Reportage on Dariusz Rosati Candidacy

Daily Views Coalition-President Rift

WS2803140094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26-27 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by J.B.L., E.K., E.Cz., K.Gr., and PAD: "Will the Coalition Hold Out?"]

[Excerpts] President Lech Walesa finally rejected the candidacy of Dariusz Rosati for deputy prime minister and finance minister, which was submitted to him on Friday [25 March] morning by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. After holding talks with Aleksander Kwasniewski, the prime minister and the coalition still maintain this candidacy. If the president officially maintains his stand, the dispute over Rosati will turn into a dispute between the president and the governing coalition.

In the Morning in the Belweder

On Friday morning, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak submitted to the president the candidacy of Dariusz Rosati for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister. During the 20-minute meeting, the prime minister's visit to Moscow as well as personnel changes in the Finance Ministry were also discussed.

After the meeting, President's Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski said that the president would not sign Dariusz Rosati's nomination because he can see "a double risk. Mr. Rosati may not know Polish reality well enough" due to his three-year stay abroad, which may make it difficult for him to make economic decisions, and his knowledge on the economy may to a considerable degree "depend on secondhand information." The other reason is "the affair of the Foreign Debt Service Fund. The legal situation is not completed yet. Legal proceedings are under way, the case has been started, and there may arise relations that are unnecessary in this difficult situation in which we have found ourselves."

Minister Drzycimski also said that the president believes that the filling of the highest posts in the state calls for great deliberation, and, in view of the doubts that have arisen, he cannot accept this candidacy.

"The decision that Dariusz Rosati's candidacy will not be accepted is irrevocable," Andrzej Drzycimski told RZECZPOSPOLITA on Friday. On Monday, the president will forward a written reply to Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak's motion; however, the document will not include any justification of the decision because the Constitution does not impose such a duty. The Belweder's spokesman did not rule out the possibility, however, that, on the very same day, a meeting may be held between the president and the prime minister. "Nevertheless, it is impossible for the president to change his mind. The coalition should agree on a new candidate for deputy prime minister and finance minister."

Walesa's spokesman emphasized that propaganda pressure was exerted on the president. "It was completely forgotten that, in line with the Constitution, he does not have to confirm such a candidacy because it is the president who is responsible for making the decision, which may in the future turn out to be erroneous."

The Coalition Is Adamant and Waiting

"For us, it is not a matter of prestige or having our own man in the government; it has to be a person who will implement the government's economic program and the budget," said Aleksander Kwasniewski. "We should act efficiently and wisely; I cannot understand how one can delay making decisions and, not having any arguments against, disagree to such a candidacy." He said that the arguments that delay the decision on the appointment or that make it impossible were false and wrong. He confirmed that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] had not withdrawn the candidacy of Dariusz Rosati because, "if an outstanding specialist is not a good candidate, who is a good one"?

After an hour's meeting with Waldemar Pawlak, Kwasniewski officially declared that the prime minister maintained the candidacy of Dariusz Rosati because he believes he is an expert, well-prepared and competent enough to become responsible for the economic issues in the government. [passage omitted]

Between Coalition and President

Now that the coalition has worked out a common stand, the prime minister is waiting for an official reply from the president. If he maintains his stand, "we will witness a new stage of the political situation," said Kwasniewski. However, it will no longer be an internal affair of the coalition but an affair between the coalition and the president. According to Drzycimski, by rejecting the presidential bill concerning the Constitution, it was the coalition that opened a new chapter in relations with the Belweder. Now the SLD leader would like the president to lose because of Rosati.

"We must try to reach agreement. Now, if the president decides on such a war, we will have to think about whether the president's powers are not too great. There are no regulations that cannot be changed, including the Constitution," said Marek Borowski.

Commenting on Friday evening on the stand taken by the prime minister, Drzycimski said: "He maintains it because such are the coalition agreements; however, if the president has rejected this nomination, they just do not have another possibility. They must look for a new candidate."

In line with Kwasniewski's words, Dariusz Rosati is at the coalition's disposal, and he will not make any hasty decision. However, in a statement for the television show "Panorama," the deputy prime minister candidate admitted that he would still like to talk with the prime minister and the SLD leader and that he did not rule out

the possibility of withdrawing his candidacy. As he left the Office of the Council of Ministers, Aleksander Kwasniewski went to the airport, from where he left for Budapest—with a delay caused by current events.

"The prolonging of the absence of the person at the post of coordinator of the economy is a bad sign for it," evaluates Polish Peasant Party [PSL] Deputy Janusz Piechocinski, "because many important laws and decisions are waiting to be dealt with."

The Recall of Modzelewski

The prime minister informed the president that he had dismissed Witold Modzelewski, secretary of state in the Finance Ministry (who has been in the post since Marek Borowski ran the ministry), and appointed PSL Deputy Jan Kubik secretary of state. He is a deputy for the first time. He works in the Budget Committee and is the director of the Tax Office in Krakow. According to SLD deputies, this change was not consulted with the SLD. Kubik himself did not know about the nomination.

Witold Modzelewski told us that the prime minister had suggested that he return to the post of under secretary of state (to which he was promoted by Jan Olszewski) and explained that the change was caused by the fact that, in line with coalition agreements, the PSL should have its own man in the ministry leadership. Modzelewski added that he had not received a written recall and that he had not yet decided whether he would accept the offer and stay in the ministry.

Aleksander Kwasniewski did not want to comment on this decision on Friday. He said that making changes in the Finance Ministry when the deputy prime minister and the ministry's head is not there was not a very good action. He merely admitted that, in line with the principle of joint responsibility, whenever the minister comes from one coalition party, the other grouping should have its own representative in the ministry's leadership.

According to Marek Borowski, the prime minister's decision is contrary to the coalition agreement. Both PSL and SLD deputies evaluate that personnel changes in the Finance Ministry that are not consulted with the SLD will force the SLD to react to them and will cause friction within the coalition.

In the evening, the prime minister presented Modzelewski with the nomination act to the post of under secretary of state in the Finance Ministry.

Budget Still Open?

Asked whether in the present situation we should expect the president to approve the state budget, Drzycimski replied: It is still open. However, by doing what he did in the Rosati case, the president gave a certain signal.

"There are no reasons that the budget should not be signed," claims Kwasniewski. "There exists something that must be called responsibility for the state, a desire to stabilize the situation in the country. Now, we should really expect such behavior from the president. I am not saying this to cause a dispute with the president but to appeal to him for consideration." [passage omitted]

The Last Accent

Late in the evening, after the Sejm session was completed, the SLD Club convened at a meeting that was closed to the press. The deputies maintained their support for Rosati's candidacy, expressed approval for the firm stance taken by the prime minister, and stated that the activity of the president would have a destabilizing effect on the state. According to them, the crisis that has arisen, which is not an internal crisis of the coalition, and the stand taken by Lech Walesa compel them to reconsider the SLD's behavior toward Lech Walesa.

"This forces us to take a closer look at the president's activities and at his powers provided by the Small Constitution," said Zbigniew Siemiatkowski. Thus, the deputies entirely backed the stand taken earlier by Marek Borowski. The club's members decided that it was necessary to hold an SLD session very soon in order to discuss the new strategy of the grouping. The leftist politicians unofficially mentioned the constitutional possibility concerning the president's responsibility for activities aimed at destabilizing the state. [passage omitted]

Sejm Speaker Oleksy Comments

WS2803124694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy by Ryszard Rybus; place and date not given: "Jozef Oleksy for RZECZPOSPOLITA; I Do Not Think the Prime Minister Does That"]

[Text] [Rybus] Do you agree with the suggestion made by Marek Borowski, deputy chairman of the Club of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] concerning the possibilities of limiting the presidential powers by the parliament?

[Oleksy] This is a statement by one of the SLD activists, which is neither the stand of the club nor the stand taken by the party. This is a complex statement in the background of recent events. Now these events are very bad. The fact that the president refused to sign the candidacy of Professor Rosati, even though the coalition was fully convinced about the values of this candidacy, must be politically significant.

[Rybus] In the commentary of the Saturday [26 March] issue of TRYBUNA appeared such expressions as "political vengeance" and "panic" of a president that is losing power. Are these acute expressions the foretaste of a confrontation with the Belweder?

[Oleksy] I do not know. You are asking me about a confrontation of the left with the president. However, it was the president who made this decision.

[Rybus] Commentators who evaluate the issue of Rosati's nomination point at the possibility of Prime Minister Pawlak's participation in this game.

[Oleksy] I do not suspect the prime minister of making any secret moves like that, because, as I understand, this is what you mean. The prime minister did delay forwarding the motion, which surprised the SLD; however, a serious decision was being made, and it is difficult to quarrel over days and hours. The fact is that the prime minister submitted the motion, which the president refused to sign. He took advantage of his constitutional powers. Now the analysis of the case can only be political. One has to ask the following question: What purpose does such a decision by the president serve? I am afraid that it does not serve the purpose of putting our economic life in order. Nor does it serve the signals that go from us abroad, where Prof. Rosati is a well-known individual.

[Rybus] The points in the Rosati game will probably not be scored by the SLD. Now the question remains who will gain more: the Belweder or Prime Minister Pawlak?

[Oleksy] These are speculations that the Sejm speaker should not really make....

[Rybus] How about the deputy chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic?

[Oleksy] The issue is not about who has gained and who has lost. If such a count were to be kept, this would have to mean another phase in the lack of agreement between the activities of the state's highest organs in issues important to the state. And I deplore this.

[Rybus] Can the events of the recent days begin the process of disintegration of the coalition?

[Oleksy] I do not think so, and I would oppose it.

[Rybus] How will this dispute end, now that the president has declared, through his spokesman, that a change in this decision is out of the question?

[Oleksy] The end is unclear. I am not able to imagine it at the moment because I am afraid that there may appear elements of emotion and prestige that will obscure the heart of the matter. I would not like this to happen. I believe that appropriate coalition bodies, as well as organs of the individual coalition members, will convene and make a political evaluation of the situation.

Kwasniewski Not Withdrawing Candidacy

LD2903092594 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 0530 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Dariusz Rosati, the prime minister's candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and minister of finance, told last night's "Panorama" program: I intend to withdraw. Last Friday the president would not appoint him to Waldemar Pawlak's government.

[Rosati] "Having been faced with the decision made by the president, I intend to withdraw my candidacy. I am only waiting for the possibility of having a conversation with Prime Minister Pawlak and Chairman Kwasniewski. I want to inform them about my intention to withdraw as a candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and minister of finance, and I would like to hear their opinions on the subject."

[Announcer] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Aleksander Kwasniewski, Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] leader, after a one-hour meeting, decided that Dariusz Rosati would remain the coalition candidate for the vacant posts. Initially, we obtained this information unofficially because the left-wing leader [Kwasniewski] left the Council of Ministers' Office by a different gate from the one where journalists were waiting for him. Later, in the Sejm, Aleksander Kwasniewski locked himself in his office. In the end, not seeing any other possibility of avoiding talking to media representatives, he left the Sejm through a window.

Later, however, the leader of the Left answered some questions from journalists.

[Kwasniewski] "He is still, I say it clearly, the candidate of the prime minister and the SLD. There will be talks held on this issue shortly. We will see what transpires."

[Unidentified correspondent] "Who will the talks be with?"

[Kwasniewski] "The president, of course."

[Correspondent] We asked Dariusz Rosati if it is possible, after a conversation with the coalition leaders, he would change his mind and continue as the candidate for the government.

[Rosati] "Theoretically, one can imagine such a development of the situation and such a fundamental change of circumstances that would allow me to remain the candidate. But, let us be honest, such a development of the situation is very unlikely. I cannot imagine a situation in which the minister of finance and deputy prime minister responsible for economic affairs would be in conflict with the president."

[Correspondent] "Have you considered the possibility of withdrawing Mr. Rosati's candidacy and naming Mr. Paga [head of the Securities Commission] as a candidate?"

[Kwasniewski] "No, we will not withdraw Mr. Rosati's candidacy."

[Correspondent] "Do you consider Mr. Paga suitable?"

[Kwasniewski] "We will not withdraw Mr. Rosati's candidacy."

Conservative Party on Rejection

LD2903121794 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Aleksander Hall, chairman of the Conservative Party [PK], has expressed the view that the rejection of Dariusz Rosati's candidacy for the posts of deputy prime minister and minister of finance marks the beginning of Lech Walesa's presidential campaign. In an interview for Radio Zet, Hall described the recent events as another step undermining democracy.

Rosati Intends To Withdraw Candidacy

WS2903102394 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc: "Rosati Intends To Give Up; Who Is Next?"]

[Text] "I have the intention of withdrawing my candidacy very soon," we were told yesterday [28 March] by Dariusz Rosati. "I am only waiting for a talk with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Aleksander Kwasniewski. I find it difficult to imagine circumstances that would make me change my decision."

Dariusz Rosati said that he considered the arguments concerning his participation in the affair of the Foreign Debt Service Fund [FOZZ], submitted by the president, to be unfair and that he would like the prosecutor's office to finally complete the investigation because he has had to prove for two years now that he is innocent.

The Monday communique by the Government's Press Office stated that Professor Rosati was still the candidate of the coalition and the prime minister for deputy prime minister and finance minister, "until the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] or Mr. Dariusz Rosati himself change their stands on this issue."

After a meeting with Waldemar Pawlak that lasted almost two hours, Aleksander Kwasniewski would not talk with journalists. We merely learned that the prime minister had assured him that Rosati was still the candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister. Kwasniewski would not comment on Rosati's intention of giving up; he said that he is a serious man and that he would not do anything like that without previously discussing it.

(After the meeting with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, the SLD leader spent a few hours in the Sejm. The evening "Wiadomosci" and "Panorama" showed Kwasniewski sneaking out of the Sejm premises by way of a ladder; however, later on he did talk to journalists.)

Commenting on the information about the coalition's maintaining his candidacy, Prof. Rosati said that he might still be a candidate in only one case: if Lech Walesa changed his mind.

President's Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski informed PAP that the president would very soon forward a reply to the prime minister and that "it will be a reply, not a justification, because the president does not have to justify this decision—it may be made on the basis of his constitutional powers." Andrzej Drzycimski stressed that the president's decision is irrevocable and stated that he did not know anything about any possible meeting between the president and the prime minister concerning this issue.

Jozef Oleksy said on Radio Zet that he could not imagine the SLD's giving up the candidacy of Prof. Rosati. He said that the crisis caused by Lech Walesa's rejecting this candidacy was "mainly a crisis of ambitions, as well as a political crisis." He also stated that this weakened the coalition and the prime minister.

"If we assume that neither one nor the other party—that is, neither the president nor the coalition—will change their minds, this is a deadlock and a conflict, which are the least necessary here. What we really need are talks that would explain what should be explained and that would outline possible scenarios because a deadlock or a conflict means a war, and no one today needs a war," stated Oleksy.

"The resignation of Dariusz Rosati would give us some maneuverability; however, in this way, we would lose another expert that we pinned enormous hopes on," said SLD Press Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

Wieslaw Paga is mentioned quite frequently as the new candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister. However, now that Paga has received support from Lech Walesa, it is not very likely that the SLD will want to have another "Belweder-related" minister. No new names are mentioned. It may therefore all wind up in the appointment of Finance Ministry Director Henryk Chmielak to the post of minister; this possibility has also been entertained. One thing is certain: The Coalition, mainly the SLD, is stalling for time by insisting on the candidacy of Dariusz Rosati. It may well mean either that Aleksander Kwasniewski has some new idea or that he does not have any idea at all.

PAP said that the prosecutor's office had not interrogated Dariusz Rosati during the FOZZ investigation, which has lasted for over two years now, because it did not consider this necessary. The indictment, which was prepared last year, includes three members of the Supervisory Board. In November 1993, the Appellation Court returned the FOZZ documents to the prosecutor's office and ordered that the investigation be complemented; it ordered, among other things, that Rosati be interrogated as a witness. The court did not specify when this interrogation should take place.

New Nominee for Finance Post

LD2903095694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0832 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Warsaw, 29 Mar—I am a civil servant who found out from the mass media that he allegedly is a candidate for the posts of deputy prime minister and minister of finance. I am a subject of speculation, but I am not speculating myself, and I have no way of balancing all of the elements connected with the risk, Leslaw Paga, chairman of the Securities Commission, told Radio Eska [Polish private radio station] on Tuesday.

On 27 March, Lech Walesa told journalists that he would not have anything against Paga's candidacy. "It is very nice that the president has a positive opinion about me", Paga said. To the question of whether he would like to become deputy prime minister, he answered: "I am doing what I am doing, and I hope to be able to continue doing it for some time, and, after finishing my work for the commission, I would like to work for a large bank."

I have no way of saying yes or no, Paga replied to the question of whether Dariusz Rosati would be a good minister of finance. "I do not know him personally, only from earlier press articles," he added.

Poll: Majority Say Walesa Actions Weaken State

LD2803184694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1729 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Warsaw, 28 March—In a poll carried out by CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center], 36 percent expressed the belief that the president has too much power. The opposite view was held by 22 percent, while 29 percent said he has as much power as he should.

The CBOS poll was carried out between 10 and 14 March on a representative sample of 1,228 of Poland's adult population.

The majority (60 percent) of the respondents expressed the belief that the president's actions weakened the state, and only 17 percent had the opposite view; 23 percent of the respondents had no view on the issue. [passage omitted]

Daily Views Possible Support for Walesa

WS2903110094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Where President Can Seek Support; Supporters and Opponents of Lech Walesa"]

[Text] Who is still ready today to support the political activities of Lech Walesa? Which grouping would be willing to support Lech Walesa in next year's presidential elections? The conflicts with the government (over Rosati) and the National Council of Radio and Television (over Solorz), in which Lech Walesa has recently taken part, and the coming presidential campaign were an occasion for politicians to specify their attitudes toward the present head of state.

Walesa can no longer count on support from the Solidarity ["S"] camp, unless we include the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] in it. Even though he has not yet formally confirmed that he wants to run in the 1995 elections, he is the official candidate of the BBWR. The bloc has so far been...

Unconditionally Loyal

...to the president. Incidentally, the bloc's voters include the greatest number of people who approve of the way in which the president is now fulfilling his duties. However, it is really difficult to say today to what degree Walesa himself believes in the possibility of transforming the BBWR into a nationwide movement supporting him.

The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has a fairly positive attitude toward the president. In the conflict over Dariusz Rosati, the PSL is trying not to take an unequivocal stand on the issue. Even though Prime Minister Pawlak has maintained Rosati's candidacy, he did that through Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski. None of the PSL leaders officially backed Dariusz Rosati, which gave rise to suspicions that Pawlak was playing a double game: He was said "not to discourage" Walesa from rejecting the SLD candidate. The possibility cannot be ruled out that some PSL leaders think it would be a good idea to remove the SLD from the government and to establish a minority PSL government that would be supported by the president. However, extension of the cooperation between the PSL and the Belweder to next year's elections seems rather unlikely. It is difficult to suppose that Waldemar Pawlak will not want to take advantage of the period of his premiership and will not run in the presidential elections against Lech Walesa. It should be added here, however, that the president is very...

Popular Among PSL Voters

In line with the research carried out by the Sopot Public Opinion Research Institute [PBS], as many as 46 percent of rural area inhabitants declare support for him.

So far, the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] has not demonstrated its reluctance toward the president. KPN deputies backed (along with the Democratic Union—UD—and the BBWR) the presidential bill on the procedures of passing the Constitution; they also do not conceal the fact that their, just like Lech Walesa's, greatest enemy is the SLD. They would be ready to take part in establishing a new government under the patronage of the president.

UD wants to take a position above the dispute between Walesa and the SLD. As it often happens in this grouping, one unequivocal stand has not been specified; it is known, though, that UD is rather on the side of the

SLD, whose finance minister would probably be inclined to continue the policy of economic reforms carried out so far.

However, neither UD (rather dissatisfied with recent decisions made by Walesa) nor the KPN (approving of the activities of the current president) will decide to support Walesa in the elections. UD and KPN leaders have presidential ambitions themselves. Leszek Moczulski even stated officially that, in 1995, he would run for the Belweder.

Lech Walesa, who frequently refers to traditional values and calls himself a man of the right wing, cannot count on support from a party that is so definitely leftist as the Labor Union [UP]. Even though we may suspect that Ryszard Bugaj's party would not accept some proposals made by Dariusz Rosati (lowering taxes, for instance), in the prestige dispute between Aleksander Kwasniewski and Lech Walesa it would side with the former. Artur Smolko, one of the UP leaders, even called Walesa "a president of destabilization." Also, one cannot rule out the possibility that, in the coming elections, UP will field its own candidate—for example, Aleksander Malachowski.

An entirely open war is being waged between Lech Walesa and the SLD; some observers believe that this is...

The Initial Stage of the Presidential Campaign

...in which the most dangerous counter-candidate of the present head of state may be Aleksander Kwasniewski. Social Democracy of the Polish Republic does not intend to be grateful to Walesa for "strengthening the left pillar" for a long time; it is more likely to remember his "Solidarity" past and his fighting against the SLD in the present government.

The extraparliamentary right (which the president called "screwups") does not intend to back Walesa even in a situation where his opponents are postcommunists. Both the members of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's bloc and the members of the alliance in which Aleksander Hall participates consider Walesa's activities to be punishable and likely to cause destabilization in the country. However, according to the PBS, the voters of the "Fatherland" belong to those who support the way Walesa is wielding power.

The issue of the future connections between "S" and its former chairman is also not clear yet. "S" voters often do not have a clear-cut opinion about the president. The president, however, has recently been leaning toward "S": Through Lech Falandysz, he implied that it was especially for his former union that he had proposed "the civic constitutional initiative." It is possible that the president, who has rejected the free-market-oriented Rosati and who may veto the "continuation budget," wants to regain popularity among radical union leaders and...

Stand at the Lead of the Mass of People

...marching toward the seat of the government. No one knows to what degree the anticommunist "S" will believe in the sincerity of Lech Walesa, who is announcing file-checking and decommunization; nonetheless, it is one of the few forces that might launch a fairly effective campaign supporting the president in the elections.

Whether or not any of the political groupings will cooperate with Lech Walesa depends to a considerable degree on reshuffles in the president's closest entourage. When the election campaign starts, the Chancellory of the head of the state is bound to become a clear political center, which may mean that it will gain a party character. It is no secret that, in order to win the support of one the parties, such as a large part of the right wing or UD, the president would have to abandon the services of some of his aides, such as Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski.

The Public Opinion Research Center asked its respondents about who would make the best president. In line with the data published in February, 17 percent of the respondents believe that the best president would be Kwasniewski. Walesa came fourth, with 9 percent, after Waldemar Pawlak and Krzysztof Skubiszewski (both 11 percent).

Walesa's supporters are largely young people with elementary and secondary-school educations, peasants and white-collar and blue-collar workers, people with low salaries who evaluate their material situation as average or good. They are believers and church-goers, not very interested in politics. Asked about their political views, they say they support the right wing or answer: "It is hard to tell.

Pawlak, Olechowski on Talks With Goncz

LD2803185294 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[Text] Arpad Goncz has had talks with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski about economic contacts between Poland and Hungary. The economic exchange between Budapest and Warsaw dropped drastically after the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Last year, our economic exchange amounted to only $330 million.

[begin recording] [Andrzej Olechowski] We have two projects in common that will have a symbolic significance for our links and will give them additional strength. One of them is our joint application for full membership in the European Union; the Hungarians will do this as early as 1 April, and we will follow soon afterwards. The other thing is Partnership for Peace.

[Waldemar Pawlak] We have talked about the idea put forward by us in Prague: Partnership for Development.

We should seek cooperation as partners within this region, so that cooperation between our countries can make use of both the human potential, the potential of friendship, and the potential of our economies. [end recording]

[Reporter] Tomorrow the Hungarian president will visit Poznan.

Regional Cooperation Discussed

WS2903114594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Mar 94 p 21

[Article by W. K.: "Hungarian President's Visit to Poland: Motion Requesting Membership in Union"]

[Text] In the near future, Poland and Hungary will introduce motions requesting recognition of their full membership in the EU, said Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski after his meeting with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. The Hungarian leader began his three-day visit to our state yesterday.

Hungary will most likely introduce a motion regarding its full EU membership by 1 April, and we will do so some time later, added the chief of the Polish diplomatic service. He also stated that, during an earlier meeting in the Belweder, the Polish and the Hungarian presidents discussed, above all, the international situation. Arpad Goncz and Lech Walesa agreed that their views on the subject coincide entirely, stated Olechowski.

Both leaders acknowledge that regional cooperation is a "key goal" for the Middle and East European states. During his talks with Lech Walesa, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz stressed that, in addition to centrifugal forces, the Visegrad Group has "stable prospects for future development."

Discussing cooperation among the Visegrad Group states, President Lech Walesa stated that "some [states] do not want to achieve some of the goals alone." He added that "not everything develops the way we would like it to develop" because "we are not doing things together."

At the Belweder, the Polish president awarded the Hungarian guest with the Order of the White Eagle, and the Hungarian president, in his turn, awarded Lech Walesa with the Hungarian Great Cross of the Order of Honor.

Premier Waldemar Pawlak, who was received by the Hungarian president at his residence, said that the subject of their meeting was connected with political and economic cooperation between the two countries. They also discussed the "Partnership for Peace" program. Recalling the negotiations addressing the Central European free trade area, the Polish prime minister disclosed the wish to speed up the realization of this agreement.

President Goncz also met with Marshal of the Sejm Jozef Oleksy. The Hungarian leader spoke in favor of the admission of Slovenia and Croatia—after the war in former Yugoslavia is over—to the Visegrad Group.

Minister Olechowski stressed that the "Partnership for Peace" program and joint efforts of NATO and the Middle and East European states to begin cooperating in military areas serve the faster rapprochement of the two states.

The chief of the Polish diplomatic service added that, despite the closeness of their policies, the Hungarian and Polish Governments differ in treating ethnic minorities.

"If the future of the Visegrad Group depended on only our will, it would have developed dynamically," said Olechowski. In his opinion, the governments of the two states believe that the slowing down of the development within this group is only temporary.

Only UN Bans Apply in Trade With Burma

LD2803221294 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Text] The United States has announced that it will send a diplomatic note to Poland, asking that no assistance be given to the regime in Burma. The Americans maintain that the Poles are helping the local junta by providing military training and maintenance of military equipment.

Here is Wladyslaw Klaczynski, the director of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Information Department:

[Begin recording] [Klaczynski] So far, the Foreign Affairs Ministry has received nothing from the Americans.

We have not sold assault helicopters. Two years ago we sold transport helicopters from Swidnik. Allegedly, the Burmese have installed some weapons in them. This could happen.

I would like to recall that Burma is not subject to any ban by the United Nations Organization.

[Unidentified correspondent] Precisely, are we bound by UN bans or by U.S. bans?

[Klaczynski] We are bound only by UN bans and by our own morality. [end recording]

SdRP's Kwasniewski on Reforms, PSL Rapport

WS2903093094 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 1810 GMT 27 Mar 94

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, SdRP, by Barbara Czajkowska, identified by caption, in Warsaw, on the "Special Line" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Czajkowska] Good evening to you, ladies and gentlemen, and to you, Mr. Sejm Deputy. Welcome.

[Kwasniewski] Good evening.

[Czajkowska] Recently in Davos [Switzerland], you publicly expressed your conviction that you have been handling people's frustrations and disappointments—which, according to you, are the real danger to the reforms in Poland—the right way. Now, what do you mean by saying you have been handling them the right way? What do you really mean by saying the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] has been handling our frustrations the right way? Results of public opinion polls that are available to society do not confirm your optimism.

[Kwasniewski] First of all, one must realize that these frustrations do indeed exist and that they are justified. Millions of people in the country have problems: They are unemployed, their retirement pensions and other types of pensions and salaries are low...

[Czajkowska, interrupting] But we know all that. But my question was: What do you mean by saying you have been handling it the right way?

[Kwasniewski] To handle it the right way means to suggest a program that will be changing the situation step by step by guaranteeing economic development first of all. This is what I talked about in Davos. I think Poland's great chance is the fact that last year we saw growth of the GDP of more than 4.5 percent, and also that, after the first two months of this year, we saw a 10-percent increase in production output...

[Czajkowska, interrupting] But that is to be attributed neither to the SLD nor to the governing coalition.

[Kwasniewski] You know, it is to be attributed primarily to people. I think that any politician who says this is to be attributed only to him is dishonest. But the fact is that, if these are the trends, they must be preserved and protected. And that is our biggest chance. So, when you remember the difficult budget we argued about, which the SLD took upon its shoulders, as it were, because the budget had been proposed by the then Finance Minister Borowski, and then we fought for the budget in the Sejm, the goal of all that was, step by step and while protecting the developmental trends in the economy, to create a chance to meet halfway those people who are frustrated and who have good reason to feel so.

[Czajkowska] So when you said in Davos that the SLD has been handling things the right way, you simply meant all of the governments that ruled the country after 1989?

[Kwasniewski] Even more than that. What I also meant was all the good in the country that we managed to create since the beginning of Poland's existence because it is my view that Poland began neither in 1989 nor in 1945. The point is simply to do in Poland whatever can bring us success and to avoid doing those things that contribute to our problems. That is my philosophy, as it were, the philosophy of a politician and the philosophy of a man. My view is that one must look for positive aspects and good solutions while avoiding bad ones, and that is why I regret many things that take place in our country and that I evaluate as bad things.

[Czajkowska] And I hope this is what we will talk about in the program tonight and also that we get your replies as to how you think these difficult problems should be solved. [passage omitted]

[Czajkowska] Sir, one does not have to be particularly observant to see that the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is clearly being favored over the SLD. When the president, for instance, warned against greedy communists, he clearly meant the SLD. There is talk among people that the presidential constitutional initiative was rejected by Sejm deputies for the SLD, even though everyone knows that Sejm deputies for the PSL also voted against. Even Solidarity attacks the SLD while clearly taking an easy-going attitude—forgive me for using that popular term—toward the PSL. All that is not just a coincidence. What is your assessment?

[Kwasniewski] You know, of course it is not just a coincidence. It can be concluded from this, that we [SLD] exist, while, in the year...

[Czajkowska, interrupting] But the PSL also exists.

[Kwasniewski] Yes, but the point is that, back in 1990, when the PSL was being born out of the old United Peasant Party, it was of marginal importance, as it were, and no one had any particular grievance against them because of that, whereas the SLD, or, actually, Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, which was being born in the spring of 1990, was confronted by the president's argument in which he said we will be finished within three months. Not only have the three months been going on and on for a long time now, but we also won the elections; let me remind you that we won the September elections by quite a big margin, to be quite honest, even though before, right-wing activists had been ascribing us the role of what they call postcommunist, or communist, remnants.

[Czajkowska] But the PSL is your coalition partner.

[Kwasniewski] Fine, but I will not say even one unfavorable word about the PSL tonight. Please, do not force me to do that.

[Czajkowska] I am not forcing you to do that. I am just asking whether there are clear....

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] They are our coalition partner whom we treasure and with whom we want to cooperate.

[Czajkowska] That is fine with me.

[Kwasniewski] But, if you allow me to, I would like to finish my thought on why there are so many attacks against the left wing and the SLD, in particular coming from the president.

[Czajkowska] Actually, I meant the PSL being clearly favored—that is the term our viewers used.

[Kwasniewski] Fine, let it be so. The reason is that the SLD is disliked because we have shown that, through a peaceful exchange of arguments, lack of aggressiveness, and rational ideas, one can simply gain social confidence and win elections. I think that very many people on the right wing—and also, unfortunately, the president, I say with sorrow—still find it very hard to come to terms with the fact that we who had been condemned to be a marginal phenomenon—some even said we belong on history's rubbish heap—right now are winners in the elections, form a governing coalition, and, moreover, when you read Western newspapers, you can see that we are actually guarantors of the Polish democratic and free-market reforms. And I think that is the right perception. After all we went through, including some very personal experiences, we are very deeply convinced that there is no going back for Poland. I mean we cannot give up democracy, the free market, or our openness to the world. When it comes to our coalition partner, well, all I can say is that I envy the PSL a bit in that all groups have favorable opinions of the party. Both the Democratic Union and the Confederation for an Independent Poland have courted the PSL, as the president is doing now. But apparently the left wing is not suited to play the role of one who is courted.

[Czajkowska] And do you not think, Mr. Chairman, that perhaps you yourselves are to blame for the PSL's being favored this way? From the very beginning of this coalition, the SLD has actually been teasing the PSL by trying to sermonize to it, by warning it, and by placing yourselves at the top of the reforms process—you said that yourself tonight, by the way—and by seeing in the PSL's measures a danger to the reforms. Recently, SLD spokesman Mr. Siemiatkowski made a comparison between Chairman Kwasniewski and a messiah who is supposed to lead the nation to a successful future without any problems. Is that not too much?

[Kwasniewski] Of course, that was a lot, and perhaps it was too much, but, as far as I can recall, that interview by Mr. Siemiatkowski, he spoke there about the left wing. I think that, in that sense, what the left wing has gone through.... [Kwasniewski pauses] Of course, I am the kind of man....

[Czajkowska, interrupting] Are you trying to suggest that, when Mr. Siemiatkowski spoke about the left wing, he also meant the PSL?

[Kwasniewski] No, I think he meant us, the political group that is us, and also....

[Czajkowska, interrupting] But it is you who was described as a Moses in that statement.

[Kwasniewski] So is it a Moses or a messiah?

[Czajkowska] I am sorry. I confused the two.

[Kwasniewski] Please, do not....

[Czajkowska, interrupting] I think I am not the one you should address but rathe, Sejm Deputy Siemiatkowski, who described you this way.

[Kwasniewski, hesitating] You know, that is of course a metaphor, and let us approach it that way. But there is no doubt that, when it comes to the left wing in the country, as I said, we managed to overcome the condemnation of a political nonexistence and become one of the ruling parties. Of course, that is by no means to be attributed to only me personally, but, on the other hand—let us not be too modest here—I think I played some part in the process. Very many people played a positive role, and attacks by some others were also helpful to us. But that is a closed chapter, and it is not the most important thing. The most important thing is what you asked me about our coalition partner. Well, my view is that there is no alternative, given the political configuration that was established after September of last year. Of course, we could get theoretical here in a number of ways, but the truth remains that the PSL-SLD coalition is creating a chance in Poland for a stable government based on a majority, for the first time in many months or even years. And one must....

[Czajkowska, interrupting] Forgive me for interrupting, but this is not what I meant.

[Kwasniewski] So what did you mean?

[Czajkowska] Let me refresh your memory: I am not willing to question the principles of the coalition's existence or the PSL's participation in it. All I am saying is that the favoring of the PSL at the expense of the SLD, which we talked about earlier, is perhaps caused—or at least there are such views—by the SLD's own behavior inasmuch as the party sermonizes to the PSL, teases it, tells it what to do, as if condemning the PSL to play a secondary role, which means the SLD leads the reforms. By the way, you yourself said that here tonight.

[Kwasniewski] No, all I said was that we are absolutely in favor of the reforms that are taking place. As far as our coalition partner is concerned, we treat the PSL with all seriousness and in the most thorough manner possible, even though cooperation is of course difficult. One must be honest about that. There would be no problems or conflicts if the cooperation were perfect. As regards the sermonizing, of course I can be self-critical here and say that we are not without guilt here and that many things have been said unnecessarily, that is for sure. But, on the other hand, I also think that too many measures by our coalition partner have not been completely understood or accepted by us. [passage omitted]

Privatization Minister on Foreign Investment

WS2903123094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Mar 94 p 7

[Interview with Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka; place and

date not given: "Is There a Danger of Paralysis of Foreign Investment in Privatization?"]

[Text] [Kostrz-Kostecka] Just three capital privatizations have taken place since the beginning of the year: the sale of the Goleniow Furniture Factory, the Dzialoszyn Cement Plant, and the Sugar Products "San" plant. Are you not afraid that revenues from privatization, which were included in the budget law for this year, may not be realized?

[Kaczmarek] No, I am not. It is enough to just take a look at revenues from the sale of the Sugar Products San plant, which are over 600 billion zlotys. More privatization projects are being prepared, and another big transaction is under negotiation.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] There is a debate going on currently, which, on the one hand, concerns who is supposed to make the privatization decisions, and, on the other, expresses a desire to limit foreign investment. Does that debate not contribute to foreign capital being less interested in our country?

[Kaczmarek] Recently, there have been more and more cases of politics and economics going their own separate ways. And I am sorry to say this, but I think one cannot worry over various statements because there is no danger of paralysis in these investments. I also think that foreign investors who are interested in Poland do not take such views seriously, either. The number of questions on companies being privatized is proof of that. What is important is what the U.S. Commerce Department said on 28 January, when it presented an analysis of countries with the highest investment potential and developmental possibilities over the next several years. In the European market, only Poland and Turkey were named; in Asia—China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea, and, in South America—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The London Club's behavior is another positive message because it is proof of their conviction that we are stable.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] But, if a division of privatization powers were to take place, which was sought during a debate on a new privatization law, among others, by the Industry, Foreign Economic Cooperation, and Transportation Mjinistries, that could make the entry of foreign investors more difficult.

[Kaczmarek] I think this is more about being in power just for the sake of it, rather than about implementing specific strategic privatization goals. I would understand taking such measures if we had a specific policy for reconstructing foreign trade, an industrial policy, a policy of reconstructing different branches, and if the point was to have power to implement these goals. But we have no such programs. I spoke with Minister Pol and think his goal is to look for solutions with the aim of carrying out a policy of commercialization, which, for him, is clearly separate from privatization, and I agree with him on that. But I disagree with the view that privatization is to be implemented at specific ministries. I think we do not appreciate the fact that, for a foreign investor, a "green fields" situation—that is, building a factory from scratch—is more worthwhile. The tobacco industry is a classic example, where specific forces do not allow for privatization of state-owned tobacco plants, but Reynolds will build a factory from scratch. Or, to cite a different branch—Philips, which is building a battery and car-battery plant. There are more and more examples indicating that foreign investors prefer to build from scratch instead of restructuring state-owned companies.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] Is the Ownership Transformations Ministry not to blame a bit for the fact that decisions about selling companies, particularly to foreign investors, take so much time? My feeling is that, especially in those cases, one seeks assurances in the form of many documents, so as to eliminate in due course anyone having reservations about the transaction. After all, the sales that were recently implemented were prepared over a long period of time.

[Kaczmarek] I do not think that is the case. Usually, the process takes quite a long time, usually six to nine months, and you must also take into account the big replacement level of staff in the ministry, which is not conducive to decisionmaking, either. Consider also that, in such cases, there is practically no tolerance for making mistakes, and that is why everything is examined very carefully several times. Volumes of contracts are getting bigger and bigger, compared with the initial ones, which, by the way, were done in pioneer fashion and thus were definitely far from perfect. Even if there is a provision in a contract, which by the way is a positive thing—such as in the case of the San factory—to the effect that the investor does not conduct any talks that could possibly influence his investment policies vis-a-vis San, that means that proper conclusions have been drawn from past experiences.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] Many new investors may emerge as a result of the implementation of the National Investment Funds [NFI] program. When can we expect them?

[Kaczmarek] Hearings before the Selection Commission of candidates for companies managing the investment funds have been completed, and, right now, financial offers are being evaluated. So the time schedule is being observed; we are even ahead of it. A ranking of companies based on individual scores could be presented as early as the first half of April. After getting to know the documents and opinions of the commission's individual members, I will be able to select some companies, with the proviso that the commission will suggest to me a certain order to be followed. There will probably be 15 funds, so this is how many companies will be needed. The commission also reviews offers by candidates for members of governing boards. Because there are 6,800 candidates, I agreed with the commission's chairman that a certain selection must be done, which would be guided by accepted criteria, and that about 800 people must be selected. Then, about 200 people will be selected after talks, and, from among them, I will select 105 representatives of the Treasury.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] What kinds of guarantees are there that really good companies will be selected that would first restructure the companies covered by the program and then privatize them successfully? In your selection, do you intend to be guided by the companies' size and reputation or by their familiarity with the market? There are, for instance, several little-known companies that have already done some things in Poland and know the situation, but, on the other hand, it is possible that there will be cases of "Marriott brigades," meaning that a well-known company sends over young employees to see whether they fit. If they do not, there is no big loss for the company because Poland is a marginal market for the company anyway.

[Kaczmarek] The mechanism goes both ways because there are, for instance, little-known companies that use the names of several dozen famous people on their list of references, but, in fact, these people do not participate in the project in question. Only the wisdom and skills of the commission members can prevent such mistakes from happening. I think the program is popular enough that a company of some reputation will not be willing to risk losing it. As for the "Marriott brigades" description, it was applied more often in cases involving certain consulting companies. Investment banks that are taken into account in that case tended not to participate in the "brigades" because the banks have been watching Poland only from a distance up to now. So, in that case, the point is to create new institutions of the capital market. That is one of the goals of the NFI program.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] What kind of supervision will there be over the companies' activities after the program is implemented, funds are established, and contracts with managing companies are signed? Could it not happen that they will immediately sell a majority of companies at low prices because they will think it not worthwhile to restructure them?

[Kaczmarek] Reservations contained in the contracts prohibit the sale of companies during a specified period of time, so that would be a breach of contract. But one obviously cannot rule out the possibility of a bankruptcy emerging in that group, in which case something will have to be done. Perhaps it will be necessary to sell one bad company to get the money to restructure some other companies.

Military Cooperation Accord Signed With Russia

AU2803183994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Text] An agreement between the Romanian Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was signed in Bucharest this afternoon. The document was signed by Gheorghe Dinca, Romanian minister of national defense, and Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian minister of defense, who arrived today in Bucharest.

The two ministers believe today's agreement marks a new stage in Romanian-Russian relations. In this respect, General Pavel Grachev told our radio station that this accord also marks the end of the period of stagnation that emerged in relations between the two countries after the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union and the revolution in Romania. The document signed in Bucharest today, the Russian guest said, is a framework agreement that pertains to all aspects of military cooperation, including technical-military cooperation, thus presupposing normal relations between two neighboring countries.

Gheorghe Tinca said that this accord creates a normal framework for ties between the two neighboring countries and is not directed against anybody else. This is the 15th document of military cooperation concluded by Romania with neighboring and other European countries.

This evening the Russian guest also met with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. After the meeting the Romanian minister of foreign affairs told journalists that he considers General Grachev's visit to be a signal for the relaunching of relations between Russia and Romania.

'Crisis' Within Intelligence Service Examined

AU2803194394 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 25 Mar 93 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "The War Within the Romanian Intelligence Service"]

[Text] Since its creation in 1990, the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] has enjoyed a rather quiet life. This institution—which was set up after the Targu Mures events [March 1990] and out of the belief that somebody should deal with would-be spies at work in Romania—has not had too many problems to cope with over the past four years. Foreign agents do not seem to have tested its capability all that much, since the only danger for our "national security" brought to the fore by one of the SRI's leaders so far was the attempt of a foreigner to find out the secret of the pollution smoke from Copsa Mica by jumping over the fence of an enterprise there. The only difficulties for the institution have come from the independent press, which was worried by the possibility that the SRI might bring back to life the glorious methods used by the no less glorious former Securitate. However, even these difficulties were no big deal for [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu's institution. The part of the press subservient to the SRI (yes, there is such a thing in Romania!) took care to present this concern as the expression of an attempt—paid from abroad—to destabilize the country. Relative harmony has reigned within the institution, since under the mask of a public appearance of softness, Magureanu hides his true steel nature.

Consequently, there has not been too much dissidence or rebellion against his absolute rule within the institution. The few instances when people dared to utter a word against him were dealt with in the purest Romanian style, by quietly removing the naughty ones. However, the SRI seems to have lost its primordial tranquility of late. This has happened not for reasons lying outside the institution, since the situation there seems to be good, even very good for the SRI now. After his endorsement by Parliament, Virgil Magureanu is no longer being challenged by the press or the opposition. His proverbial ability has finally had its way. Nor are spies causing trouble to the SRI any longer. According to Magureanu, they do not exist, because they have all already been caught. The causes of the disturbance come from within the institution. Some two weeks ago, the public learned with stupefaction (from EVENIMENTUL ZILEI) that Gheorghe Diaconescu, head of the SRI's Counterespionage Division, had been dismissed. No sooner had the upset created by this news evaporated than another piece of news took its place, namely that the SRI plans to dismiss Dumitru Cristea, one of Magureanu's prominent deputies. As is the case with all the institutions of today's power in Romania, the SRI did not condescend to give too many explanations about these two events that have taken place inside the institution. In these circumstances, it is hard for us to realize what is actually going on in one of the basic organizations for Romania's national security. Is there a life and death battle being waged between foreign networks? Have the two events any connection at all with the uncovering of a KGB spy within the CIA? Does Virgil Magureanu want to remove the people of a much stronger adversary, who is placed in the structures of the current power? Are the various accusations that one hears against Gheorghe Diaconescu and Dumitru Cristea true? Or are they pure SRI fabrications? What is certain is that the SRI is going through a crisis and the crisis is so big that it cannot be contained within the institution and has quickly become public knowledge. This is an indication that the confrontation between Magureanu and some people within the SRI has become a life and death affair. The sacked general Gheorghe Diaconescu does not seem to have come to terms with his fate. Despite the drastic measures taken by Magureanu, it is more than certain that protegees of the dismissed general are still left within the SRI. These are not people that give up easily. Even though they are not doing so directly, they are probably acting against the SRI director. Threatened with dismissal, Cristea is fighting hard to prevent it. For the time being, the war is being waged at the level of mere press statements.

However, nobody can guarantee that they will stay put at that level. The struggle might also reach the stage of released documents and compromising disclosures. Therefore, one can proceed from the assumption that the SRI is undergoing a major upheaval, which may seriously affect the ability to function of this vital institution for the country. Who will put an end to this strife? Looking at all the other bodies of power, we realize with concern that there is nobody who can bring peace to the SRI. Consequently, all that is left for us to do is to watch helplessly the unfolding of this war, which currently poses a greater danger for us all than the entire political and economic crisis.

Survey Places Iliescu Third in Popularity

AU2603195394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 94

[Text] In an interview granted to our reporters today, sociology expert Alin Teodorescu commented on the results of the first public opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Marketing and Public Opinion Polling within the program [words indistinct] 1994.

The areas surveyed by the poll were political options, the popularity and notoriety of the principal Romanian political personalities, the standard of living and quality of life, the economic and social policy of the government, and mass media consumption.

The poll was conducted among a representative sample of 1,100 persons with a margin of error of 3 percent.

The question referring to the direction in which our country is heading is a question that is usually included in all questionnaires examining the current problems of countries and it is meant to establish the mood among the population at the time of the poll.

In the years 1990, 1991, and 1992, Romania seemed to be the most optimistic country in the world, as 70-80 percent of the population believed that the country was heading in a very good direction. Currently, things seem to be getting back to normal, Teodorescu emphasized, as, according to international standards, it is normal that the majority of the population should be dissatisfied.

Regarding the quality of life, the things the Romanians are dissatisfied about are quite clear, and they refer to the lack of cleanliness of streets and public places, the way in which local administration bodies exert their duties, the level of incomes, and political life. In that context, the performance of Parliament and the government are considered to be very low.

Referring to the mass media, Teodorescu said that there is only one daily that really has a nationwide circulation, covering the whole territory, and that is EVENIMENTUL ZILEI. Local dailies rank second. The publications further down the list are ADEVARUL, ROMANIA LIBERA, and GAZETA SPORTURILOR. The first channel of the Romanian Television has an audience of 85 percent. The first channel of Bucharest Radio Network has an audience of 71 percent, followed by the programs of its local radio studios with an audience of 29 percent, and by the local cable television programs. Foreign radio networks and private radio networks have not gained as much in popularity as was expected.

Regarding the popularity of political personalities, for the first time ever the Emil Constantinescu [Democratic Convention of Romania chairman]-[President] Ion Iliescu twosome has been surpassed in popularity by the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Adrian Nastase, who was favored by 55 percent of the persons polled. He is followed by Emil Constantinescu with 45 percent, President Ion Iliescu with 44 percent, Petre Roman [Democratic Party-National Salvation Front chairman] with 41 percent, Corneliu Coposu [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party chairman] with 39 percent, and [Civic Alliance Party Chairman] Nicolae Manolescu with 33 percent.

Regarding the political parties for which the persons polled would cast their votes, the parties belonging to the Democratic Convention of Romania are heading the list with 37 percent, followed by the Social Democracy Party of Romania with 24 percent, and the National Romanian Unity Party with 6 percent. The question intended to establish the polled persons' readiness to participate in an election was answered affirmatively by 80 percent, which proves that there is an interest in political life and a conviction that voting is important for the way Romania will look in the future.

Decrease in Support Explained

AU2903122994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 24 Mar 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "Ion Iliescu Has Fallen From the Top of the List"]

[Excerpts] The TINERETUL LIBER daily, which has been issued in a new format today, publishes the latest opinion poll of the IRSOP [Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Poll] on the issue of the population's electoral options. The major conclusion of the opinion poll is really sensational: For the first time since December 1989, Ion Iliescu cedes the top place that he has held in the electoral sympathy to another politician, who is none other than Ion Iliescu's former adversary in the September 1992 elections, namely, the current leader of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania], Emil Constantinescu. [passage omitted]

I will only mention that, as a result of this recent opinion poll carried out by IRSOP, the perennial Prince Charming of the Romanian electorate, the person who won two presidential elections and has been the holder of the first place in all polls since 1989, is now holding second place, 10 points behind the first one on the list, Emil Constantinescu. This represents the response to the question: If presidential elections were held next Sunday

and the same candidates as in 1992 would run in those elections, whom would you vote for? The IRSOP polls have always been suspected of behind-the-scenes games. At a first glance one might suspect such a game being played now. One of the means through which the Iliescu group has kept its position for four years has been to put the opposition to sleep, by feeding it the illusion and the feeling that it has become victorious. This is precisely what happened for example shortly before the September 1992 elections, when the opposition, intoxicated—in a shrewd manner—with the prospects of indisputable triumph, slackened the intensity of its electoral actions. It is clear that the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] is preparing for early elections. However, considering that the open and brave confrontation is not one of this party's habits, the moment of provoking elections has been postponed. All this time, the PDSR will be able to carry out its activity of fighting political adversaries using state money, without anybody being able to accuse it of violating the provisions of the electoral law. The IRSOP poll could be regarded as a simple maneuver meant to appease the vigilance of the opposition by creating the illusion that the PDSR and Ion Iliescu have already been knocked out. However, at a closer glance—which would mean to take into consideration the current concrete social, political, and economic situation—the fall from the top of electoral options is convincing. From 1992 and up to now, Ion Iliescu's political capital has not stopped eroding. He is losing his electoral inheritance at an incredible speed of late. The reasons for this process should be sought first of all in the dramatic deterioration of the daily life. No matter how strongly the constitution stipulates that it is the government and not Ion Iliescu who is responsible for national economic affairs, an ordinary person, less attentive to subtleties, automatically holds the president responsible for the country's disastrous state. This transfer of responsibility from the government to Ion Iliescu has been much accelerated by Ion Iliescu's lack of capability to play exclusively the role of Romania's president. His actions to appoint a mediocre prime minister who lacks personality, to send numerous recommendations to the government from Cotroceni [presidency], and to turn the job of the president into that of counselor of numerous ministers, have gradually convinced the entire population that Romania is virtually led by Ion Iliescu. Thus, the president has been and continues to be held responsible for all current evils in Romania, even those for which he is not guilty at all.

The reason for this process that intensifies the erosion of the president's electoral capital can be found also in the ambiguous policy promoted by Ion Iliescu. The president won the elections through a left-wing platform. Later, he became—at least according to his statements—a passionate promoter of a right-wing policy. Neither the previous option for the left-wing, nor the current one for the right-wing have been clear and firm options. Currently, just like at that time, the president is leading a paradoxical policy which we could call today a left-right-wing policy. This has made Ion Iliescu lose the sympathy of the left-wing electorate, without succeeding in winning the right-wing one. As usual, not only in politics but also in life, ambiguities and half measures, as well as the habit of hopping from one side to another, have to be paid for.

Silajdzic Addresses Assembly on Agreements

AU2803154994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1247 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Speech by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 28 March—live]

[Text] Esteemed Deputies: [words indistinct] that this session of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have the significance of a political event that will lead us into qualitative [word indistinct] of the struggle against aggression and the new stage of the peace process, as well as a new period of life.

The agreements reached in Washington have already yielded the first effects—first of all, on the fields in central Bosnia, Herzegovina, and other regions mostly populated by Bosniaks and Croats. One of the results of the Washington agreement is this Assembly session, which is competent to verify the agreements and consistently implement them.

Many and partly contradictory assessments have already been made about the agreement by domestic and world politicians, journalists, and other observers. These assessments range from the extremely positive and optimistic, which see the agreements as an historic turning point in the solving of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, to the negative and pessimistic, which see the agreement as just one more paper that will not bring any essential change to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that at this moment one should not waste much time or effort on seeking and assessing attributes by which the agreements will be qualified.

Put simply, with this agreement, a very important step has been made toward a permanent and just solution to the situation in which our country finds itself. A realistic concept has been defined and certain prerequisites for implementing it have been ensured. However, it will be possible to assess objectively the significance and value of the work done in Washington only when the full effects of the agreement are seen. It is not the time for euphoria or pessimism, but for extremely serious, responsible, and intensive work on implementing the agreement and seeking the solutions for those questions that the agreements have left open.

There are many valid reasons for reaching the agreements and I will present only several of the most important ones.

First, these agreements represent a basis for the speedy establishment of peace and the normalization of the situation, above all in those regions populated mostly by the Bosniak and Croatian people and open the door to the so-called Serbian side; they therefore present the possibility of a permanent and just political solution for the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Second, these agreements represent a defeat for the strategy of the Serbian aggressor, who in fact reckoned on the rift between the Bosniaks and the Croats and who profited most from the incitement of the conflict. By overcoming the conflict, reaching the agreements and implementing them, one creates an extremely important strategic balance, which significantly reduces the room for maneuver of the extremist and aggressive Serbian nationalism, thereby rendering the project of a Greater Serbia historically without prospects.

Third, [words indistinct] a significant step toward annulling the consequences of ethnic cleansing, because by adopting them one creates the political and legal prerequisites for the return of the refugees and displaced people to their homes, and by implementing them one ensures the realistic conditions for this.

Fourth, in realizing these agreements one relatively quickly opens the road for forming links with the Western world, above all through the status of associate member of the European Union, if we manage this, and with NATO within the Partnership for Peace. One does not need much political wisdom or knowledge to appreciate the importance of this prospect, so the chance should not be missed.

Fifth, the war devastation has had catastrophic consequences and the removal or recovery of these requires huge resources. Without the help of the developed world, the process of renewal, reconstruction, and development is almost unimaginable.

The concluded agreements and their implementation will render much more realistic our chances to receive the justly expected help. Finally, these agreements have been fully endorsed by the United States, the European Union, and many countries and international organizations.

This support is not only of a theoretical and verbal nature, but expresses a readiness to guarantee the agreements and to support their implementation with concrete measures and instruments, including the appropriate arrangements with the peacekeeping forces.

We therefore have the right to expect from the international community, and above all the United States, to do what is necessary to implement the project made with their support and help. Therefore, these are some of the more important reasons and goals that we had in mind when we concluded the Washington Agreement.

Ladies and gentlemen, deputies, allow me briefly to say something about some sections that go to make up the package of agreements, that is, the constitutional project of the federation, the preliminary agreement on the principles of the future confederation, the arrangement concerning the right of the Republic of Croatia to cross the Neum commune and the same right of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina concerning the lease of the port of Ploce, as well as the military agreement concluded in Split, which is an integral part of the package.

Regarding the constitutional project for establishing the federation, this project obviously represents the most acceptable answer to the question: How should the state be organized according to the needs of the citizens and people who live in this region? Relations within the federation are founded on the full equality of the Bosniak and Croatian peoples and the equality of all citizens. The organization of the federal and cantonal authorities consistently expresses these principles.

The duties of the federation are adequately defined and provide the absolutely necessary level of political and economic integration for the existence and functioning of the federal state. At the same time, a high degree of decentralization and the transfer of numerous powers of the state to the federal units and cantons, and the appropriate solutions on determining territories of the federal units have instantly eliminated all reasons for conflicts and clashes, save pretensions for conquest and separating parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The cantons as federal units are not defined exclusively according to the ethnic principle, because this is simply impossible in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course there will be cantons in which the Bosniaks or the Croats will make up 80 percent and cantons where this ratio will be almost 50-50 percent.

In either case, both the Bosniaks and the Croats are constituent nations, which means that a Croat or a Bosniak cannot be in a minority in any part of the federation, regardless of the number of members of that nation in a particular region. Therefore, the cantons are not to be considered exclusively national territories of either nation. Every federal unit is joint, as is the federation.

Regarding the constitutional project of the federation, there was full unanimity and I think that the act of adopting and promulgating the constitution will be [word indistinct]. Regarding the adoption of the constitution and the realization of provisional solutions, I will make some proposals later.

Regarding the preliminary agreement on the principles of the future confederation, I think that these principles have been defined in such a way that they completely guarantee the respect of all the state attributes of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the Republic of Croatia. The federation will not lose any of its characteristics regarding its sovereignty with the conclusion of the confederal agreement.

On the other hand, both the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, within the confederal relationship, are creating wide and firm prerequisites for the achievement of capital, economic, defense, and other interests.

Neither side is going into this confederal relationship blind. On the contrary, it has been envisaged that specific relations in every sphere be defined by separate agreements. The confederation is simply an expression of the real interests of the people and citizens, two states, and only as such can it be created and survive.

In this context is also the arrangement concerning the regime of crossing parts of the [Neum) commune, which is identical to the right of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the regime of crossing the territory of the Republic of Croatia to the port of Ploce. This arrangement is of mutual interest and represents an expression of mutual understanding and confidence building. The principle of reciprocity has in this case been fully respected, too.

Finally, regarding the military agreement, one should state that it is already being implemented according to a set pace, and that the results so far achieved are within expectations. Contacts are being held at the highest military level at which answers are successfully being found to the majority of outstanding issues. (?Of course), the final success of the full implementation of the military agreement depends to a great extent on steps to be taken in the sphere of politics. We must bear this in mind all the time when we hold political talks and make political decisions.

Therefore, in general, the agreements concluded represent a sound basis and an important step toward final, lasting, and just solutions. Although certain positive effects are already being felt, one must nevertheless bear in mind that their implementation is yet to come. This is a very (?responsible) and very complex and delicate job. [words indistinct] psychological, emotional barriers, calming of passions, and (?extremism) of all kinds.

This is not a call to forget or forgive. Crimes, regardless of who has committed them, cannot and must not be forgotten, nor can the perpetrators remain unpunished. Our future is not and cannot be made of only memories of crimes and injustice. Hating crime and criminals is understandable, but hating entire nations is a crime in itself.

The peoples on this territory have always been able to and wanted to live together; this is our future. I am not implying just the Bosniaks and Croats alone, but the Serbs as well. On this basis, there is an open invitation for the Serbs to join the agreement and live in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina like other peoples under the same conditions and with the same rights.

In any case, we will know how to respect those members of the Serbian nation who did not side with the perpetrators of crimes, especially those who actively contributed to the struggle against the aggression, the struggle for joint freedom and a joint state. They will most certainly not be second-class citizens, nor will members of all the other peoples. (?In) the democratic society that we want to build, there is no place for second-class citizens.

Esteemed deputies, although agreement has already been reached on the essential issues, we are still facing numerous decisions that will be neither simple nor easy

to make. Not because some people here want disagreements, but simply because the answers that need to be found are not simple and easy. I think that the very act of adopting and promulgating the constitution of a federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although the most important, represents the easiest part of the work, considering the consent that has already been achieved.

However, our aim is not only to adopt the constitution, but also to implement it quickly, consistently, and fully. To achieve this we urgently need to find and synchronize a certain number of legal, organizational, and staff solutions that must promptly follow the adoption of the constitution.

The transitional solutions include tight but (?manageable) deadlines if an agreement on some essential issues is reached in advance. Therefore, I consider important the proposal that within the discussion on the constitutional project we bring into line the views and opinions on those issues that need to be decided upon the adoption of the constitution. This is not some kind of political condition, but simply a practical approach to the realization of the established concept.

The transitional provisions envisage that the Assembly elect a transitional president and vice president of the federation and appoint a government immediately after the adoption of the constitution. The setting up of cantonal bodies is envisaged to take place within 30 days. The countdown to these deadlines will start with the adoption of the constitution and it would not be good if we found ourselves in a situation where these deadlines had not been met.

Therefore, I consider it important that the Assembly hold a continuous session so that solutions on which the realization of the constitution depend in this transitional period are found and synchronized, and that we then adopt the constitution.

Of course, a different order of moves is possible. This will finally be decided by the Assembly. Whatever the decision, we rightly believe that the all the participants in the work of the Assembly will be profoundly aware of our responsibility before our peoples, our citizens, the international community, God and the people, as it is commonly said.

Therefore, I appeal to you on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to (?support) and endorse the agreements that have been reached, and to invest all your energy in implementing them consistently and efficiently. Thank you. [applause]

Croats Refuse To Enter Sarajevo Assembly Hall

LD2903125494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1201 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Mar (TANJUG)—The radio of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna has reported that this morning Croat deputies refused to enter the hall in Sarajevo, where the Muslim-Croat assembly is meeting, until Croat national symbols are displayed along with Muslim symbols.

Ivan Bender, chairman of the chamber of deputies of the Assembly of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, told Croatian TV upon his arrival in Sarajevo that he would lodge a protest against the decision to start the Assembly proceedings without delegates from the Croatian Democratic Union of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Muslim Sarajevo radio, today's session has been postponed and will start at 1400.

Constitution To Be Approved

LD2903133394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] The constituent assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is supposed to approve the constitution of the new state federation, will be held tomorrow morning. This was stated to HINA [Croatian news agency] by Ivan Bender, president of the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. According to him, after the end of tomorrow's constituent assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna will leave Sarajevo in the afternoon.

Otherwise, the work of the regular assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina is continuing. The debate is about the draft constitution and the Washington agreement. The resumption of this session was planned for 1400 but up until this broadcast went on air, HINA's correspondent in Sarajevo had not obtained confirmation of this.

Bihac Deputies Support Federation Constitution

LD2803223594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Deputies of the Bihac assembly discussed the draft constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation at a session today. After an introductory speech by Mirsad Delagic, Bosnian government minister for regional coordination for the Bihac-Banja Luka district, and statements by the republic's deputies Adem Ibrahimpasic and Ejub Topic, deputies of the Bihac assembly praised this historic document and fully approved the proposed constitution. They also concluded that—due to administrative mistakes—a protest must be lodged with the chairman and the secretary general of the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament to request that invitations and documents for future sessions be sent to the Bihac deputies. [passage omitted]

Karadzic: FRY, Greek Troops Should Be Deployed

AU2903102394 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Mar 94 p 9

[Report by "D.K.": "Karadzic: Greek and Yugoslav Soldiers Should Come to Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[Text] Banja Luka, 27 Mar—After attending the meeting of the Communal Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party of Banja Luka and holding a longish talk with businessmen from the region, Radovan Karadzic commented for our newspaper on the Muslim spring offensive and the sending of Turkish troops.

"The Muslim spring offensive has begun and their offensive is taking place along all lines, and particularly on the Trebava battlefield near Doboj and toward Kupres. This offensive must stop. If the Muslims fail to atop their offensive, we would then have to launch a counteroffensive, and then we are no longer going to talk about territories. The Muslims can get territories for their state through negotiations, but if they nevertheless decide in favor of fighting, then the factual state will be decisive, as we cannot give back the territories for which young Serbian men are losing their lives. Therefore, it should be clear to the Muslim side and the international community that it is either war or peace here. If there is war by the will of the Muslims, then the Muslims must pay the price of that war," Karadzic said and added the following:

"As regards the sending of the Turkish troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is is another dangerous precedent involved here and I am afraid that this is the eclipse of the United Nations. I am afraid that the United Nations are quickly going in the direction of self-abolition, self-discredit, just as the case was with the League of the Nations before the World War II. If the arrival of Turkish troops leads to the escalation of the war, the UN secretary general and the Security Council will directly bear responsibility. We demand, and will do so officially, for FRY forces to be included in the Blue-Helmet forces. For, Russia is not a counterpart to Turkey, that is, Turkey is not a Russian counterpart. Russia is a counterpart to the United States, and Turkey is an interested Balkan country, so, apart from Greek soldiers, Yugoslav ones should join the forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Serb Congress Rejects Karadzic's 'Fascism'

AU2803200394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1303 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Report by Esad Cerovic]

[Text] The Congress of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended yesterday with the adoption of the Declaration of Citizens of Serbian Nationality. The Declaration asks the international community that they [the Serbian citizens] be included in negotiations on the integral peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the fact that many assessments consider that the Congress should have been organized at a much earlier date, this assembly in Sarajevo marks the process of differentiation and a national awakening of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It shows that this process is not deadlocked and it raises to the surface the question of whether the national feeling of the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina will take the form of the Bosnian Serbs journeying to a civic society.

Yesterday's Congress in Sarajevo answers this question. This Congress was the matriculation examination for the Serbs who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their "No" to fascism, primitivism, and national socialism. What had been halted by force and ideology—as was evident at yesterday's Congress of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina—has come out of the shadows and offered light in place of darkness and truth in place of lies. It has also shown a tie to the Bosnian land and the desire to live with all the other peoples. Karadzic's grim ideology, an ideology of darkness, murder, massacre, expulsion, national socialism, was unmasked at the Sarajevo Congress, and the [word indistinct] that he represents all the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina was taken away from him. With this, the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina have lifted to the level of reality their chance not to live at the tail of events, but to move on toward Europe, toward a civic society. The personal feeling of belonging to an ethnic identity must certainly be respected, and it will be. That is why we need to differentiate both in alphabet and speech. The right to be called Bosnian Serbs belongs to that part of the Serbian people that yesterday clearly expressed its political position.

To put it as nicely as one of the participants in the Congress of Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina put it: Karadzic can probably represent only that part of the people that voted for him and that unreservedly support him, or—more precisely—the chetnik part, the part that sees the chetnik ideology as its own. This ideology has always ended up on the garbage heap of history.

Of course, yesterday's Congress in Sarajevo did not appeal to the [word indistinct] factory of lies. A commentary speaks about passers-by that were picked up off the street. However, in the name of truth, the Serbian people—those who may have been unable to see this gathering—need to be told that the following people actively participated and were present in the congress hall: Ljubomir Berberovic, Tihomir Berberovic, lawyer Zarko Bulic, Miro Lazovic [B-H Assembly chairman], [Presidency member] Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic, [Presidency member] Mirko Pejanovic, Dragutin Braco Kosovac, Mico Rakic, Nikola Kovac, Nada Mladina, Gavrilo Grahovac, Goran Simic, and Zivko Babic. Every Serb, regardless of where he lives, is probably aware that Dragutin Braco Kosovac, Mico Rakic, and Ljubomir Berberovic have far more distinguished reputations than the criminals Karadzic, Koljevic, and Krajisnik.

Theories that advocate the existence of (?worthless) peoples and states are wrong. Yesterday's Congress of the citizens of Serbian nationality struck a blow to Karadzic's theory of the impossibility of joint existence and his primitive nationalism, and this blow will send it to where it belongs—the garbage heap of history.

Leader Comments on Congress

AU2803170894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Mediha Colo report on news conference by Mirko Pejanovic, president of the Serbian Civic Council, on results of 27 March Congress of Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina—recorded]

[Text] [Colo] President of the Serbian Civic Council Mirko Pejanovic first stressed that the reactions to the Congress of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina were favorable, both in the country and abroad. He then singled out a few significant things pertaining to the congress.

[Pejanovic] The first thing is that the congress has shown that citizens of Serbian nationality who live on the territory under the control of the legitimate authorities and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are tremendously determined to fight for a shared life. They have exhibited this determination by participating—together with the democratic and civic options from the Croatian and Muslim nations—in the resistance and defense of the multinational and multicultural essence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The other thing manifested at yesterday's congress is that the adopted declaration is founded on basic political aims that are incorporated in the platform and work of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. The declaration reaffirms two principles of this platform: The principle of ethnic equality and Bosnia-Herzegovina's unity within its internationally recognized borders, and in this context, support for solutions designed to resolve the Bosnian issue based on the concept of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Colo] This solution is considered optimal because it allows local self-management, regional and cultural autonomy, and joint institutions, the most important of which is the Council of Peoples where the vital interests of each nation will be realized, stressed Pejanovic, and continued:

[Pejanovic] The third thing I would like to stress is that the congress of citizens of Serb nationality was held in the spirit of efforts and demands for the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Colo] Mr. Pejanovic then explained to correspondents that the Congress of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina had proposed that deputies in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly who are from the ranks of the Serbian people draft an amendment to the proposed Constitution of the Bosniak Muslim and Croat Federation.

[Pejanovic] The amendment consists of only one word. The word Serbs should be added to the list of peoples listed in the part of the Constitution that refers to constituent peoples.

[Colo] The Serbian Civic Council will draw up its program for peace initiatives and talks aimed at finding an integral solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina. One such meeting—with Mr. Charles Redman—has been set for Wednesday [30 March]. This council, together with progressive Muslim and Croatian forces, will contribute to the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We shall also request firmer international pressure in finding a political solution with the so-called third, Serbian side, in which the opinion of the Serbian Civic Council will be one of the factors involved in finding this solution, said Mirko Pejanovic, president of the Serbian Civic Council, at today's news conference.

Rift in Liberal Bosniak Organization Explained

AU2903150394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Edin Nuhic report on a news conference by Muhamed Filipovic, chairman of the Liberal Bosniak Organization, in Sarajevo on 29 March—recorded]

[Text] At the start of the news conference academician Muhamed Filipovic stressed that he was holding the news conference as chairman of the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO], legally elected at the recently held party convention. He said that—instead of a central committee of the party—a War Presidency was appointed at the first war convention of the party held last year. That decision was interpreted in different ways, making it necessary to call another convention. The decision to do this was completely legal and in accordance with the party's statute. The dilemmas about whether the Party Presidency had the right to call this convention had caused a political rift in the party.

Adil Zulfikarpasic stated that I betrayed the party, Filipovic stressed, adding: Those who believe that my involvement in the state delegation and my acceptance of the ambassadorial post in Switzerland are acts of betrayal, they are opposed to the independence and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After all, Filipovic added, the public is aware that my involvement in the state delegation prevented the signing of the partition of Bosnia. Therefore, to attack such a man means to be committed to a policy opposed to this.

The reporters reminded Filipovic that he had stated at the party convention that Zulfikarpasic in no way financed the LBO during the war, and that he had called in April 1992 on the members of the party to overthrow Alija Izetbegovic. The reporters were interested in why those facts were not made public before. Filipovic said that he did not want [words indistinct] Zulfikarpasic to give up on Bosnia, since he was still hoping that the latter would be able to offer some kind of help. Filipovic also said that it was not true that Zulfikarpasic had been trying to obtain weapons for the defense of the country, as he had been telling foreign and some domestic media. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and Government are acquainted with this fact.

Finally, in confirmation of Filipovic's statements, Salih Foco, newly elected deputy chairman of the LBO, added that the LBO committees in Tuzla and Zenica had been disbanded because of inconsistencies concerning the implementation of party policy and at the insistence of some members of the regional committees.

Krajisnik Alleges UNPROFOR Bias

LD2803155294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Text] Novi Sad, 28 Mar (TANJUG)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the assembly of the Srpska republic, has described as strange the behavior and mediation of UN Protection Force members in most places where the Muslim spring offensive has begun. In a statement to Radio Novi Sad, he assessed that UN forces are attempting to calm the situation only in places where the Muslim forces are not having successes. "It is for precisely this reason that we have sent a protest to the United Nations, stressing in particular the examples of the battlefields near Maglaj, Bihac, and some others," Krajisnik added. He stressed that forecasts of a Muslim offensive have turned out to be true and he confirmed that Muslims are obtaining weapons from abroad.

Muslims, Croats Step Up Attacks on Serbs

LD2903134594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1252 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Banja Luka, March 29 (TANJUG)—Forces of the Bosnian Moslems and of the army of Bosnian Croats (HVO) have intensified their attacks on Serb positions and settlements in the central, northern and western parts of the ex-Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb military sources announced on Tuesday.

The announcement said Moslem troops intensified mortar fire in the region of the central Bosnian town of Srbobran (formerly Donji Vakuf). It added that Moslems continued using infantry arms, anti-aircraft guns and rifle-launched rockets in their fierce attacks on Serb positions on the western Bosnian battlefronts of Bihac and Novi Grad (formerly Bosanski Novi).

In the Moslem attacks on Bihac, one Serb defender was killed and the Serb side was forced to fire back, but it did not respond to the attacks on Novi Grad where there were no casualties, the announcement said. It added that on Monday, after 13 days of fighting, the army of Bosnian Serbs stopped an offensive launched by Moslems on March 16 and aimed at capturing the central Bosnian heights of Kupres. Bosnian Serb troops pushed the Moslems back towards the nearby town of Bugojno up north.

The Moslem attack on the Kupres heights, as the Bosnian Serb military sources said, was planned as part of the offensive launched to seize the town of Srbobran and later the town of Jajce.

The sources cautioned against fresh fierce attacks by Moslem forces which were redeploying themselves towards Srbobran and Kupres, moving in there their men and materiel from Travnik and Gornji Vakuf, the central Bosnian towns where they had fought Bosnian Croats.

The sources said the army of Bosnian Croats overnight fiercely attacked the positions of Serb defenders in the northern Bosnian stretch of the Sava valley, especially those outside the Serb villages of Jenjic and Lepnica, but there were no casualties and the defenders had not responded.

Serb Artillery Attacks on Gorazde Renewed

AU2903114694

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 29 March reports intensified fighting in the following areas:

As the announcer in the studio reports, quoting correspondent Enes Musovic, "since 0515 this morning the aggressor's artillery has been firing a shell every second at the defense lines and the civilian quarters. The attacks are particularly concentrating in the region of Gradina on the right bank of the Drina River, from the direction of Foca and Cajnice." As correspondent from Gorazde Fahrudin Bekcic then reports, "eight injured and one killed is the final outcome of the chetnik rampage over the last 24 hours. The artillery attacks that had started yesterday stopped briefly just after midnight, to be continued with even greater ferocity at 0510 this morning. More than 2,000 shells of various calibers have landed in a matter of only a few hours. The aggressor is displaying the most intense attacks in the direction of Cajnice. They are attacking the entire defense line on the right bank of the Drina River between Osanica and Ustipraca with howitzers, tanks, mortars of all calibers, antiaircraft machine guns, self-propelled antiaircraft artillery, and hill guns. Another 10 trucks with fresh enemy forces arrived in this area at approximately 0500 hours. Perfectly reliable information claims that there are numerous Montenegrin reservists and mercenaries among them." As Bekcic continues to report, "the situation is equally dramatic on the other side, in the part of the battlefield toward Rogatica and in other directions." He concludes that "according to the reports from the field, this is the most powerful attack in this region" so far.

A report by Smajl Terzic from the information service of the 7th South Operative Group of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army claims that "the aggressor has been attacking the defense lines in the zone of responsibility of the 7th South Operative Group from all available arms overnight. The situation was the most stormy near (Buzno Groblje) and (?Plane), where the united units in a counteroffensive pushed the chetniks back and conquered domineering elevations from which the enemy had been pounding the free territory day and night. Plenty of ammunition and arms were seized in this

action. In retaliation for numerous losses in manpower and military hardware, the chetniks shelled the civilian targets in Mrkotic where one woman died. They are constantly attacking the Pejici-Bandera defense line, as well as (Krh and Svijakovac) from Dedovo Brdo."

Relief Supplies Cut Off

AU2803183494

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 28 March carries in its regular 35-minute newscast three reports on the combat situation in the republic.

Gorazde correspondent Enes Musovic reports that "an artillery attack at Mijanovici, from the direction of Miljane, is still in progress. The chetniks still do not believe that they cannot take another inch of the Gorazde free territory, although they are using the most destructive mortar shells, tanks, Pragas, and other deadly weapons. New groups of chetniks have reached Kozara, Ogorjevac, Duge, and Praca. The reconnaissance units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army East Bosnian Operative Group have noticed that the chetniks are mining the railroad line in [name indistinct] on the Rogatica-Ilidza road. They have also noticed a large concentration of aggressor's forces in this area. In addition to attacking all the defense lines in the area of the Gorazde Municipality, the chetniks have managed to cut short the supply of humanitarian aid to Gorazde."

Correspondent Velid Djindo reports on the situation in Olovo and says that "this morning's gunfire announced another fierce day of war. The enemy guns were soon joined by mortars, which shelled military and civilian targets with the heaviest shells. Attacks at Olovo continued in the afternoon hours. We have no information about the consequences of the aggressor's attacks."

The studio announcer reads a report by the 1st Corps Information Service and says that "the aggressor today violated the cease-fire in the Sarajevo area. There were small arms' provocations from Nedzarici, from the direction of the Bosut barracks. The enemy snipers were particularly active, which resulted in the wounding of two members of our Army in Hladivode and Stupsko Brdo. The 1st Corps troops did not respond to these provocations."

UNHCR Suspends 'Vital' Aid Route

AU2903122494 Paris AFP in English 1214 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 29 (AFP)—Fighting was reported in northern Bosnia Tuesday [29 March], as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees suspended a vital overland aid route into the region. In Geneva, UNHCR spokeswoman Sylvana Foa said all convoys to the northern enclave of Banja Luka via Serb-held territory would be suspended until further notice. Radio Sarajevo reported clashes between the Moslem-led Bosnian army and Bosnian Serb forces around the northern town of Maglaj. In Vitez, a UN Protection Force spokesman said Moslem and Croatian forces had pushed back Bosnian Serb forces by several kilometers (miles) to the west of Maglaj, echoing the radio report. Spokesman Rod Tracy, citing Moslem sources in Maglaj, said the Moslem and Croat forces had advanced to Mount Gavranic, 7 kilometers (4 miles) to the west of the town. Tracy added that the British battalion based here had given Moslem forces at Zenica a 24-hour ultimatum to withdraw six anti-aircraft guns deployed in the region in violation of a ceasefire agreement. Echoing these reports, a Belgrade newspaper said Tuesday that eight civilians, including three children, were killed in Moslem shelling of the Bosnian Serb-held town of Doboj, also in northern Bosnia. The daily BORBA cited military officials as saying that the Moslem-led Bosnian army opened fire from positions at Matuzici to the southwest of the town, launching several dozen mortars onto the town.

Bosnian Serbs have reported an upsurge in fighting in the region around Doboj, as well as around Brcho, Kupres, over the last few days. Their leader Radovan Karadzic threatened on Sunday [27 March] to launch a counter-attack. In Geneva, Foa said the decision to suspend aid convoys to Banja Luka had been taken after an incident on Saturday at the UNHCR depot in the enclave, in which police seized 12 palettes of aid supplies from two UN trucks. She said only local officials had been at the time of the seizure. The police said the aid was to be distributed in Banja Luka, but they had not been authorized to take the aid, Foa said. Foa added that the suspension of convoys in the region would remain in force until the issue was resolved. "We have suspended convoys through the Banja Luka area until this is settled," she said.

The UNHCR warehouse in Banja Luka is used to store supplies not only for the town but also for other Moslem-held enclaves in central Bosnia. Radio Sarajevo also reported fighting Tuesday around the eastern enclave of Gorazde, with Serbs launching intense mortar attacks on the town. One person had been killed and eight injured, the radio said. It added that Serbian reinforcements had arrived in a dozen trucks on the other side of the Drina river.

Meanwhile Tracy added in Vitez that the head of British forces, Sir Charles Guthrie, was scheduled to arrive in the region Tuesday for a two-day visit taking in Vitez, Gornji Vakuf and Zepce. Separately here Tuesday, the resumption of a session of the Bosnian parliament was delayed for procedural reasons. Lawmakers are due to discuss the adoption of a constitution of a future Moslem-Croat federation.

Granic Addresses Chamber on Washington Accords

LD2903125594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] A complete solution to the problems in southeast Europe will not be possible without leading EU [European Union] members and the Russian Federation, and especially not without the prominent and decisive role of the United States. Dr. Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, said this when he submitted a report on the Washington agreements to the Croatian Parliament's Chamber of Deputies. Here is a report by Jasminka Dudic:

[Dudic] With the Washington agreements we are entering a new era of relations with the world. It is our view that we have real prospects and guarantees that we will in future resolve our aspirations and difficulties with the help and support of the international community. The doors to inclusion in both the Council of Europe and the EU, entry into the Partnership for Peace initiative, and financial support from the world are opening for us, Dr. Granic said.

After recalling the road of the Croatian president and of our foreign policy which led to the Washington agreements, Dr. Granic stressed that the path ahead of us will not be simple and that now, in the negotiations on the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia- Herzegovina, the Serb side should also be included.

Speaking about the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the reintegration of the UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones, Dr. Granic also said:

[Begin Granic recording] We have firm guarantees that the sanctions, the possible alleviation of them, or even their substitution will be and will remain a crucial means for achieving a just and satisfactory solution both in Croatia and in Bosnia- Herzegovina. In other words, sanctions will continue to remain in place as a punishment but also as a stimulus and as a signal to the Serb side, in other words to Belgrade, that this is now an exceptionally favorable moment for the achievement of a global solution and for a new leaf to be turned. [end recording]

[Dudic] The Croatian signature on the Washington documents is an expression of the continuity of Croatian state policy vis-a-vis the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the legitimate aspirations of the Croat people. However, on the consequences of the unpreparedness of the international community to put a stop to the Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing, Dr. Granic said:

[Begin Granic recording] These have led to phenomena of the exacerbation of the circle of distrust and a conflict of interests even amongst the victims of the Greater Serb aggression. The violation of international and war law, which has occurred on both sides and which further deepened tensions, should not be forgotten either. Serious clashes took place between members of the Croat and Muslim Bosniak nations, and these became ever more destructive both for the relations between these two nations and also for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, for the unity of the Croatian nation, and for the position of the Republic of Croatia in the world.

In the struggle against the Serb aggressor, the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina developed its own armed forces as well as its own institutions of power in the form of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and it expressed its awareness that future resolutions of its position must be developed, starting from the principles of full respect for its sovereign will in those areas where for centuries it has been the majority population. The Republic of Croatia was not able to remain indifferent to the other sides in respect of the ever more explicit danger for the whole of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

[Dudic] The foreign minister also dwelled in detail on the strategic importance of the agreements and documents signed and said, among other things, that the preliminary agreement starts clearly from the separate identities of two states which do not intend to rush into the immediate creation of a confederation, but go for cooperation in the economic and defense fields. The Croatian leadership will persevere in its policies to achieve the reintegration of the UNPA zones, in other words the peaceful option, but, Dr. Granic stressed, we cannot accept the continuation and intensification of the current situation for the forseeable future. He repeated Croatian demands connected with changes to and the greater effectiveness of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. He also stressed that in future we will link the process of the normalization of relations with the FRY with progress in the process of the reintegration of temporarily occupied territory into the overall systems of the Republic of Croatia.

At the end of his address, Dr. Granic once again recalled that the basic aims of our overall policy—including our foreign policy—remain unchanged and that in this process we are remaining faithful to a firm orientation toward Europe. A debate on the report on the Washington agreements is under way in the Chamber of Deputies.

Delegation Leader Comments on Sarajevo Talks

LD2803134294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpt] The Croat delegation to the Sarajevo talks numbers 44 members in all, 28 of whom are deputies in the assembly of Herceg-Bosna. They are being led by Kresimir Zubak, president of the Presidential Council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, Ivan Bender, president of the Chamber of Deputies, Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic, and General Ante Roso.

Prior to their departure, Kresimir Zubak told us:

[Begin Zubak recording] I am convinced that we will reach agreement in Sarajevo regarding the procedures of the session itself and that we will this evening in Sarajevo also approve the draft [constitution].

It is envisaged that when the constitution comes into effect, if it is approved this evening, then it should come into effect tonight at 2400. The next day there should be elections for the interim president and vice president of the federation, but these elections must be preceded by a political agreement. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Serb-Croat Talks Resume in Zagreb

LD2903103394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Cease-fire talks between the delegation of the Republic of Croatia and representatives of rebel Serbs from the UNPA [UN Protected Areas] zones resumed at 1100 in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb. These talks, which began 22 March, were adjourned because of additional consultations by both sides and consideration of the proposals which emerged during the talks.

Today's talks are being attended for the first time by Charles Redman, the special envoy of the U.S. President. Vitaliy Churkin, special envoy of the Russian president, and U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith were also taking part. The Croatian delegation comprises Engineer Hrvoje Sarinic, Slavko Degoricija, Gen Petar Stipetic, Naval Captain Davor Domazet, Smiljana Reljic and Budimir Pleskina. The Serbs from the UNPA zones are being represented at the talks by Dusan Rakic, Slobodan Jarcevic, Mile Novakovic, and Aco Draca.

The meeting in the Russian Embassy is being chaired by representatives of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, ambassadors Geert Ahrens and Kai Aide. The only subject of the talks, it has been announced, will be an agreement on a cease-fire and in this connection the separation of forces.

Mediator 'Optimistic' on Truce

AU2903123994 Paris AFP in English 1228 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 29 (AFP)—Ceasefire talks between Croatia and rebel Krajina Serbs resumed at the Russian Embassy here Tuesday [29 March] after a week-long break, with one of the co-chairmen optimistic they would achieve a truce.

The negotiations, the first since the conflict erupted two years ago, broke off on March 22 after failing to reach a ceasefire agreement. The talks were brokered by Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin.

Kai Eide, the UN representative who is co-chairing the talks with European Union Ambassador Gert Ahrens, said: "I think that we will now conclude the cease-fire agreement and then we will look for the implementation of it."

The talks are aimed solely at forging a ceasefire between the two sides. The rebel Serbs have proclaimed a separatist republic, the Serb republic of Krajina (RSK), on roughly a quarter of Croatian territory.

Eide said the negotiating teams have spent the last week studying the oustanding problems. "We carried out... preparation on the ground and on the maps," he said, adding that there were a "few remaining issues. I think that it is up to the political determination of the two parties to solve them." "We certainly expect them to have that determination," he added.

John Mills, spokesman for the mediators, said after the start of Tuesday's talks that: "the Krajina and the Croatian delegates, with a military negotiation team, immediately started working on the maps.

"There is determination (and) impatience to get results. This is an opportunity that should not be allowed to go by," he added.

Martic Letter Protests Croatian 'State Terror'

LD2803140694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1218 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Text] Knin, 28 Mar (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], sent a letter today to Butrus-Ghali, secretary general of the UN Security Council, in connection with the extension of the UN peacekeeping forces' mandate. The letter says:

Excellency,

The people of the RSK welcome your report to the Security Council of 16 March 1994, because you proposed extending the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces in the RSK and the Republic of Croatia until 31 March 1995. This decision, with the involvement of the United States and the Russian Federation, will prevent further bloodshed and destruction. However, I expect great problems on the road to achieving a final peace, because the expectations intimated in your letter to the Security Council of 28 January 1994 have not been fulfilled.

At that time you expressed your intention of carrying out a detailed assessment of the role and functioning of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] before the Security Council considered extending its mandate. This assessment—although it was made with the assistance of command centers under Yasushi Akashi, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, and all the UNPROFOR Officials, at least according to your report—does not make a single mention of the suffering of the Serbian nation in Croatia, or does it condemn this UN member for its state terror against Serbs, which began in 1990.

You are well aware that the Republic of Croatia was the first to begin ethnic cleansing and that, according to your report of 15 May 1993, UNPROFOR had registered, up until 18 March 1993, 251,000 exiled Serbs in the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia alone. Despite this, in

your latest report—in Section III, point five, paragraph "d"—you request that refugees be returned only to areas under UN control. In other words, the Serbs driven out of Croatian towns—and at that time, on 15 May 1993, you said that they were greater in number than the Croatians who used to live in the RSK before 1991—do not concern you.

In point six, you accuse us of having a different view on the UNPROFOR mandate, while we are only asking that the facts on the expulsion of Serbs from Croatia be registered in the normative documents of the United Nations, and only then will the UN Security Council be in a position to make just and unbiased decisions.

Your Excellency,

We have lost so much time and the UN has failed to identify the causes of the Serbian-Croatian war. Attention was focused on 25 percent of the territory of former Croatia which is now part of the republic of Serb Krajina, while 75 percent of the territory—under the control of Croatian authorities—has been totally omitted from your assessments. It is precisely the territory of the Republic of Croatia which has seen the most cases of ethnic cleansing, destruction, and killing of the Serbian people. The information center of the Serbian Council, a non-governmental and non profit-making organization, with its headquarters in 7 Safarik Street, Belgrade, tel. 3221 108, has discovered the existence of 87 mass graves. There, and in other as yet unidentified places of execution, lie over 14,000 Serbian civilians killed by members of the Croatian MUP [Interior Ministry police].

Do not be astonished to find that peace is so difficult to bring about along the Krajina-Croatia borders. All you are considering is part of the problem, the one linked with the RSK territory, or, as indicated in UN documents, UN Protection Areas. Without an appropriate analysis and without making an official record of the fate of the Serbs expelled from Croatia, you are searching for a solution in vain, especially given that Croatia began its state terror, the expulsion of Serbs, back in 1990. Croatia is the only culprit for the Serbian-Croatian war, and the only one responsible for the creation of two ethnic states—the Srpska republic and the Republic of Croatia.

Tudjman Apologizes to Jewish Community

LD2803183694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman this evening received a film personality of world acclaim—Branko Lustig, the producer of "Schindler's List"—and awarded him with the Order of Prince Trpimir. [passage omitted]

Tudjman said: As president of today's democratic state of Croatia, I take this opportunity to apologize to you and all members of the Jewish community on behalf of those who took part in the Holocaust and enforced the Nazi-fascist racist laws in the NDH [the Independent State of Croatia, a World War II Nazi puppet-state]. At the same time, it is with pleasure that I stress the historical truth that the large majority of the Croatian nation condemned all types of that criminal policy, and many Croats took an active part in the antifascist struggle, including myself, who, as a young man fought for four years. It is probably not a coincidence that it is a man like myself—a man from the ranks of the Croatian antifascist movement—who is leading the modern democratic Croatian state, but neither is the fact that your hometown Osijek came under threat in our time, and its surroundings suffered the crime of ethnic cleansing. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister on Cooperation With Bulgaria

AU2803162094 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 28 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Crvenkovski-Daskalov Meeting"]

[Text] Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic on Macedonia—FYROM] Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, together with his associates, met with the Bulgarian counterpart Stanislav Daskalov, who paused in Skopje on his way to Albania. The talks focused on future development of Macedonian-Bulgarian relations and cooperation. Both ministers stressed the need to intensify and regulate mutual economic and traffic relations, in spite of present sanctions and blockades.

Commentary Views Regional Security Issues

AU2803134094 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 25 Mar 94 p 6

[Commentary by Mirka Velinovska: "Season of Confederations"]

[Excerpts] Even if it is proven that most of the world's media have assessed the United States' and Russia's performances badly, saying that they only appeared to be participating in the settlement of the Balkan problems and that it was not actually a rerun of Yalta, the unavoidable conclusion is that the changing world has been caught in a contradiction. It needs a break to gain time and see where and how to go on. Forces are once again gathering, the process is reversed. The blocs fell apart, the problems that had existed before transformed themselves into mutant forms after the balance of the bipolar world was disturbed, and neither now nor in the near future will there be any efficient mechanisms for their solution. Therefore, there will probably be, if only for a short time, a return to the old tried and tested experiences. That is why there is Russian presence in the Balkans. The Russian Blue Helmets have been in Croatia, as part of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces], since the beginning of the mission, but they went to Bosnia at Karadjic's request. This was an excuse, they took advantage of the good opportunity. One of the political anomalies is that Russia has now achieved something it could never do before [the Russian presence in Bosnia]—neither in czarist times, nor through ideology, let alone during Tito's lifetime—with UN sponsorship and as a partner of the United States.

Maybe the world is trying to dress its ranks, to think in a different way, but it is a fact that it is still following the pattern it has shaped and that is the reason for us, in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], to believe that all solutions are possible, and expected, in the still undefined political territory that is the Balkans. Let us not forget that Macedonia is not in the CSCE system of collective security, it is not on the list of countries with a ticket for the Partnership for Peace plan, the United States has frozen the establishment of diplomatic relations, and in that sense, all options are still possible.

What was the role of Greece in urging Russia to enter the Balkans—practically at the gates of NATO? Logically, there should not be many reasons, but just take a look at what is going on: Andrey Kozyrev was in Athens at precisely the time when Greece announced the introduction of the economic blockade against Macedonia and not only did he say nothing regarding the blockade but, until the present day we have not yet heard any official Russian stance on this issue, except for its readiness to mediate in the dispute. Probably Kozyrev knows that there is already a mediator in the dispute with Greece; it is Cyrus Vance, and the new dispute is not a problem of a bilateral nature, but a problem the European Union has with one of its members, and it is not a dispute, but a unilateral declaration of economic war. Therefore, one gets the unavoidable impression that Kozyrev thought it was good that that Russia has now increased its activity on the territory of former Yugoslavia, it could finish its job and extend the zone of Russian interest to a point that Russia was never allowed to reach before. Even more than that, because "we and the Russians are Slavs," and moreover, we are orthodox. Russia has not abandoned its legitimate interest in Bulgaria despite the altered milieu there. Recently, in Bulgaria, as the concept of an orthodox-western division strengthened, a "concern about the possible transfer of the Bosnia syndrome to Bulgarian soil" appeared and the Muslim (Turkish) minority was mentioned as a danger, as well as Turkey itself, which is a sign that the Orthodox-Slav concept has its supporters in Bulgaria, who disturb the United States' interest in the East-West transversal.

Another subsidiary effect, no less important in such a strategy if it is applied to Macedonia, is that Russia could outflank Kosovo and Albania, which is totally different from having the United States outflank Serbia. Somewhat below, some 200 kilometers to the south, there is Greece, a barrier to the greater ambitions of the orthodox allies, under the full protection of the United States and the European Union, a pet that was given a role in the blocs' world. It is very well thought of, and it has to be mentioned that it was well prepared. It is not known what and how big the contribution of major partner, the United States, was in all this, but that Greece came up with this idea is perfectly well known. At times through direct channels, at others through indirect channels, official Macedonia received signals of "attractive" offers, and as is always the case, they were followed by the threat that was it not for Greece and Serbia, Macedonia would collapse. Just take a look at the Serbian press lately, it is totally obvious, just listen to the statements of the Serbian politicians and "scientists" and everything becomes clear. Vuk Draskovic has already opened the season of confederations, saying, or better wishing, to see Macedonia in confederal relations with Serbia, that is logical for him. In BORBA of 22 March, in the report from Washington titled "Through

Krajina to the Yugo-Basket" it was written that "the agreement between Washington and Moscow on Krajina is an announcement of their joint activity in finding a loose confederal structure for former Yugoslavia (without Slovenia, and Macedonia for now)." On the other hand, there is the view of Croat journalist Gojko Marinkovic that "a long time ago, the United States provided itself with a big aircraft carrier in 'Eastern Yugoslavia' called Macedonia."

That seems to be the crux of Greece's dissatisfaction. It is using direct, and other, means to marginalize Macedonia's position in order to return to other questions of top national interest—Cyprus and the Greek minority in Albania, which were referred to by the contradictory [Greek Alternate Foreign Affairs Minister Theodhoros] Pangalos as even more important than the border with Macedonia, for which he recommended another policy, because the one implemented by Greece at this moment "is understood by no one in the world." This diplomat, if everything, is okay with his thinking machine [as published], which allows him to make logical judgments, as shown by his latest statement that "the border with our country will remain closed because the embargo is just and the reasons deep," but we should expect changes in Greek policy, as well as in the behavior of the people.

Whatever it might imply, it seems to me that the Europeans and the United States are rubbing our nose in it, just on the eve of Papandreou's visit to Washington, which has now been postponed three times, with a possibility of also being postponed this time. If an expressedly anti-American rally of 1 million people is under preparation in Salonika, reinforced by the possible visit of John Shalikasvili to Macedonia at the beginning of April, the Clinton-Papandreou meeting will be at risk. In any case, the integral statement of Pangalos should be understood as an announcement of the agenda of the Washington meeting and as a presentation of two additional open and awkward problems in the White House Oval Office related to its zone of interest. However, all this does not mean that Greece has lost its favorable position in relation to Macedonia, or its interest in us. Pangalos should not be trusted when he says that the issue that his country has created is of a lesser importance than the ones he announced, or the ones he defrosted. It would be naive. Greece will still be engaged in marginalize Macedonia, but this time with the help of other means. An example of the directions of the "new Greek policy" may be the attempt at the European Conference on Transport, where it [Greece] proposed the construction of the Drac-Salonika-Istanbul corridor, with the aim of by-passing Macedonia. The proposal was not adopted because transport can not be influenced easily by one country's wishes, and it is of great interest to many factors. Even such a proposal does not give the answer to the question about the north-west corridor, which is as important, if not more important, for Greece. In this case, Macedonia cannot be avoided, unless Greece presents a reserve plan for a repeated by-passing of Macedonia—that part of the road should go across Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia.

Concerned about how to make all its moves, our neighbor, it seems, has not counted on the simple fact that the United States will not easily give up its strategic interests and games merely out of friendship with Greece. Russia is also not a country that can be tricked. You cannot trade with it the way the "Salonika merchants" are doing, presenting the Macedonian-Greek dispute the way they want to, without receiving an adequate reply from the United States. The United States has—just after the experience in Bosnia- Herzegovina, where Russia became the guarantor for Karadjic's Serbs—announced and implemented its own symbolic additional presence in Macedonia within the frameworks of UNPROFOR. It looked like an extra deposit on a deposit for a certain territory. Moreover, reliable sources revealed to us that the unestablished, frozen U.S. ambassador comes with a team composed of mainly economic experts, therefore it is normal to think that the plan for a greater Russian component on our territory will not be possible for the moment. Nevertheless, we should not be lulled by this relatively well-defined Macedonian position. It does not mean that such attempts and definite Greek-Serbian pressures on Macedonia will disappear. In the text above we mentioned the elements of concern. Let us add to them: The world community, particularly the United States and the European Union, has not offered Macedonia much from its pockets except for its ponderous sympathy and respect. Not much has been left out of the decision that it was indispensable to provide financial aid in order to make some small compensation for the damage caused by the blockade against Serbia and Montenegro, including the damage that is yet to come after the Greek unilateral blockade. Here and there we can hear that a certain country eased its conscience with a couple of million dollars, in a situation when everyone knows your needs are for hundreds of millions of dollars. If that becomes part of the basket of preventive diplomacy that is now being exercised in our country, then there will hardly be any effects of the prevention if the citizens of Macedonia don't make their own contribution. In other words, the best prevention is ourselves and our awareness that this is a very dangerous situation, and a policy that will not help in our own destruction. Trade and the partners' balance of forces are on course, and we have no serious guarantees for the final outcome. If Europe existed as Toto Cottugno sang about it—united and with strong national interests in each separate country member for the creation of a joint European policy—that would be another story.

Defense Minister Jansa Impeached; Kacin Appointed

AU2903071094 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Last night, after a nine-hour extraordinary session on the impeachment of the defense minister, the State Chamber deputies, with 49 votes in favor and 39 against, relieved Janez Jansa of the duty of defense minister. With 48 votes in favor and 39 votes against, Jelko Kacin became the new defense minister.

LDS Leader on Jansa Removal

AU2903082194 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] The head of the club of deputies of the Liberal Democracy Party [LDS], Jozef Skoljc, says that the proposal to impeach minister Jansa was not a proposal to alter the political balance of powers:

[Begin Skoljc recording] In a way, at least in my opinion, it is very problematic if the cooperation in the coalition is made conditional on a certain minister being untouchable. This is a new position in these talks and neither the Christian Democrats nor the Social Democrats have ever championed this position so far.

It is also rather nonpolitical to say that the Social Democrats equal Janez Jansa. The Social Democrats were given an opportunity to take part in the government. Now, whether they will decide for cooperation or not is another matter. However, the fact is that whenever somebody has been replaced so far, parties did not leave the government coalition because of it. Woe to those parties that are prisoners of the ambitions of their presidents! [end recording]

Social Democrats Leave Coalition

AU2903080894 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Joze Pucnik, head of the club of deputies of the Social Democrats, gave the following statement:

[Begin Pucnik recording] I shall say it directly—the Social Democrats no longer have any business in this coalition. The manner in which the prime minister got rid of our president, the defense minister [Janez Jansa], is such that even discussion is no longer possible. What next? Regarding certain issues, we have been in opposition so far. Now we will, of course, pursue these things even more consistently. The opposition parties do not have much scope and the same applies to us. We will shift the focus of our activity outside the parliament, in strengthening the organization, attracting new members, and forming new local organizations, and thus, preparing ourselves for the local elections that will take place at the end of this year. [end recording]

Christian Democrats Respond

AU2903081594 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] President of the Christian Democrats Lojze Peterle said that the party council will analyze the situation that has emerged. He reminded of the prevailing opinion in the party council, which is opposed to the party remaining in the coalition:

[Begin Peterle recording] In keeping with the obligation by the council, we are working on the possibility of either staying or leaving the government. The latter possibility is definitely stronger. As you will recall, we demanded that Jansa and the Social Democrats be in the government. Once they leave the government, the roughly balanced formula will break down. We have repeated, on several occasions, that we do not intend to stay in the government at all costs and in anybody's company. [end recording]

10,000 Rally in Support of Jansa

LD2803192594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1856 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Ljubljana, 28 Mar (TANJUG)—Around 10,000 supporters of compromised Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa continued their rally in support of Jansa in front of the parliament building in Ljubljana this evening. Surrounded by a police cordon, angry demonstrators are demanding the removal of President Milan Kucan and Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. Jansa's supporters this evening started to collect signatures for a petition demanding that the parliament not dismiss Jansa. Serious threats were voiced at the expense of those who see Slovenia's future without Jansa and disagree with his political guidelines. [passage omitted]

Background of 'Crisis'

LD2803213694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2109 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Text] Ljubljana, March 28 (TANJUG)—Some 10,000 demonstrators rallied outside the Slovenia's parliament building to express support to the Defense Minister Janez Jansa. Police were trying to prevent the demonstrators, from the rightist and nationalist parties, from forcing their way into the building and interrupting the discussion on the proposal of Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to relieve Jansa because of abuses of power and violations of the constitution and of human rights. Jansa's followers were demanding also the state's President Milan Kucan and Prime Minister Drnovsek be relieved.

The immediate cause for removing Jansa from his ministerial post was his involvement in the recent brutal assault of military police on civilian Milan Smolnikar near Ljubljana. The military police at Jansa's orders beat up Smolnikar, accusing him of spying on the Defense Ministry for Slovenian President Milan Kucan. The

removal of Jansa was Monday opposed by Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle, president of the Christian Democrat Party, the third strongest party in the ruling coalition, who proposed to the prime minister to withdraw the demand. After Drnovsek refused to compromise, even if the Christian Democrats left the ruling coalition, Peterle requested a parliamentary debate on confidence the government.

In the biggest crisis in Slovenia since it seceded from the former Yugoslavia, the Army and police were also at odds as a reflection of, as set out in Ljubljana, the intransigent interests of the political currents in the state leadership. Police was prepared for possible resistance from some sections of the Slovene Army which opposed Jansa's removal.

The Slovenian parliament was expected Monday night to come forth with a stand on the prime minister's proposal for Jelko Kacin, former information minister, to become defense minister.

Commentary on Developments

AU2903123394 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 25 Mar 94 p 2

[Ivan Puc editorial commentary: "Prime Minister Without a Magic Formula"]

[Text] After several days of hesitation, Drnovsek decided to make a move he was compelled to by the United List and many of his deputies despite the possibility of tensions that might lead to bipolarization. The replacement of Janez Jansa with Jelko Kacin, former Democratic information minister and, before that, Jansa's deputy in what was then the Secretariat for Peoples' Defense, thus marked the political spring that could quickly turn into a political winter. We can merely guess what tilted the scales against the defense minister. However, it seems that, this time, the prime minister did not find a magic formula with which he could at least partially satisfy the main protagonist of this—as we have subsequently learned—criminal game. Besides Jansa, it also involved Christian Democratic [SKD] Interior Minister Ivan Bizjak, and primarily President Milan Kucan, the likely mastermind of the entire game, who was also instrumental in the downing of Peterle. Let us just recall Kucan's carefully chosen, ominous words about disqualifications and liquidations after the organization that is supposedly backed by Kucan's circle realized that the Defense Ministry had established the presence of its agents, even though it did not identify them yet.

We would be naive to think that Drnovsek decided for the replacement (only) because of the overstepping of their authority by the defense ministry employees and the violation of constitutionally guaranteed human rights. These were precisely the arguments that a part of the former committee for the protection of human rights put to him. The foundation stone for the replacement was laid when the Democrats abandoned their several-months-old pro-Demos policy and, together with some political organizations, finally cut back on the defense funds. By joining the Liberal Democratic Party, they covered their backs in the face of an increasingly unfavorable outcome of the [Maribor] arms' affair, whose main protagonists they were. The interior minister of that time, Igor Bavcar, and the director of VIS [Security-Information Service] Dr. Miha Brejc (as the latest testimonies and the Maribor public prosecutor's indictment suggest) with the cooperation of the president of the state arbitrarily and independently of the Defense Council and the Defense Ministry, which is authorized to issue permits for the transit of arms, brought arms for Hasan Cengic to Maribor airport. And how did the Christian Democrats, who will now be the only "right-wing" party in the government, decide? It is not very likely that the Social Democrats will stay in the government—despite Drnovsek's offer—and accept another ministerial post. This was implied by Jansa's clear warning to Drnovsek immediately after the prime minister's decision was announced to the public. The stance of the Christian Democrats was not decisive enough. Their public statement demonstrated that—despite the demands for an investigation with clear results—they allowed Drnovsek to have a free hand. They only added a warning that—if the investigation shows so—the president of the state should also resign. However, how the investigation will continue without Jansa is quite another matter.

Claes To Support EU Associate Membership

AU2403100894 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes is visiting Slovenia. He has already met with the highest state officials, namely, President Kucan, Prime Minister Drnovsek, and Foreign Minister Peterle. After the talks Willy Claes and Lojze Peterle signed a bilateral agreement on road and air traffic between Belgium and Slovenia. The ministers assessed today's talks at the news conference from which we have a report by Igor Juric:

[Begin recording] [Juric] Willy Claes assessed the talks as successful, which is not surprising because there are no problems between the countries. He emphasized the importance of the signing of today's agreement and spoke in favor of imminent agreement on double taxation and protection of investments, and an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, which would strengthen the contacts between the countries. He spoke most, however, about the relations between Slovenia and the European Union:

[Claes, in English with superimposed translation into Slovene] I believe that the time has come for final negotiations on associate membership between Slovenia and the European Union. At the end of the week I will meet with Jacques Delors and urge him that the negotiating team that has already visited Slovenia faces the council as soon as possible and proposes its views on negotiations.

The final admittance will, of course, depend on the European Parliament and the parliaments of individual member-states of the Union. I believe that Slovenia meets all the criteria and our state will support you wholeheartedly in this.

[Juric] In the continuation he also said he doubted that the next expansion of the European Union would occur before 1996 as the present members must first resolve their internal problems. He concurred with our foreign minister that a gradual approach is needed in the integration with the European Union.

Minister Peterle said that Slovenia has made the biggest steps toward the European Union so far while Belgium was the chairman of the Union. The result of good relations between the countries is also the signing of today's agreement, which is the first between the countries, and will definitely help more intense economic cooperation. [passage omitted] [end recording]

French Official Visits, Promises Support

AU2803154094 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Alain Lamassoure, minister for European Affairs in the French Government, is visiting Slovenia. He was received by Prime Minister Drnovsek and Foreign Minister Peterle, while the esteemed guest also held talks with the members of the Parliamentary Commission for International Relations. Tomaz Gerden reports from a news conference by Lamassoure and Peterle:

[Begin recording] [Gerden] Alain Lamassoure, minister for European Affairs in the French Government, is in Slovenia for the third time. The previous two meetings took place at the party level, when Mr. Lamassoure supported Slovene efforts to gain independence in 1991. With Foreign Minister Peterle and Prime Minister Drnovsek they discussed French-Slovene relations, which are excellent according to Minister Lamassoure. [passage omitted]

The French, that is to say, the Renault automobile factory will continue to invest in Novo Mesto Revoz factory and broaden its economic cooperation with our country. Both delegations discussed the role of Slovenia in the European Union in great detail. Minister Lamassoure assured that France views Slovenia as a Central European country that is no longer a part of the Balkan events. [passage omitted]

Minister Lamassoure said that France will support Slovenia in negotiations on the association agreement. This agreement could be signed as soon as during the French chairmanship of the European Union after the new year. Regarding the lifting of the arms embargo for Slovenia, France continues to be cautious, however, in the foreseeable future it will support Slovene demands in the UN Security Council.

Slovene Foreign Minister said the following about the talks with Minister Lamoassoure:

[Peterle] I am glad that there are no particular open issues on a bilateral level and that relations are developing well. I am, of course, particularly pleased that the emphasis is being placed on economic development. [passage omitted]

The bulk of our discussion concentrated on multilateral affairs, especially the issue of our drawing closer to the European Union, and within this context we also discussed our rapprochement with, that is to say, the formalization of our relations with the WEU. We also discussed the Partnership for Peace and to so-called Balladur Plan, or the stability plan, in which Slovenia is interested along with some other countries. [end recording]

Federal

Libyan Special Envoy Makes Official Visit

Meets With Jovanovic

LD2803152794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1443 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 28 Mar (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic today received 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turyaki, special envoy of the head of state of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah.

In the course of the meeting, which passed in a friendly atmosphere, the two sides discussed latest developments on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the situation in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and perspectives for bilateral Yugoslav-Jamahiriyah cooperation, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced.

Meets With Minister Unkovic

LD2903111994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1037 GMT 29 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Mar (TANJUG)—Dr. Milorad Unkovic, the federal minister for foreign economic relations, today received Dr. 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turyaki, the special envoy of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi.

It has been announced that the cordial and friendly talks confirmed the hitherto good bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Libya. Minister Unkovic stressed his satisfaction at the fact that, even in the conditions of sanctions under which the two countries are living, there is an interest and desire for the best possible level of cooperation.

Trade between the two countries prior to the introduction of sanctions by the international community was exceptionally important to Yugoslavia so that efforts to revitalize cooperation in future are an exceptional pleasure.

Envoy al-Turyaki expressed Libya's readiness to send humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia via the Red Cross. According to him, this is only a small symbol by which Libya wishes to show its goodwill and understanding for its old Yugoslav friends.

Jovanovic: Embargo 'Major Obstacle to Peace'

BR2903112694 Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Mar 94 p 3

[Claire Trean report on interview with FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in Paris; date not given: "Vladislav Jovanovic Considers Embargo on Serbia To Be 'Major Obstacle to Peace'"]

[Text] A Franco-Serbian dialogue was officially restarted at the end of last week with the visit to Paris of Vladislav Jovanovic, the foreign minister of the "new Yugoslavia" (Serbia and Montenegro). At the end of the talks, in particular with French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and the President's General Secretary Hubert Vedrine, Mr. Jovanovic noted that by virtue of a "tacit agreement" they had not mentioned the events of recent weeks (the role played by France in the ultimatum imposed by the West on the Bosnian Serbs) and he expressed his satisfaction with the fact that France wanted to reestablish political contact with "the Yugoslav side."

In fact, since the United States decided to intervene in the search for a solution to the Bosnian conflict, starting with the agreement between the Muslims and the Croats, the French foreign minister has constantly repeated that peace would not come through a bilateral agreement in a three-sided contest and that the Serbs had to be brought into the negotiations.

France recalled the plan it had initiated and which the European Union [EU] had proposed in November which, in particular, suggested a progressive and conditional lifting of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations in exchange for concessions from Serbia. It is on this aspect that Mr. Jovanovic is now insisting, stressing his disappointment that the EU had not "kept those promises" and expressing his hope that it would "again take the initiative" on this point. The trade embargo imposed on Serbia "is an anachronism," he said, and "a major obstacle to peace and its lifting is a condition for arriving at a solution."

Military Logic

However, the Yugoslav foreign minister did not make this a precondition to the Serbs taking part in negotiations on Bosnia to which they are being convened by the Americans. He said: "The sanctions must be lifted completely in parallel with the implementation of a peace plan. If we conclude a peace plan, we must automatically start to remove the sanctions and they must have been lifted completely by the time the Serbian side has met the commitments it signed up to in the peace plan." He added: "If we do this, the Muslims will be stripped of any remaining hopes they have of winning the war and obtaining a unitarian Bosnia thanks to sanctions."

Mr. Jovanovic did not want to "speak on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs" on the Bosnian issue, and said that Belgrade cannot force them to accept something they do not want. When his opinion was asked as to whether some of their leaders, such as General Mladic who commands the Bosnian Serbs, are not opposing any negotiated settlement, he replied that Mladic "is a military man following a military logic," and that, as a result, his comments cannot be considered to be "official" on political issues. He added: "What counts is Radovan Karadzic and his closest advisers."

Mr. Jovanovic does not therefore speak for them. He noted that the Bosnian Serbs had refused to enter the

Muslim-Croat federation signed last week in Washington, but, in his opinion, they remain "open" to any initiative geared toward finding a solution. He added: "The problem is that the Americans are inviting them to join the process without telling them what is being proposed. What they need is more details on the proposal that is being made to them."

Mr. Jovanovic would only (cautiously) discuss one of the points up for negotiation: the distribution of territory between the Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. He reiterated that the Serbs had previously accepted to "offer" 33.3 percent of Bosnia to the Muslims (and 17.5 percent to the Croats) and considered that "it is not impossible" for them to again accept such a partitioning after fresh negotiations. Without any doubt, Mr. Jovanovic will have met with the support on this point of Alain Juppe, who had declared himself in favor of this distribution of territory when the Muslim-Croat negotiations started, which in his opinion not go ahead at the expense of the third party.

Krajina

Where the fate of Krajina is concerned (the region of Croatia controlled by the breakaway Serbs and for which Zagreb wants to reestablish its sovereignty), Mr. Jovanovic was again careful not to reveal Belgrade's strategy: "We do not take sides. The negotiations must take place between Zagreb and Knin (the Serbian stronghold in Krajina)." He moreover stated that the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Serbia "were not related to the Bosnian crisis," although he added that, when asked by the EU, Belgrade had agreed to "make an effort" on the other crises in the former Yugoslavia with a view to the progressive lifting of sanctions.

Belgrade, he said, is ready to "aid in a process of normalization," in particular focusing on restoring communications, on condition that the Croats "do not immediately complicate" the issue by straightaway raising the political issue of the status of Krajina.

Hesitation by France

However, it is this problem that the breakaway Krajina Serbs are raising themselves when they oppose, for example, the reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, provided for in an agreement between the two capitals, claiming they will set up border posts on the section that runs through their region. Mr. Jovanovic stressed that Croatia was only recognized by the United Nations after the decision had been made to send UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] troops into Krajina (the Vance plan), "that is, when Croatia had not established its sovereignty over the region."

Zagreb obviously disputes this version, basing its argument on other UN resolutions that assume that Croatia will retain the same borders it had in the old Yugoslav federation. France appears hesitant about expressing a clear opinion on this issue, which is again becoming essential to finding a solution. As for the United States, its position has been laid down if we are to believe the declarations made on Sunday to representatives of the Krajina Serbs by the U.S. ambassador to Zagreb: "I told them very clearly that the United States and Russia and the whole of the international community consider that the zones under UN protection are part of Croatia and that there is no possibility of a political solution which would make Krajina independent or a part of Serbia."

Army Chief Stresses Military Modernization

LD2803190594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1405 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 28 Mar (TANJUG)—Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army, visited the military high school in Belgrade today. [passage omitted]

Perisic said in a statement: "Despite the economic blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and numerous pressures, society's scientific research and military-industrial complex is doing its utmost to contribute to the maintenance of the necessary level of the Yugoslav Army's combat readiness. In conditions of the existence of objective difficulties and the lack of financial resources, it is thanks to the self-sacrificing involvement of scientific personnel and the consolidation of the military industry that we are succeeding in following contemporary achievements in the world in the field of armaments and military equipment. In keeping with this, the army's existing combat systems—which to the greatest extent are the result of our own research and technological-technical potential, together with the rational use of military resources—are making possible the successful defense of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the FRY.

"In the context of the further modernization of the Yugoslav Army, we are devoting particular attention to the air force and air defense, as well as to increasing the efficiency of artillery and armored facilities. The perfection of missile systems is developing in terms of increasing their range and military effectiveness, as well as in improving their guidance systems. As a result of all this, the Yugoslav Army, inspired by great patriotism, is in a position to confront any potential aggressor and inflict intolerable losses on him."

Serbia

Milosevic Meets With Libyan Special Envoy

LD2803215294 Tripoli Libyan Television Network in Arabic 1930 GMT 28 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Serbian Republic President Slobodan Milosevic has praised the efforts of the brother leader of the revolution [Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi] to find a peaceful solution to the raging conflict in the region of what used to be known as Yugoslavia. From Belgrade, the TV correspondent sent us this report:

[Begin recording by unidentified correspondent] Peace and God's mercy be upon you brothers and sisters in the Great Jamahiriyah. Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian Republic president, praised the efforts exerted by the brother leader of the revolution to find a peaceful solution to the conflict raging in the region of what used to be previously known as Yugoslavia.

The president of the Serbian Republic said this afternoon when he received Dr. 'Ali al-Turayki, envoy of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, on reconciliation between the parties to the conflict in the region, that we highly appreciate the speedy efforts exerted by the Great Jamahiriyah for restoring stability and security to what used to be known as Yugoslavia.

He added that the Serbs did not object to the agreement between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovia, and they did not object either to the creation of a republics for the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He pointed out that outside intervention and greed were responsible for obstructing the achievement of peace between the fighting sides for achieving their goals and greed in the region. The president of the Serbian Republic affirmed his country's stance with the Great Jamahiriyah in confronting the unjust coercive measures imposed by the imperialist countries. The meeting was attended by the secretary of the Libyan Arab people's bureau in Belgrade. The delegation of imams, preachers, mosque speakers, teachers of the Koran, Arabic language teachers, and teachers of Islamic studies this morning met Vladislav Jovanovic, the foreign affairs minister of federal Yugoslavia, which includes Serbia and Montenegro, in Belgrade. The meeting was attended by Dr. 'Ali al-Turayki, envoy of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, and the brother secretary of the Libyan Arab people's bureau in Belgrade. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Kosovo

Rugova Comments on Prospects for Talks

AU2803162394 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 27 Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Report by Shefqet Rexhepi on a news conference given by Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, in Prishtina on 26 March: "The Kosova Question Is Being Presented as a Problem Requiring a Solution"]

[Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, began yesterday's news conference by saying that raids accompanied by destruction and arrests, always on the pretext of a search for weapons, have continued this week in the communes of Mitrovice, Vishtrri [Vucitrn], Ferizaj [Urosevac], Malisheva, Istog, Gjilan, Decan, Kline, Podujeve, Viti, and elsewhere. Serbian repression has concentrated on certain communes, where there have been repeated raids. In Mirofc near Podujeve, the police also fired guns, while soldiers in addition to the police were involved in raids in the commune of Viti. Besides these daily raids, press-ganging into the army continues, and call-up papers are being distributed. In the commune of Gjakove alone, 500 call-up notices have been delivered. Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] activists are subject to continuous repression, and the police also entered the LDK's premises in Kodra e Trimave [Vranjevac].

We Have Our Stands

The harassment of writers and intellectuals also continued last week, as in the case of Shaip Beqiri, who was sentenced to 60 days' imprisonment. Reshat Nurboja, chairman of the Republican Party, was also arrested. The police also entered the premises of the Kosova Information Center in order to exert pressure against this very important institution. Torture beyond all measure is also continuing in prison, such as in Dubrave near Istog and in Mitrovice.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova went on to welcome the statement by Denmark's UN military representative, who said that there can be no successful talks without the Albanians of Kosova and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], or without all the Albanians of the former Yugoslavia. President Rugova also welcomed the visit to Albania of Willy Claes, who, besides bilateral issues, also broached the question of Kosova. The Kosova question is increasingly being put forward as a problem requiring a solution. Willy Claes had earlier said that the 1974 Constitution [of the SFRJ, defining Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia] would no longer satisfy Kosova.

Bujar Bukoshi visited the United States this week. This is an important visit as part of the regular contacts that we have with the United States, President Rugova stressed. Dr. Rugova again requested that Kosova be taken under the protection of the UN Security Council.

President Rugova then replied to journalists' questions. The first question stated that there seem to have been reports during Willy Claes's visit to Albania that the West is ready to start talks to ensure the maximum autonomy for Kosova and asked what this meant? President Rugova said that there had been various proposals, but it is not a question of the West's position. As president of Kosova, I am obliged to act on the decisions of the referendum for an independent and neutral Kosova. We have asked for Kosova to be first put under a protectorate.

The next question was whether Claes had gone to Albania to persuade Sali Berisha to accept an autonomous status for Kosova. Dr. Rugova again said that this was journalistic speculation, while we have our own standpoint. It is a question of well intentioned proposals and not conditions or premises for talks.

We Have Asked for a U.S. Initiative on Kosova

Replying to whether Serbian-Albanian talks are expected to begin and whether a starting point for such talks exists, President Rugova emphasized that this is journalistic talk. There are no starting points for talks: The starting points are the two sides. The rules of discussion demand that they should take place without starting points and conditions. We are sufficiently strong in our position to start talks with the Serbian side without conditions. Asked to comment on the Croat-Serb talks, he said that we welcome these talks, if they can reach an understanding. Meanwhile, asked to connent on the stand of the Yugoslav Government on stationing CSCE observers in Kosova, Dr. Rugova said that we have no particular comment. It is a matter of stubbornly defending positions that in fact do themselves harm.

Asked whether a special U.S. representative, such as Redman, will be appointed for Kosova, Dr. Rugova emphasized that we had asked for a U.S. initiative on Kosova. Redman is a representative for the entire territory of former Yugoslavia. It remains to be seen whether or not a special representative for Kosova will be appointed.

Another question was whether Rugova had informed the UN High Commission for Refugees about the expulsion of refugees from Germany and the question of Albanians under siege in Sarajevo. In this connection, Rugova stressed that we have informed the Commission's office in Prishtina, and it will no doubt do something. Asked about the secret meeting of the interior ministers of several Western countries about refugees and the demand to open the Macedonian-[The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Kosova border, Dr. Rugova said that it is a question of greater, freer, and more normal traffic across this border. We have asked for the refugees to be returned via Prishtina airport, an idea that is being considered.

The measures being taken by the German authorities are not directed against the Albanians or anybody else, but at reducing the number of refugees in the country, which is much greater that in many other countries of the world. The German authorities will decide after examining the application of every refugee. The idea of using Skopje airport arose because it is the shortest route. Asked how many refugees will be returned, Rugova said that it is a matter of several thousand.

Serbian Police Confiscate Reporters' Notes

AU2403185294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] At about 1500 today, Serbian police intervened in the Kosova Information Center [QIK] offices in Prishtina. The offices are situated in the Qafa complex of business buildings in Prishtina. Today, they were held under the continuous supervision of the Serbian police.

Serbian civilians, who first entered the QIK offices, played the role of uninformed citizens. Then, at about 1500, two plainclothes policemen entered the offices and took personal notes from three QIK reporters.

At 1510, four policemen entered the offices. Two of the policemen were holding automatic weapons. They ordered the reporters to stop work. Meanwhile, the Serbian policemen confiscated personal notes from seven QIK reporters.

The QIK reports that the Serbian police showed interest in the work performed at the office and left, taking the notes with them.